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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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736 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Cybersecurity Obfuscation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A multi-step prompt injection vulnerability allows attackers to bypass Large Language Model (LLM) safety guardrails by combining prompt obfuscation with task decomposition. The attack methodology, identified as part of the CySecBench research, employs a "Word Reversal" technique where every fifth word in the malicious input is reversed to evade initial keyword detection. This obfuscated input is then embedded within a benign educational context, specifically instructing the model to act as a…

CySecBench: Generative AI-based CyberSecurity-focused Prompt Dataset for Benchmarking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Strategic Ranking Manipulation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) based search engines utilizing Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to ranking manipulation attacks via indirect prompt injection. Adversaries can embed optimized adversarial triggers or crafted semantic patterns within external webpage content. When these manipulated documents are retrieved and integrated into the LLM's context window alongside a user query, the adversarial content disrupts the model's contextual understanding. This results in the LLM…

Dynamics of adversarial attacks on large language model-based search engines
Evaluated models: Not reported

Evolutionary LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) by using an evolutionary algorithm to generate effective jailbreak prompts. The algorithm leverages the LLM's capabilities to iteratively refine prompts, increasing the likelihood of eliciting harmful responses to otherwise disallowed queries.

LLM-Virus: Evolutionary Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Claude 3.5 Haiku, GPT-3.5 Turbo+5 more
  • Claude 2
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B

Diffusion-Driven LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

DiffusionAttacker exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing manipulation of prompts to elicit harmful responses, even when the model incorporates safety mechanisms. The attack leverages a sequence-to-sequence diffusion model to rewrite harmful prompts, making them appear harmless to the LLM's internal representation while preserving their original semantic meaning. This bypasses safety filters and elicits undesired outputs.

DiffusionAttacker: Diffusion-Driven Prompt Manipulation for LLM Jailbreak
Evaluated models: Alpaca 7B, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo+4 more
  • Alpaca 7B
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

LLM Relevance Score Inflation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based relevance assessment frameworks, such as the Umbrela system, are vulnerable to evaluation subversion and artificial score inflation due to evaluation circularity and LLM "narcissism" (an LLM's inherent bias toward favoring LLM-generated outputs). When an information retrieval system integrates an LLM into its ranking pipeline—such as using it as a final-stage re-ranker—the automated LLM-as-a-judge evaluator assigns artificially inflated scores that fail to correlate with actual human…

LLM-based relevance assessment still can't replace human relevance assessment
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o

Multimodal LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A hybrid multimodal jailbreaking attack, dubbed JMLLM, exploits vulnerabilities in 13 popular large language models (LLMs) across text, image, and speech modalities. The attack leverages alternating translation, word encryption, feature collapse in images, and harmful text injection to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Success rates vary across LLMs and modalities, with some models exhibiting significantly higher vulnerability than others.

Divide and Conquer: A Hybrid Strategy Defeats Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, ERNIE 3.5 Turbo+10 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • ERNIE 3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Qwen VL Max

Contextual Adversarial Prompts

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to human-readable adversarial prompts crafted using situational context derived from movie scripts. These prompts, which combine a malicious prompt, a seemingly innocuous adversarial insertion, and relevant contextual information, can bypass LLMs' safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. The technique leverages the LLM's ability to understand context and generate responses consistent with that context to mask the malicious intent. The…

Human-Readable Adversarial Prompts: An Investigation into LLM Vulnerabilities Using Situational Context
Evaluated models: Flan-t5 Large, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemma 2B IT+16 more
  • Flan-t5 Large
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemma 2B IT
  • Gemma 7B
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Meta-llama-3-8B
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral-7B-v0.1
  • Mistral-8x7B-instruct-v0.1
  • Phi-1.5
  • Phi-3-mini-128k-instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Preference-Optimized Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

JailPO is a black-box attack framework that leverages preference optimization to generate effective jailbreak prompts for aligned LLMs. The attack automatically generates prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful or undesirable responses from the target LLM. The framework includes three attack patterns (QEPrompt, TemplatePrompt, MixAsking) with varying degrees of effectiveness and risk.

JailPO: A Novel Black-box Jailbreak Framework via Preference Optimization against Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo

Linked-Task LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel jailbreak paradigm, Simple Assistive Task Linkage (SATA), circumvents LLM safeguards by masking harmful keywords in a malicious query and using a secondary, simple assistive task (e.g., masked language modeling or element lookup by position) to convey the masked keywords' semantics to the LLM. This distracts the LLM and allows it to bypass safety checks, leading to the generation of harmful responses.

SATA: A Paradigm for LLM Jailbreak via Simple Assistive Task Linkage
Evaluated models: Claude-v2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o+3 more
  • Claude-v2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B

One-Step Model Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in LLMs allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms by crafting prompts that disguise malicious intent as a "defense" against harmful content. The attack, Reverse Embedded Defense Attack (REDA), leverages the model's own defensive capabilities to generate harmful outputs while masking the malicious intent within the response structure. This allows for successful jailbreaks in a single iteration, without requiring model-specific prompt engineering.

Jailbreaking? One Step Is Enough!
Evaluated models: GLM 4 9B Chat, GPT-3.5, Llama 2 13B+3 more
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-3.5
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.