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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

139 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Confident Misinformation Hallucination

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to induce factually incorrect outputs by injecting misinformation into prompts framed with strong confidence. By using authoritative phrasing (e.g., "As we know..."), attackers exploit model sycophancy, causing the LLM to accept the false premise and generate hallucinated content aligned with the injected misinformation. The models fail to detect and correct the embedded falsehoods, generating fabricated but plausible responses.

AdversaRiskQA: An Adversarial Factuality Benchmark for High-Risk Domains
Evaluated models: GPT-oss 20B, GPT-oss 120B, GPT-5+3 more
  • GPT-oss 20B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • GPT-5
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 Next 80B-A3B Instruct

LLM Judge Framing Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

When Wording Steers the Evaluation: Framing Bias in LLM judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct+11 more
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • o4-mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-5

Metacognitive Prompting Lowers Resistance

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Vulnerability of LLMs' Belief Systems? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3.3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Physical Navigation Prompt Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based navigation agents, including NavGPT and prompt-tuned outdoor agents, are vulnerable to adaptive prompt injection attacks. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to hijack the physical movement of the agent by embedding optimized malicious instructions into benign natural language inputs. The issue arises because the agents parse user instructions to generate executable plans without sufficient separation between control logic and untrusted input. The PINA (Prompt Injection Attack…

PINA: Prompt Injection Attack against Navigation Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B

Invisible Headline Trading Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper input validation in Large Language Model (LLM) integrated Algorithmic Trading Systems (ATS) allows remote attackers to manipulate trading decisions via crafted "adversarial news" headlines. The vulnerability exists when ATS pipelines ingest financial news data via standard scraping libraries (e.g., Scrapy, BeautifulSoup, Cheerio) and pass raw HTML or non-normalized text directly to LLMs (such as FinBERT, FinGPT, or GPT-4) for entity recognition (stock-name association) and sentiment…

Adversarial News and Lost Profits: Manipulating Headlines in LLM-Driven Algorithmic Trading
Evaluated models: FinBERT, FinGPT, FinLLaMA+7 more
  • FinBERT
  • FinGPT
  • FinLLaMA
  • o3
  • o3 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o Mini High
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

Misleading Option Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed using Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) interfaces or choice-based selection structures are vulnerable to Option Injection. By appending a task-irrelevant candidate choice (e.g., Option E) containing a steering directive—specifically utilizing threat framing (penalty coercion) or bonus framing (reward inducement)—an attacker can hijack the model's decision-making process. The vulnerability stems from a flaw in attention allocation: the model's…

OI-Bench: An Option Injection Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Susceptibility to Directive Interference
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5 Mini, Claude Haiku 4.5+9 more
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Llama 4 Scout
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3.2
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Grok 4.1

VLM In-the-Loop Adversary

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The VILTA (VLM-in-the-Loop Trajectory Adversary) framework is vulnerable to Prompt Injection and Data Poisoning via un-sanitized scene representation inputs. The system integrates a Vision-Language Model (Gemini-2.5-Flash) into a closed-loop reinforcement learning environment, feeding it Bird’s-Eye-View (BEV) imagery alongside text-based vehicle dynamics data (e.g., position, speed, and risk_category) to generate challenging driving trajectories. An attacker who can manipulate the input…

VILTA: A VLM-in-the-Loop Adversary for Enhancing Driving Policy Robustness
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash

Stealthy Tool Chain Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A stealthy resource exhaustion (Economic Denial-of-Service) vulnerability exists in the multi-turn tool-calling layer of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, particularly those utilizing the Model Context Protocol (MCP). An attacker controlling a third-party tool server can manipulate text-visible fields (such as argument descriptions and error messages) to force the LLM into a prolonged, verbose tool-calling loop. By demanding lengthy, non-semantic outputs (e.g., long comma-separated lists) and…

Beyond Max Tokens: Stealthy Resource Amplification via Tool Calling Chains in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B, GLM 4.5 Air, GPT-4o+4 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • GLM 4.5 Air
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Seed 32B

LLM False Refusal Bias

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a False Refusal vulnerability during legitimate hate speech detoxification tasks (text style transfer). Safety alignment mechanisms fail to contextually distinguish between a benign instruction to "detoxify" or "rewrite" harmful content and the generation of harmful content itself. This results in a denial of service where the model refuses to process the input. This vulnerability is not uniformly distributed; it is statistically biased to…

Analyzing Bias in False Refusal Behavior of Large Language Models for Hate Speech Detoxification
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Mixtral 8x7B

Plaintext Output Overflow

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) contain a resource consumption vulnerability termed "Overflow," wherein specific non-adversarial, plain-text prompts trigger excessive text generation that saturates the model's output token budget. This vulnerability exploits the model's alignment towards helpfulness and exhaustiveness, alongside tokenizer inefficiencies (e.g., zero-width characters), to force the generation of maximum-length responses (often exceeding 5,000 tokens) from short inputs. This differs…

BenchOverflow: Measuring Overflow in Large Language Models via Plain-Text Prompts
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.2 3B Instruct+5 more
  • GPT-5
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen 3 4B Instruct 2507
  • Qwen 3 8B Instruct
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • Gemma 3 4B IT

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.