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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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97 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) operating in hybrid Web-OS environments are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Attackers can embed malicious natural language or code instructions within legitimate web content (e.g., social media forums, chat applications, shared cloud documents) that the agent processes during benign task execution. Due to the agent's inability to distinguish between trusted user instructions and untrusted environmental data, the CUA…

RedTeamCUA: Realistic Adversarial Testing of Computer-Use Agents in Hybrid Web-OS Environments
Affects: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are vulnerable to intellectual property (IP) leakage attacks. An attacker with black-box access (only interacting via the public API) can craft adversarial queries that propagate through the MAS, extracting sensitive information such as system prompts, task instructions, tool specifications, number of agents, and system topology.

IP Leakage Attacks Targeting LLM-Based Multi-Agent Systems
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 70B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/9/2025

Mobile LLM agents utilizing vision-based screen perception (OCR or Multimodal Large Language Models) are vulnerable to Visual Prompt Injection via malicious GUI overlays. An attacker holding the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission can deploy non-focusable floating windows (using FLAG_NOT_FOCUSABLE) containing adversarial text or fabricated UI elements over legitimate applications. Because the agent captures the entire screen buffer to interpret the device state, it ingests the adversarial overlay…

From Assistants to Adversaries: Exploring the Security Risks of Mobile LLM Agents
Affects: GPT-4o

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/30/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating in stateful environments (web browsers, operating systems, and tool-use contexts) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and multi-modal adversarial attacks. These vulnerabilities arise when agents process untrusted environmental observations—such as web accessibility trees, screen screenshots, or database query results—that contain concealed malicious instructions. Specifically, attackers can embed prompt injections into HTML accessibility…

DoomArena: A Framework for Testing AI Agents Against Evolving Security Threats
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +2 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety mechanisms based on supervised fine-tuning and preference alignment exhibit a vulnerability to "steering" attacks. Maliciously crafted prompts or input manipulations can exploit representation vectors within the model to either bypass censorship ("refusal-compliance vector") or suppress the model's reasoning process ("thought suppression vector"), resulting in the generation of unintended or harmful outputs. This vulnerability is demonstrated…

Steering the CensorShip: Uncovering Representation Vectors for LLM" Thought" Control
Affects: DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 32B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B +8 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/30/2025

A Universal Zero-shot Embedding Inversion vulnerability exists in vector databases and embedding-based retrieval systems. The flaw allows an attacker to reconstruct original plaintext documents from their vector embeddings without requiring access to the original training data or training an embedding-specific inversion model. The attack, identified as "ZSinvert," leverages a multi-stage adversarial decoding process: (1) a cosine-similarity guided beam search using a Large Language Model (LLM)…

Universal Zero-shot Embedding Inversion
Affects: Qwen 2 5B

Source: arXiv

Multi-agent systems (MAS) utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) orchestration are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking via indirect prompt injection, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability arises when a sub-agent (e.g., a file surfer or web surfer) processes untrusted input containing adversarial metadata, such as simulated error messages or administrative instructions. The sub-agent faithfully reproduces this adversarial content in its report to the orchestrator agent. The…

Multi-agent systems execute arbitrary malicious code
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro +1 more

Source: arXiv

Fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) on the CyberLLMInstruct dataset results in a critical degradation of safety alignment and refusal mechanisms. While the dataset comprises "pseudo-malicious" content (educational descriptions of malware, phishing, and exploits without executable payloads), the Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) process on this corpus causes the models to generalize this instruction-following behavior to actual malicious requests. This effectively bypasses safety guardrails…

CyberLLMInstruct: A new dataset for analysing safety of fine-tuned LLMs using cyber security data
Affects: Llama 2 70B, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems employing standard dense embedding models (e.g., Sentence-T5, SimCSE-BERT, RoBERTa, MPNet) for End-Cloud collaboration are vulnerable to Embedding Inversion Attacks (EIA). While embeddings are vector representations designed to be human-unrecognizable, they retain sufficient semantic information to allow an attacker with access to the vectors (e.g., a malicious or compromised cloud provider) to reconstruct the original sensitive plaintext input.

Safeguarding LLM Embeddings in End-Cloud Collaboration via Entropy-Driven Perturbation

Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) safety judges exhibit vulnerability to adversarial attacks and stylistic prompt modifications, leading to increased false negative rates (FNR) and decreased accuracy in classifying harmful model outputs. Minor stylistic changes to model outputs, such as altering the formatting or tone, can significantly impact a judge's classification, while direct adversarial modifications to the generated text can fool judges into misclassifying even 100% of harmful generations as…

Know Thy Judge: On the Robustness Meta-Evaluation of LLM Safety Judges
Affects: Atla Selene Mini 8B, Llama 2 13B, Llama 3.1 8B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.