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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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139 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) and autonomous agent frameworks, termed "Emoticon Semantic Confusion," allows for the generation and execution of unintended, potentially destructive code. Because ASCII-based emoticons (e.g., ~, *, !(^^)!) heavily overlap with the symbol space of programming operators, shell wildcards, and file paths, LLMs frequently misinterpret these affective, non-verbal cues as executable directives. When processing user instructions in code-generation or…

False Friends in the Shell: Unveiling the Emoticon Semantic Confusion in Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-4.1 Mini +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a False Refusal vulnerability during legitimate hate speech detoxification tasks (text style transfer). Safety alignment mechanisms fail to contextually distinguish between a benign instruction to "detoxify" or "rewrite" harmful content and the generation of harmful content itself. This results in a denial of service where the model refuses to process the input. This vulnerability is not uniformly distributed; it is statistically biased to…

Analyzing Bias in False Refusal Behavior of Large Language Models for Hate Speech Detoxification
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Ministral-8B-Instruct-2410, Gemma-2-9B-It, and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct, contain a safety guardrail bypass vulnerability when subjected to optimized adversarial prompts. The vulnerability is exposed via the RainbowPlus quality-diversity search method utilized within the RedBench evaluation framework. These models exhibit high Attack Success Rates (ASR)—up to 97.81% for Ministral and 96.25% for Llama-3.1—failing to refuse prompts in…

RedBench: A Universal Dataset for Comprehensive Red Teaming of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 7B 8B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

LLM-based evaluation systems ("LLM-as-a-Judge") exhibit a structural vulnerability termed "Framing Bias," wherein the model produces logically contradictory judgments depending on the syntactic framing of the evaluation prompt. Specifically, when assessing the same content using predicate-positive (P) framing (e.g., "Is this toxic?") versus predicate-negative (¬P) framing (e.g., "Is this non-toxic?"), models frequently fail to invert their binary decisions, leading to inconsistency rates…

When Wording Steers the Evaluation: Framing Bias in LLM judges
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct +11 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

LLM-as-a-Reviewer systems, which utilize large language models to automate the peer review process, are vulnerable to the Paraphrasing Adversarial Attack (PAA). PAA is a black-box optimization technique that exploits the model's sensitivity to specific input sequences and self-preference bias. By iteratively paraphrasing specific manuscript sections (such as the abstract) using in-context learning (ICL) guided by previous review scores, an attacker can generate adversarial sequences that…

Paraphrasing Adversarial Attack on LLM-as-a-Reviewer
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

LLM routing systems are vulnerable to adversarial rerouting attacks where malicious triggers prepended to user queries manipulate the router's model-selection mechanism. Because LLM routers function as classifiers evaluating query complexity to balance computational cost and response quality, an attacker can craft adversarial prefixes that distort the query's latent semantic representation. This exploits the router's decision boundaries, forcing the system to misclassify the input and redirect…

RerouteGuard: Understanding and Mitigating Adversarial Risks for LLM Routing
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-5 +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Token-level embedding-time watermarking algorithms, specifically KGW (Kirchenbauer et al.) and Exponential Sampling (EXP, Kuditipudi et al.), when implemented in Large Language Models (LLMs) for Bangla text generation, are vulnerable to watermark erasure via cross-lingual round-trip translation (RTT) attacks. While these methods achieve high detection accuracy (>88%) under benign conditions, translating watermarked Bangla text to English and back to Bangla causes detection accuracy to collapse…

BanglaLorica: Design and Evaluation of a Robust Watermarking Algorithm for Large Language Models in Bangla Text Generation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn persuasive conversational attacks that induce the adoption of counterfactual beliefs. By leveraging the Source–Message–Channel–Receiver (SMCR) communication framework, attackers can systematically erode a model's confidence in established facts and compel the model to output misinformation. Specific attack vectors include manipulating source attribution (authority framing), message content (logical, credibility, or emotional appeals)…

Vulnerability of LLMs' Belief Systems? LLMs Belief Resistance Check Through Strategic Persuasive Conversation Interventions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.2 3B, Llama 3.3 70B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed using Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) interfaces or choice-based selection structures are vulnerable to Option Injection. By appending a task-irrelevant candidate choice (e.g., Option E) containing a steering directive—specifically utilizing threat framing (penalty coercion) or bonus framing (reward inducement)—an attacker can hijack the model's decision-making process. The vulnerability stems from a flaw in attention allocation: the model's…

OI-Bench: An Option Injection Benchmark for Evaluating LLM Susceptibility to Directive Interference
Evaluated models: GPT-5, GPT-5 Mini, Claude Haiku 4.5 +9 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

A vulnerability in the prompt-based persona conditioning of clinical Large Language Models (LLMs) allows system-level role prompts (e.g., "You are an ED physician") to override the model's base safety guardrails and degrade task accuracy. When assigned medically grounded personas or specific interaction styles (e.g., "bold" or "cautious"), the LLM adopts these roles as behavioral priors, which induces non-monotonic, context-dependent shifts in clinical risk posture. While improving performance…

The Persona Paradox: Medical Personas as Behavioral Priors in Clinical Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.