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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

736 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM-Driven Motion Adversarial Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Evaluated models: Mdm, Mld

Multi-Agent T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image (T2I) models using a multi-agent framework ("Atlas") powered by Large Language Models (LLMs). Atlas iteratively generates and refines prompts, leveraging a Vision-Language Model (VLM) to assess filter activation and an LLM to select effective prompts that maintain semantic similarity to the original, malicious prompt while evading the filter. This enables the generation of images containing unsafe content.

Jailbreaking text-to-image models with llm-based agents
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, LLaVA 1.5 13B, Sharegpt4v-13B+4 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • LLaVA 1.5 13B
  • Sharegpt4v-13B
  • Stable Diffusion 3 Medium
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion Xl Refiner
  • Vicuna-1.5-13B

Function-Call Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing function calling are vulnerable to a "jailbreak function" attack. Maliciously crafted function definitions and prompts can coerce the LLM into generating harmful content within the function's arguments, bypassing existing safety filters designed for chat modes. This exploits discrepancies in safety alignment between function argument generation and chat response generation.

The dark side of function calling: Pathways to jailbreaking large language models
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Sonnet, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro+3 more
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Mistral-8x7B

Analyzing-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an "Analyzing-based Jailbreak" (ABJ) attack that exploits their analytical and reasoning capabilities. ABJ crafts prompts that instruct the LLM to analyze seemingly innocuous data (e.g., character traits, features, job descriptions) related to a malicious intent, leading the LLM to generate harmful content despite its safety training. This bypasses standard safety mechanisms designed to prevent direct requests for harmful information.

Figure it Out: Analyzing-based Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude-3-haiku-0307, GLM 4 9B Chat, GPT-3.5 Turbo+3 more
  • Claude-3-haiku-0307
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4-turbo-0409
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Qwen-2-7B-chat

AutoJailbreak of GPT-4V

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in GPT-4V's facial recognition safety mechanisms allows for automated jailbreaking attacks using Large Language Models (LLMs) to bypass safety features and elicit unintended facial identification responses. The attack, termed "AutoJailbreak," optimizes prompts through iterative refinement with an LLM "red-teaming" model, significantly increasing the attack success rate. This vulnerability exploits weaknesses in GPT-4V's prompt processing and safety alignment, allowing malicious…

Can Large Language Models Automatically Jailbreak GPT-4V?
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4V

Hidden-Intent LLM Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that employ conversation strategies to elicit harmful information through seemingly benign dialogues. The attack, termed "Imposter.AI," leverages three key strategies: (1) decomposing malicious questions into innocuous sub-questions; (2) rephrasing overtly malicious questions into benign-sounding alternatives; and (3) enhancing the harmfulness of responses by prompting the LLM for illustrative examples. This allows attackers to…

Imposter. ai: Adversarial attacks with hidden intentions towards aligned large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 13B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B
  • WizardLM 13B

LLM Version Fingerprinting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) integrated into applications reveal unique behavioral fingerprints through responses to crafted queries. LLMmap exploits this by sending carefully constructed prompts and analyzing the responses to identify the specific LLM version with high accuracy (over 95% in testing against 42 LLMs). This allows attackers to tailor attacks exploiting known vulnerabilities specific to the identified LLM version.

Llmmap: Fingerprinting for large language models
Evaluated models: Aya-23-8B, Cohere-35B, GPT-4+9 more
  • Aya-23-8B
  • Cohere-35B
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • OpenChat 3.5
  • Phi-3-medium-28k-instruct
  • Phi 3 Medium 4k Instruct
  • Smaug-llama-3-70B-instruct
  • Solar-10.7B-instruct-v1.0

LLM Memory Poisoning Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents allows attackers to inject malicious demonstrations into the agent's memory or knowledge base. By crafting a carefully optimized trigger, an attacker can manipulate the agent's retrieval mechanism to preferentially retrieve these poisoned demonstrations, causing the agent to produce adversarial outputs or take malicious actions even when seemingly benign prompts are used. The attack, termed…

Agentpoison: Red-teaming llm agents via poisoning memory or knowledge bases
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • text-embedding-ada-002

Embodied LLM Misaligned Actions

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to manipulation via voice-based interactions, leading to the execution of harmful physical actions. Attacks exploit three vulnerabilities: (1) cascading LLM jailbreaks resulting in malicious robotic commands; (2) misalignment between linguistic outputs (verbal refusal) and physical actions (command execution); and (3) conceptual deception, where seemingly benign instructions lead to harmful outcomes due to incomplete world knowledge within…

BadRobot: Manipulating Embodied LLMs in the Physical World
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo+2 more
  • BERT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B

Low-Perplexity LLM Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that utilize low-perplexity prompts to elicit unsafe content. These prompts, while statistically likely to occur in normal conversation, can trigger the generation of harmful or toxic outputs that evade standard safety filters. The vulnerability stems from the model's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and malicious intents within the statistical distribution of natural language.

ASTPrompter: Weakly Supervised Automated Language Model Red-Teaming to Identify Low-Perplexity Toxic Prompts
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 7B+1 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 7B
  • TinyLlama 1.1

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.