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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

104 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Gamified Goal Pursuit Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A "Gamified Adversarial Multimodal Breakout via Instructional Traps" (GAMBIT) vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), specifically those employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. The vulnerability exploits the finite cognitive resource budget of the model by inducing "cognitive overload" through a high-stakes, gamified context. The attack functions by decomposing a harmful query into a visual puzzle (e.g., a shuffled grid of image…

GAMBIT: A Gamified Jailbreak Framework for Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Grok 2 Vision, GLM-4.1V Thinking+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Grok 2 Vision
  • GLM-4.1V Thinking
  • QVQ-Max
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • o4-mini

Black-Box Vision-Language Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), specifically InstructBLIP, LLaVA, and MiniGPT-4, are susceptible to a black-box adversarial jailbreak vulnerability via Zeroth-Order Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (ZO-SPSA). An attacker can generate adversarial images with imperceptible perturbations that, when paired with harmful text prompts, bypass the model's safety alignment mechanisms (such as RLHF). Unlike traditional white-box attacks, this method does not require access to…

Crafting Adversarial Inputs for Large Vision-Language Models Using Black-Box Optimization
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B, InstructBLIP, Vicuna 13B

Single Word Video Corruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text-to-Video (T2V) diffusion models are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt attacks that degrade output quality regarding semantic fidelity and temporal dynamics. This vulnerability is exploited via the T2VAttack framework, which utilizes two primary vector strategies: T2VAttack-S (Substitution) and T2VAttack-I (Insertion). T2VAttack-S leverages a greedy search to identify key semantic tokens and replaces them with high-similarity synonyms defined in lexical databases (e.g., WordNet)…

T2VAttack: Adversarial Attack on Text-to-Video Diffusion Models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Dual Stego MLLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) integrated systems are vulnerable to a "Dual Steganography" jailbreak paradigm (referred to as Odysseus). The vulnerability arises from the reliance of safety filters on the assumption that malicious content must be explicitly visible in the input or output modalities (text or image). Attackers can bypass these filters by encoding malicious queries into binary matrices and embedding them into benign-looking images using steganographic encoders…

Odysseus: Jailbreaking Commercial Multimodal LLM-integrated Systems via Dual Steganography
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Grok 3

Embodied Cross-Modal Misalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Indirect Environmental Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents utilizing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and planning are vulnerable to Indirect Environmental Jailbreak (IEJ). The vulnerability arises from the system's failure to distinguish between user-issued instructions and text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., writing on walls, sticky notes, or projections). The VLM processes visual text detected in the camera feed as authoritative context or direct commands, allowing a black-box…

The Shawshank Redemption of Embodied AI: Understanding and Benchmarking Indirect Environmental Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL Plus, Gemini 2.0 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen3-VL Plus
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GLM 4.5
  • DeepSeek-VL2
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

ITS Typography Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that combines image typography manipulation with multi-turn prompting. The vulnerability exploits the model's visual encoder and instruction-following capabilities by embedding a harmful textual query directly into a benign image as a visible caption (using specific fonts and blending techniques). An attacker then engages the model in a three-turn conversation: first asking a benign question about the visual object…

Jailbreaking Large Vision Language Models in Intelligent Transportation Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2 7B, LLaVA 7B

Weak-OOD Jailbreak Boost

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack vector termed "weak-OOD" (weak Out-of-Distribution), specifically instantiated via the JOCR (Jailbreak via OCR-Aware Embedded Text Perturbation) method. The vulnerability arises from an asymmetry between the model's pre-training phase (which establishes robust OCR capabilities and intent perception) and the safety alignment phase (which lacks generalization to visual anomalies). Attackers can embed malicious text instructions…

Why does weak-OOD help? A Further Step Towards Understanding Jailbreaking VLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL2.5 8B

Multi-Agent Multimodal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The JPRO (Automated Multimodal Jailbreaking via Multi-Agent Collaboration) framework exploits a vulnerability in Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) related to insufficient cross-modal safety alignment and lack of maliciousness sustainability in multi-turn dialogues. The attack leverages a multi-agent system (Planner, Attacker, Modifier, Verifier) to automate the generation of adversarial image-text pairs. By employing hybrid tactics—such as combining role-playing with malicious content…

JPRO: Automated Multimodal Jailbreaking via Multi-Agent Collaboration Framework
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL2.5 8B

Latent Space Discontinuity Exploitation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.