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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

GPT-4v System Prompt Leakage

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A system prompt leakage vulnerability in GPT-4V allows extraction of internal system prompts through carefully crafted, incomplete conversations combined with image input. Extracted prompts can be used as highly effective jailbreak prompts, bypassing safety restrictions and leading to undesirable outputs, including revealing personally identifiable information from images.

Jailbreaking gpt-4v via self-adversarial attacks with system prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4V, LLaVA 1.5

Nested Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety mechanisms through carefully crafted "jailbreak" prompts. The vulnerability exploits the LLMs' susceptibility to prompt rewriting and scenario nesting, allowing malicious prompts to elicit unsafe responses despite safety filters. This is achieved by modifying a harmful prompt's wording without changing its core meaning, and then embedding it within a seemingly innocuous task scenario (e.g., code…

A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Generalized Nested Jailbreak Prompts can Fool Large Language Models Easily
Evaluated models: Claude-instant-v1, Claude-v2, GPT-2+4 more
  • Claude-instant-v1
  • Claude-v2
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat

Typographic VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks via typographically rendered visual prompts. The vulnerability stems from the VLM's ability to process and interpret image-based text, bypassing safety mechanisms designed for text-only prompts. Malicious actors can encode harmful instructions into images, which are then processed by the VLM's visual module and subsequently interpreted by the language model, resulting in the generation of unsafe and policy-violating…

Figstep: Jailbreaking large vision-language models via typographic visual prompts
Evaluated models: Cogvlm-chat-v1.1, GPT-4V, Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B+4 more
  • Cogvlm-chat-v1.1
  • GPT-4V
  • Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B
  • Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-7B
  • Minigpt4-llama-2-chat-7B
  • MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
  • Minigpt4-vicuna-7B

Nested-Scene LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel "DeepInception" attack that leverages the models' personification capabilities to bypass safety guardrails. The attack uses nested prompts to create a multi-layered fictional scenario, effectively hypnotizing the LLM into generating harmful content by exploiting its tendency towards obedience within the constructed narrative. This allows for continuous jailbreaks in subsequent interactions.

Deepinception: Hypnotize large language model to be jailbreaker
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4V

Persona-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to persona modulation attacks, a black-box jailbreak technique that leverages an LLM assistant to generate prompts causing the target LLM to adopt harmful personas and produce unsafe outputs. This vulnerability circumvents built-in safety mechanisms, enabling the generation of responses related to illegal activities (e.g., synthesizing drugs, building bombs, money laundering), hate speech, and other harmful content. The attack's effectiveness is…

Scalable and transferable black-box jailbreaks for language models via persona modulation
Evaluated models: Claude 2, GPT-4

Linguistic LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a targeted linguistic fuzzing attack that exploits the complexity of human language to bypass safety guardrails. The attack, termed "Jade," leverages transformational-generative grammar rules to systematically increase the syntactic complexity of benign seed questions, making them increasingly difficult for LLMs to recognize as malicious. This leads to the generation of unsafe content, even when the underlying semantics remain unchanged.

Jade: A linguistics-based safety evaluation platform for llm
Evaluated models: ChatGLM2 6B, GPT-2, GPT-3+2 more
  • ChatGLM2 6B
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • PaLM 2

Self-Fooling LLM Prompt Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A prompt-based adversarial attack, termed PromptAttack, can cause Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate incorrect outputs by manipulating the input prompt. PromptAttack crafts prompts that include the original input, an attack objective (to generate semantically similar but misclassified output), and attack guidance with instructions for character, word, or sentence-level perturbations. This allows an attacker to manipulate an LLM's response without direct access to its internal parameters…

An LLM can Fool Itself: A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo

LLM Red Teaming Framework

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to craft malicious prompts that induce the LLM to generate harmful content, such as fraudulent material, racist remarks, or instructions for illegal activities. The vulnerability arises from the LLM's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and malicious instructions disguised within seemingly innocuous prompts. Attackers can exploit this by leveraging techniques like obfuscation, code injection/payload splitting, and…

Attack prompt generation for red teaming and defending large language models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Hidden Prompt Injection Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Compositional Instruction Attacks (CIA), where malicious prompts are embedded within seemingly harmless instructions. This allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses from the model, even if the individual components of the prompt would be flagged as safe. The attack exploits the model's inability to correctly identify underlying malicious intent within composite instructions.

Prompt packer: Deceiving llms through compositional instruction with hidden attacks
Evaluated models: ChatGLM2 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Automated LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to prompt-based jailbreaks, allowing adversaries to bypass safety guardrails and elicit undesirable outputs. The Prompt Automatic Iterative Refinement (PAIR) algorithm efficiently generates these jailbreaks using a limited number of black-box queries to the target LLM. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to robustly handle adversarial prompts crafted through iterative refinement, even without white-box access to its internal mechanisms.

Jailbreaking black box large language models in twenty queries
Evaluated models: Claude Instant 1.2, Claude 2.1, Gemini Pro+6 more
  • Claude Instant 1.2
  • Claude 2.1
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo-1106
  • GPT-4-0125-preview
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama Guard
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.