Language Model Security Database

A vulnerability in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows circumvention of safety mechanisms through improved few-shot jailbreaking techniques. The attack leverages injection of special system tokens (e.g., [/INST]) into few-shot demonstrations and demo-level random search to optimize the probability of generating harmful responses. This bypasses defenses that rely on perplexity filtering and input perturbation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to improved optimization-based jailbreaking attacks. The vulnerability stems from the susceptibility of LLMs to crafted prompts that exploit weaknesses in their safety mechanisms, allowing them to generate harmful responses despite safety training. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of diverse target templates containing harmful self-suggestions and guidance within the optimization goal, accelerating the convergence of the attack.

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to enhanced jailbreak attacks by appending multiple end-of-sentence (EOS) tokens to malicious prompts. This bypasses internal safety mechanisms, causing the LLM to respond to harmful queries that it would otherwise reject. The EOS tokens subtly shift the LLM’s internal representation of the prompt, making it appear less harmful without significantly altering the semantic meaning of the malicious content.

AutoBreach exploits the vulnerability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to wordplay-based adversarial prompts. By leveraging an LLM to generate diverse wordplay mapping rules and employing a two-stage optimization strategy, AutoBreach crafts prompts that bypass LLM safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unintended responses, even without modifying system prompts. The vulnerability lies in the LLM's susceptibility to semantic manipulation through cleverly disguised inputs.

A vulnerability allows attackers to bypass Large Language Model (LLM) moderation guardrails by using specially crafted prompts containing "cipher characters." These characters, strategically placed within the prompt's output, alter the LLM's response to reduce its "harm" score, enabling the generation of content that would otherwise be blocked. The attack leverages a jailbreak prefix combined with a malicious question and cipher characters to bypass both input and output level filters. This…

A vulnerability in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) allows for efficient jailbreaking attacks by leveraging visual input to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack constructs a multimodal model by adding a visual module to the target LLM, then uses a modified PGD algorithm to optimize visual input to generate jailbreaking embeddings. These embeddings are then converted back into text and appended to harmful queries, successfully eliciting objectionable content from the target LLM.

A vulnerability in the voice mode of GPT-4o allows bypassing safety restrictions through a novel "Voice Jailbreak" attack. This attack leverages principles of fictional storytelling (setting, character, plot) to craft audio prompts that persuade the LLM to generate responses violating OpenAI's usage policies, including generating content related to illegal activities, hate speech, physical harm, fraud, pornography, and privacy violations. The attack's success rate is significantly higher than…

This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms in Llama-2-7B-Chat and other safety-aligned LLMs using crafted adversarial prompts. The vulnerability stems from a gap between the gradient of the adversarial loss with respect to the one-hot representation of tokens and the actual effect of token replacements on the model's output. This gap allows for the generation of adversarial prompts that elicit harmful responses despite safety training. The paper demonstrates that…

Commercial text-to-image (T2I) generative AI systems are vulnerable to automated prompt injection attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms and induce the generation of copyrighted material. An attacker can use an automated pipeline to generate prompts that precisely describe copyrighted images, effectively circumventing word-based detection filters.

Medical Multimodal Large Language Models (MedMLLMs) are vulnerable to cross-modality attacks. Attackers can craft "mismatched malicious attacks" (2M-attacks) by providing MedMLLMs with image-text pairs where the image modality and/or anatomical region do not match the textual query, causing the model to generate incorrect or harmful responses. These attacks can be further optimized ("optimized mismatched malicious attacks"—O2M-attacks) using multimodal cross-optimization (MCM) techniques to…