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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

114 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Adversarial LLM Internal Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing internal security mechanisms based on linearly separable embeddings in intermediate layers are vulnerable to a generative adversarial attack. The CAVGAN framework exploits this vulnerability by generating adversarial perturbations that misclassify malicious inputs as benign, allowing the attacker to bypass the LLM's safety filters and elicit harmful outputs.

CAVGAN: Unifying Jailbreak and Defense of LLMs via Generative Adversarial Attacks on their Internal Representations
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 8B, Qwen 2.5 14B+2 more
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Airborne Audio LLM Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio-based Large Language Models (ALLMs), specifically Qwen2-Audio, are vulnerable to over-the-air adversarial audio attacks. An attacker with white-box access can generate robust adversarial audio perturbations using gradient-based optimization combined with audio augmentation techniques (specifically SpecAugment, translation, and additive noise). These perturbations, when played through a speaker in the physical environment, manipulate the ALLM processing the audio via a microphone. This…

Attacker's Noise Can Manipulate Your Audio-based LLM in the Real World
Evaluated models: Not reported

Staged LLM Pipeline Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) protected by multi-stage safeguard pipelines (input and output classifiers) are vulnerable to staged adversarial attacks (STACK). STACK exploits weaknesses in individual components sequentially, combining jailbreaks for each classifier with a jailbreak for the underlying LLM to bypass the entire pipeline. Successful attacks achieve high attack success rates (ASR), even on datasets of particularly harmful queries.

STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 9B, GPT-4 Turbo+4 more
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 14B

LLM Judge Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Alibaba Cloud PAI-Judge and PAI-Judge-Plus are vulnerable to a composite adversarial attack that exploits attention mechanism limitations in Large Language Models (LLMs). An authenticated attacker can manipulate automated evaluation outcomes by appending a long, irrelevant text suffix (approximately 1000 to 2000+ characters) to a response containing adversarial perturbations. This "long-suffix" strategy overwhelms the judge model's context window, causing the attention mechanism to degrade and…

LLMs Cannot Reliably Judge (Yet?): A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

JailFlip Implicit Harm

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) (including GPT-4, Claude 3, Gemini, and Qwen families) leading to "Implicit Harm." Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use overtly harmful queries, this vulnerability allows remote attackers to coerce the model into providing factually incorrect, plausible, and dangerous responses to benign-looking inputs. By employing "JailFlip" techniques—specifically constructed affirmative-type or denial-type queries…

Beyond Jailbreaks: Revealing Stealthier and Broader LLM Security Risks Stemming from Alignment Failures
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, GPT-4o+3 more
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Qwen Plus
  • Qwen Turbo

Twin Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A white-box vulnerability allows attackers with full model access to bypass LLM safety alignments by identifying and pruning parameters responsible for rejecting harmful prompts. The attack leverages a novel "twin prompt" technique to differentiate safety-related parameters from those essential for model utility, performing fine-grained pruning with minimal impact on overall model functionality.

TwinBreak: Jailbreaking LLM Security Alignments based on Twin Prompts
Evaluated models: DeepSeek 7B, Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B+13 more
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Gemma 3 1B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

VLM Navigation Object Fusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Vision-Language Model (VLM) perception module in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents is vulnerable to adversarial 3D object injection via the Adversarial Object Fusion (AdvOF) framework. An attacker can generate physically plausible 3D objects with adversarial perturbations capable of deceiving the agent's VLM across multiple viewing angles and distances. The vulnerability exists due to a misalignment between 3D physical manipulations and the agent's 2D image perception, combined…

Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion
Evaluated models: Not reported

Distilled Jailbreak Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows adversarial prompt distillation from a large language model (LLM) to a smaller language model (SLM), enabling efficient and stealthy jailbreak attacks. The attack leverages knowledge distillation techniques, reinforcement learning, and dynamic temperature control to transfer the LLM's ability to bypass safety mechanisms to a smaller, more easily deployable SLM. This allows for lower computational cost attacks with a potentially high…

Efficient and Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks via Adversarial Prompt Distillation from LLMs to SLMs
Evaluated models: BERT Base, Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B+8 more
  • BERT Base
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Nonsensical CoT Reasoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting are vulnerable to input perturbations that decouple intermediate reasoning from the final answer. An attacker can generate adversarial examples using gradient-based optimization (targeting specific loss functions that maximize reasoning divergence while minimizing answer loss) to induce "Right Answer, Wrong Reasoning" behaviors. This vulnerability manifests through two primary attack vectors: 1. Token-level perturbations…

Robust Answers, Fragile Logic: Probing the Decoupling Hypothesis in LLM Reasoning
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Zephyr 7B Beta+4 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Zephyr 7B Beta
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo

SAE Interpretability Illusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), utilized for interpreting the internal residual stream activations of Large Language Models (LLMs) into human-understandable concepts, are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. By employing gradient-based optimization techniques adapted for SAEs (specifically a generalized Greedy Coordinate Gradient), an attacker can craft inputs via suffix appending or token replacement that manipulate the SAE's latent feature activations. This vulnerability allows for the…

Interpretability Illusions with Sparse Autoencoders: Evaluating Robustness of Concept Representations
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Gemma 2 9B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.