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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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798 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Flowchart-based LVLM Jailbreak Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

FC-Attack leverages automatically generated flowcharts containing step-by-step descriptions derived or rephrased from harmful queries, combined with a benign textual prompt, to jailbreak Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs). The vulnerability lies in the model's susceptibility to visual prompts containing harmful information within the flowcharts, thus bypassing safety alignment mechanisms.

FC-Attack: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Auto-Generated Flowcharts
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620, Gemini 1.5 Flash, GPT-4o 2024-08-06+4 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • GPT-4o 2024-08-06
  • GPT-4o Mini 2024-07-18
  • InternVL2.5 8B
  • LLaVA NeXT 8B
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct

LLM Hidden Meaning Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an adversarial encoding attack where English instructions are obfuscated using valid but visually nonsensical UTF-8 byte sequences. By manipulating multi-byte UTF-8 encoding schemes—specifically by fixing the last 8 bits of a code point to match a target ASCII character and rotating the remaining bits—attackers can generate sequences (e.g., Byzantine musical symbols) that appear incomprehensible to humans and standard text filters but are…

À la recherche du sens perdu: your favourite LLM might have more to say than you can understand
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20241022, Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620+11 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20241022
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet 20240620
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • o1-mini
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Vikhr Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Phi-3.5 Mini
  • GigaChat-Max

LLM Lower Layer Freeze Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows for efficient jailbreaking by selectively fine-tuning only the lower layers of the model with a toxic dataset. This "Freeze Training" method, as described in the research paper, concentrates the fine-tuning on layers identified as being highly sensitive to the generation of harmful content. This approach significantly reduces training duration and GPU memory consumption while maintaining a high jailbreak success rate.

Efficient Jailbreaking of Large Models by Freeze Training: Lower Layers Exhibit Greater Sensitivity to Harmful Content
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B Chat, GLM 4 9B Chat HF, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+4 more
  • Baichuan 2 7B Chat
  • GLM 4 9B Chat HF
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Ministral 8B Instruct 2410
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct

Adaptive LLM Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM agents utilizing external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into the external data accessed by the agent, manipulating its behavior even when defenses against direct prompt injection are in place. Adaptive attacks, which modify the injected payload based on the specific defense mechanism, consistently bypass existing defenses with a success rate exceeding 50%.

Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Vicuna 7B

Multi-Turn Foot-In-The-Door Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A multi-turn prompt injection attack, termed "Foot-In-The-Door" (FITD), exploits the psychological principle of incremental commitment to progressively escalate malicious requests, bypassing LLM safety mechanisms. The attack leverages intermediate "bridge" prompts and self-alignment techniques to coax the model into generating increasingly harmful outputs, even when initially refusing similar direct requests.

Foot-In-The-Door: A Multi-turn Jailbreak for LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3 8B Instruct+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Qwen 1.5 7B Chat
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct

One-Shot LLM Steering Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to one-shot steering vector optimization attacks. By applying gradient descent to a single training example, an attacker can generate steering vectors that induce or suppress specific behaviors across multiple inputs, even those unseen during the optimization process. This allows malicious actors to manipulate the model's output in a generalized way, bypassing safety mechanisms designed to prevent harmful responses.

Investigating Generalization of One-shot LLM Steering Vectors
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B, Gemma 2 2B IT, Llama 13B+2 more
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 2B IT
  • Llama 13B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Improved LLM Jailbreak Transferability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing gradient-based optimization for jailbreaking defense are vulnerable to enhanced transferability attacks due to superfluous constraints in their objective functions. Specifically, the "response pattern constraint" (forcing a specific initial response phrase) and the "token tail constraint" (penalizing variations in the response beyond a fixed prefix) limit the search space and reduce the effectiveness of attacks across different models. Removing these…

Guiding not Forcing: Enhancing the Transferability of Jailbreaking Attacks on LLMs via Removing Superfluous Constraints
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo+5 more
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Yi 1.5 9B Chat

Metaphor-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreaking attack leveraging adversarial metaphors. The attack, termed AVATAR, induces the LLM to reason about benign metaphors related to harmful tasks, ultimately leading to the generation of harmful content either directly or through calibration of metaphorical and professional harmful content. The attack exploits the LLM's cognitive mapping process, bypassing standard safety mechanisms.

from Benign import Toxic: Jailbreaking the Language Model via Adversarial Metaphors
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GLM 3 6B, GPT-4o+8 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GLM 3 6B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1
  • Qwen 2 72B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

REINFORCE Adaptive Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Llama 2, Llama 3, Gemma, and Vicuna, are vulnerable to an adaptive, distributional adversarial attack methodology termed "REINFORCE." Existing gradient-based jailbreak attacks (such as Greedy Coordinate Gradient - GCG) typically optimize adversarial suffixes to maximize the likelihood of a fixed affirmative response (e.g., "Sure, here is how"). The REINFORCE method circumvents this by treating the LLM as a probabilistic policy and using Reinforcement…

REINFORCE Adversarial Attacks on Large Language Models: An Adaptive, Distributional, and Semantic Objective
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B, Gemma 1.1 2B+2 more
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Gemma 1.1 2B
  • Gemma 1.1 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Zero-Perturbation Emoji Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Emoti-Attack vulnerability constitutes a zero-word-perturbation adversarial attack against Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems and Large Language Models (LLMs). The vulnerability exploits the discrete embedding space of emojis and emoticons to manipulate model behavior without altering the semantic content or character integrity of the original text. By appending strategically optimized emoji sequences to the prefix and suffix of an input string (formalized as $s \oplus x \oplus…

Emoti-Attack: Zero-Perturbation Adversarial Attacks on NLP Systems via Emoji Sequences
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Llama 3 8B Instruct, GPT-4o+4 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini Exp 1206
  • BERT
  • RoBERTa

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.