Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Attention-Based Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety-alignment mechanisms by manipulating the model's internal attention weights. The attack, termed "Attention Eclipse," modifies the attention scores between specific tokens within a prompt, either amplifying or suppressing attention to selectively strengthen or weaken the influence of certain parts of the prompt on the model's output. This allows injection of malicious content while appearing benign to the model's…

Attention Eclipse: Manipulating Attention to Bypass LLM Safety-Alignment
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 13B Chat+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B

TurboFuzzLLM Jailbreak Templates

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks leveraging mutation-based fuzzing techniques. The TurboFuzzLLM framework efficiently generates adversarial prompts, combining mutated templates with harmful questions to elicit unauthorized or malicious responses. This vulnerability allows bypassing built-in safeguards and obtaining harmful outputs through black-box API access. The effectiveness stems from advanced mutation strategies (including refusal suppression, prefix…

TurboFuzzLLM: Turbocharging Mutation-based Fuzzing for Effectively Jailbreaking Large Language Models in Practice
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4 Turbo+5 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Mistral Large 2
  • R2D2
  • Zephyr 7B

Agent-in-the-Middle Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the communication mechanisms of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) enabling an Agent-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack. An attacker can intercept and manipulate messages between agents, causing the victim agent to produce malicious outputs. The attack does not require compromising individual agents directly; instead, it leverages contextual manipulation of inter-agent communications.

Red-Teaming LLM Multi-Agent Systems via Communication Attacks
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o

Iterative Chaos Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack, "Mousetrap," which leverages the models' reasoning capabilities to elicit harmful responses. Mousetrap uses a "Chaos Machine" to iteratively transform prompts via one-to-one mappings (e.g., character substitutions, word reversals), creating complex reasoning chains that confuse the LRM and cause it to generate unsafe outputs despite safety mechanisms. The iterative nature of the attack, combined with role-playing…

A Mousetrap: Fooling Large Reasoning Models for Jailbreak with Chain of Iterative Chaos
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking, o1-mini

Prefix-Tree Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) with structured output interfaces are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit the interaction between token-level inference and sentence-level safety alignment. Attackers can manipulate the model's output by constructing attack patterns based on prefixes of safety refusal responses and desired harmful outputs, effectively bypassing safety mechanisms through iterative API calls and constrained decoding. This allows the generation of harmful content despite…

Exploiting Prefix-Tree in Structured Output Interfaces for Enhancing Jailbreak Attacking
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B, Llama 2 13B+5 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 14B Chat
  • Qwen 7B Chat

Adversarial VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically the LLaVA-1.5 and LLaVA-1.6 series, are vulnerable to optimization-based white-box jailbreak attacks despite standard safety alignment measures like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Attackers can craft adversarial perturbations in the image space (imperceptible noise) or latent space using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to manipulate the model's internal representations. These perturbations maximize the…

Adversary-Aware DPO: Enhancing Safety Alignment in Vision Language Models via Adversarial Training
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B

Context-Coherent LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A context-coherent jailbreak attack (CCJA) allows bypassing safety mechanisms in aligned large language models (LLMs) by optimizing perturbations in the continuous word embedding space of a masked language model (MLM). The attack leverages the MLM's ability to reconstruct text from hidden states to generate semantically coherent yet malicious prompts that induce the target LLM to produce unsafe outputs, even with strong safety alignment. The attack's effectiveness is enhanced by using a seed…

CCJA: Context-Coherent Jailbreak Attack for Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Guanaco 13B, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct+4 more
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

LLM Syntax Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These attacks maintain the harmful intent while altering the linguistic structure, making detection based on token-level patterns ineffective.

StructTransform: A Scalable Attack Surface for Safety-Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: BERT, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o+5 more
  • BERT
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 90B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1

Learned Instruction Rewriting Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "Rewrite to Jailbreak" (R2J) attacks. R2J exploits the models' safety mechanisms by iteratively rewriting harmful prompts, subtly altering wording to bypass safety filters while maintaining the original malicious intent. This differs from previous methods which rely on adding extraneous prefixes/suffixes or creating forced instruction-following scenarios, thus being more difficult to detect.

Rewrite to Jailbreak: Discover Learnable and Transferable Implicit Harmfulness Instruction
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B

Reasoning-Augmented Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks leveraging the model's reasoning capabilities. The attack, RACE, reformulates harmful queries into benign reasoning tasks, exploiting the LLM's ability to perform complex reasoning to ultimately generate unsafe content. This bypasses standard safety mechanisms designed to prevent the generation of harmful responses.

Reasoning-Augmented Conversation for Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking+6 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.