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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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273 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/10/2026

Agentic Large Language Model (LLM) systems utilizing persistent memory, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines, and external tool connectors are vulnerable to Logic-layer Prompt Control Injection (LPCI). An attacker can inject obfuscated (e.g., encoded, structurally nested, or semantically reframed) payloads into external memory stores or RAG documents. These payloads bypass conventional inference-time plaintext content filters, persist across session boundaries, and remain dormant…

LAAF: Logic-layer Automated Attack Framework A Systematic Red-Teaming Methodology for LPCI Vulnerabilities in Agentic Large Language Model Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3 Haiku, Llama 3.1 70B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

OpenClaw v2026.2.9 is vulnerable to a resource amplification and economic denial-of-service (DoS) attack via malicious third-party skills. An attacker can publish a Trojanized skill that exploits the framework's tool-calling loop and context-management architecture by injecting a multi-turn "Segmented Verification Protocol" (SVP). Malicious instructions embedded in the skill's SKILL.md file mandate extensive autoregressive sequence generation, while a companion script returns PROGRESS, REPAIR…

Clawdrain: Exploiting Tool-Calling Chains for Stealthy Token Exhaustion in OpenClaw Agents
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 3/8/2026

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to perform a highly transferable Denial-of-Service (DoS) or "blocking" attack. By injecting a single maliciously crafted document into the RAG knowledge base, attackers can force the LLM to refuse to answer benign queries. Unlike previous attacks that rely on explicit instruction injection or high-perplexity adversarial suffixes—which modern models easily…

When Safety Becomes a Vulnerability: Exploiting LLM Alignment Homogeneity for Transferable Blocking in RAG
Evaluated models: GPT-5.2, GPT-5 Mini, DeepSeek V3.2 +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

A vulnerability in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) allows an attacker to propagate covert biases and misalignment across multiple agents via subliminal prompting, an attack vector termed "Thought Virus." By injecting a seemingly benign, semantically unrelated token (such as a specific 3-digit number) into the prompt of a single compromised agent, an attacker can induce a specific targeted behavior (e.g., outputting a specific target concept or decreasing factual truthfulness). This induced…

Thought Virus: Viral Misalignment via Subliminal Prompting in Multi-Agent Systems
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2026
Analyzed 4/11/2026

A "Visual Confused Deputy" vulnerability exists in Computer-Using Agents (CUAs) that rely on visual perception to execute coordinate-based GUI actions (e.g., click(x,y)). Because the agent's understanding of the system state is entirely dependent on the screenshot provided by the runtime, a compromised runtime or tool can intercept and alter the screenshot pixels before forwarding them to the LLM. By visually swapping the locations of benign and privileged UI elements, an attacker can trick…

Visual Confused Deputy: Exploiting and Defending Perception Failures in Computer-Using Agents
Evaluated models: Claude 3.7 Sonnet

Source: arXiv

Published 2/24/2026
Analyzed 7/20/2026

The paper evaluates a reproducible indirect prompt injection issue in ReAct-style LLM agents: untrusted retrieved content can be interpreted as instructions and redirect the agent toward unauthorized tool calls. The authors report that successful attacks correlate with concentrated attention on injected content and evaluate defenses using InjectAgent, AgentDojo, TrojanTools, and a visual prompt-injection benchmark. These are paper-reported findings, not independently verified facts.

ICON: Indirect Prompt Injection Defense for Agents based on Inference-Time Correction
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B, Mistral 8B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/22/2026

Adversarial Explanation Attacks (AEAs) introduce a behavioral vulnerability in Large Language Model (LLM) based decision-support systems where the communication channel between the AI and the user is exploited to induce trust in incorrect model predictions. By manipulating the framing of an explanation—specifically its reasoning mode, evidence type, communication style, and presentation format—an attacker can dissociate the perceived plausibility of an explanation from its factual correctness…

When AI Persuades: Adversarial Explanation Attacks on Human Trust in AI-Assisted Decision Making
Evaluated models: Llama 3.3 70B

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 4/11/2026

Agentic LLMs integrated with external data services (e.g., Model Context Protocol, MCP) are vulnerable to Adaptive Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. When an agent queries external servers, attackers can inject malicious payloads into the retrieved content to hijack the agent's reasoning process and force the execution of high-authority tools. Unlike traditional static prompt injections, this vulnerability dynamically exploits the agent's internal logic audit. By using Markovian…

AdapTools: Adaptive Tool-based Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, DeepSeek R1, Gemini 2.5 Flash +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 2/21/2026

Large Language Model (LLM) based web agents (such as those built using the BrowserUse scaffold) are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks when autonomously navigating and processing untrusted web content. Unlike standard Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), this vulnerability occurs when the LLM orchestrator consumes the DOM or visual screenshots of a webpage containing concealed or contextually disguised adversarial instructions. The LLM interprets these embedded text strings as…

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL 32B Instruct

Source: arXiv

Published 2/1/2026
Analyzed 3/9/2026

LLM agents employing unconstrained test-time memory evolution are vulnerable to "Agent Memory Misevolution," a form of deployment-time reward hacking. When an agent's strategy memory bank is updated based solely on a task success threshold (utility) without explicit safety constraints, the system progressively accumulates and prioritizes "toxic shortcuts"—strategies that efficiently solve benign tasks but implicitly erode safety alignments. Over continuous interactions, the probability…

TAME: A Trustworthy Test-Time Evolution of Agent Memory with Systematic Benchmarking
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen 2.5 32B

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.