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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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704 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

BarkPlug Data Poisoning Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A poisoning attack against a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system that manipulates the retriever component by injecting a poisoned document into the data used by the embedding model. This poisoned document contains modified and incorrect information. When activated, the system retrieves the poisoned document and uses it to generate misleading, biased, and unfaithful responses to user queries.

Poison Attacks and Adversarial Prompts Against an Informed University Virtual Assistant
Evaluated models: Barkplug V.2

SQL Injection Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ) vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) by manipulating the structure of input prompts. The attack leverages the model's processing of system prompts, user prefixes, user prompts, and assistant prefixes to effectively "comment out" the expected response prefix and inject harmful instructions, causing the LLM to generate unsafe content. This vulnerability exploits the external properties of the LLM…

SQL Injection Jailbreak: a structural disaster of large language models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+2 more
  • DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Nonlinear Prompt Jailbreak Features

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks exploiting nonlinear features within prompt encodings. These features, not detectable by linear methods, allow adversaries to reliably elicit harmful outputs despite safety training. Different attack methods leverage distinct nonlinear features, limiting the transferability of detection and mitigation techniques.

What Features in Prompts Jailbreak LLMs? Investigating the Mechanisms Behind Attacks
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, Llama 3 8B Instruct

Composable String Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using sequences of invertible string transformations (string compositions). Attackers can combine multiple transformations (e.g., leetspeak, Base64, ROT13, word reversal) to obfuscate malicious prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms that detect simpler attacks. Even with safety training, the models fail to correctly interpret the transformed input and produce unsafe outputs.

Plentiful Jailbreaks with String Compositions
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+2 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini

Emoji Judge Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used as safety judges are vulnerable to an "Emoji Attack," a prompt injection technique that leverages token segmentation bias. Inserting emojis within tokens alters sub-token embeddings, misleading the judge LLM into classifying harmful content as safe. The attack's effectiveness is amplified by strategically placing emojis to maximize the embedding discrepancy between sub-tokens and the original token.

Emoji Attack: A Method for Misleading Judge LLMs in Safety Risk Detection
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama Guard+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 2
  • ShieldLM
  • WildGuard

Ensemble Black-box Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to transferable ensemble black-box jailbreak attacks. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit undesired or harmful responses from the LLM by using an ensemble of LLM-as-attacker methods that optimize malicious prompts, adaptively adjusting resources based on prompt difficulty, and strategically modifying prompt semantics to evade detection.

Transferable Ensemble Black-box Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Deepseek-v2.5, Gemma 2B IT, Gemma 2 9B IT+5 more
  • Deepseek-v2.5
  • Gemma 2B IT
  • Gemma 2 9B IT
  • GLM 4 Plus
  • Glm-4-flash
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Qwen-max-latest

Gibberish-Suffix LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking via the addition of adversarial suffixes generated by models like AmpleGCG-Plus. These suffixes, often consisting of gibberish or nonsensical text, cause the LLM to bypass safety protocols and generate harmful or undesired outputs. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to reliably identify and filter these adversarial suffixes, even when they lack semantic meaning. AmpleGCG-Plus significantly improves the success rate and…

AmpleGCG-Plus: A Strong Generative Model of Adversarial Suffixes to Jailbreak LLMs with Higher Success Rates in Fewer Attempts
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+6 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

VLM RedTeaming Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, IDEATOR, which leverages a separate VLM to generate malicious image-text pairs. The attacker VLM iteratively refines its prompts based on the target VLM's responses, bypassing safety mechanisms by generating contextually relevant and visually subtle malicious prompts.

IDEATOR: Jailbreaking and Benchmarking Large Vision-Language Models Using Themselves
Evaluated models: MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B, InstructBLIP, Chameleon+10 more
  • MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
  • InstructBLIP
  • Chameleon
  • LLaVA-OneVision
  • MiniGPT-v2
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet

Benign Mirroring Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to stealthy jailbreak attacks leveraging benign data mirroring. Attackers train a local "mirror model" on benign data obtained from the target LLM. This mirror model, mimicking the target's behavior, is then used to generate adversarial prompts, which are subsequently deployed against the target LLM, bypassing content moderation systems due to the lack of overtly malicious content in the initial data gathering phase.

Stealthy Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models via Benign Data Mirroring
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 Chat+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct

Self-Tuning LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel iterative self-tuning attack (ADV-LLM) that crafts adversarial suffixes. This attack significantly reduces the computational cost of generating effective jailbreaks compared to prior methods, achieving near 100% success rate against various open-source LLMs and high success rates (e.g., 99% against GPT-3.5, 49% against GPT-4) against closed-source models. The attack leverages iterative self-tuning to improve the LLM's ability to generate…

Iterative Self-Tuning LLMs for Enhanced Jailbreaking Capabilities
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.