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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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81 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Adversarial VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically the LLaVA-1.5 and LLaVA-1.6 series, are vulnerable to optimization-based white-box jailbreak attacks despite standard safety alignment measures like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Attackers can craft adversarial perturbations in the image space (imperceptible noise) or latent space using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to manipulate the model's internal representations. These perturbations maximize the…

Adversary-Aware DPO: Enhancing Safety Alignment in Vision Language Models via Adversarial Training
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B

CRI Jailbreak Initialization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

CRI (Compliance Refusal Initialization) initializes jailbreak attacks by leveraging pre-trained jailbreak prompts, effectively guiding the optimization process towards the compliance subspace of harmful prompts. This significantly enhances the success rate and reduces the computational overhead of attacks, often requiring only a single optimization step to bypass safety mechanisms. Attacks utilizing CRI demonstrate significantly improved ASR (Adversarial Success Rate) and reduced median steps…

Jailbreak Attack Initializations as Extractors of Compliance Directions
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct+5 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Phi-4
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3

Sophisticated Reasoning Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically instruction-following models using standard refusal training and adversarial training (such as Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and Mistral-7B-V0.2), contain a vulnerability related to safety alignment bypass. The vulnerability arises from the models' inability to generalize safety reasoning to Out-Of-Distribution (OOD) inputs and scenarios involving competing objectives. Attackers can exploit this by employing linguistic manipulation (slang, uncommon dialects…

Enhancing Model Defense Against Jailbreaks with Proactive Safety Reasoning
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2

Universal Magic Word Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in text embedding models used as safeguards for Large Language Models (LLMs). Due to a biased distribution of text embeddings, universal "magic words" (adversarial suffixes) can be appended to input or output text, manipulating the similarity scores calculated by the embedding model and thus bypassing the safeguard. This allows attackers to inject malicious prompts or responses undetected.

Jailbreaking LLMs' Safeguard with Universal Magic Words for Text Embedding Models
Evaluated models: E5 Base v2, Jina Embeddings v2, Nomic Embed+2 more
  • E5 Base v2
  • Jina Embeddings v2
  • Nomic Embed
  • Qwen 2.5 0.5B
  • Sentence-T5 Base

Guardrail Bypass Harmful Fine-tuning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Virus attack method enables attackers to bypass guardrail moderation on fine-tuning data, leading to a significant degradation of safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This is achieved through a dual-objective data optimization strategy that crafts harmful data undetectable by the guardrail while maximizing their effectiveness in compromising the victim model's safety.

Virus: Harmful Fine-tuning Attack for Large Language Models Bypassing Guardrail Moderation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama Guard 2

Confounder Gadgets Reroute LLMs

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) routing systems (control planes) that allows for the manipulation of inference flow via adversarial input sequences. LLM routers, which dynamically direct user queries to either "weak" (cheaper) or "strong" (expensive) models based on predicted query complexity, can be bypassed by appending specific, pre-optimized token sequences known as "confounder gadgets." These gadgets artificially inflate the router's complexity score for an input…

Rerouting llm routers
Evaluated models: Not reported

Evolutionary LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) by using an evolutionary algorithm to generate effective jailbreak prompts. The algorithm leverages the LLM's capabilities to iteratively refine prompts, increasing the likelihood of eliciting harmful responses to otherwise disallowed queries.

LLM-Virus: Evolutionary Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Claude 3.5 Haiku, GPT-3.5 Turbo+5 more
  • Claude 2
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B

Obfuscated Activations Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks that generate obfuscated activations, bypassing latent-space defenses such as sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent out-of-distribution (OOD) detection. Attackers can manipulate model inputs or training data to produce outputs exhibiting malicious behavior while remaining undetected by these defenses. This occurs because the models can represent harmful behavior through diverse activation patterns, allowing attackers to…

Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent-Space Defenses
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B, Llama 3 8B Instruct

Visual Jailbreak via Multi-Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using carefully crafted adversarial images. Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms by generating images semantically aligned with harmful prompts, exploiting the fact that minimal cross-entropy loss during adversarial image optimization does not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. The attack uses a multi-image collaborative approach, selecting images within a specific loss range to enhance the likelihood of successful…

Exploring Visual Vulnerabilities via Multi-Loss Adversarial Search for Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 2, MiniGPT-4

Zeroth-Order MLLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses using a memory-efficient zeroth-order optimization technique. The attack, termed Zer0-Jack, leverages simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) with patch coordinate descent to generate malicious image inputs, even without access to the model's internal parameters (black-box setting).

Zer0-Jack: A Memory-efficient Gradient-based Jailbreaking Method for Black-box Multi-modal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Inf-mllm1, LLaVA 1.5+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Inf-mllm1
  • LLaVA 1.5
  • MiniGPT-4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.