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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

609 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Reinforcement Learning Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

PathSeeker demonstrates a novel black-box jailbreak attack against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes multi-agent reinforcement learning. The attack iteratively modifies input prompts based on model responses, leveraging a reward mechanism focused on vocabulary expansion in the LLM's output to circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. This technique bypasses existing safety filters by encouraging the model to relax its constraints, rather than directly targeting…

PathSeeker: Exploring LLM Security Vulnerabilities with a Reinforcement Learning-Based Jailbreak Approach
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek Chat, Deepseek-coder+14 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • Deepseek-coder
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemma2-8B-instruct
  • Glm-4-air
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral Nemo
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B

Symbolic Math Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack, termed "MathPrompt," which leverages the models' ability to process symbolic mathematics to bypass built-in safety mechanisms. The attack encodes harmful natural language prompts into mathematically formulated problems, causing the LLM to generate unsafe outputs while ostensibly solving a mathematical problem.

Jailbreaking Large Language Models with Symbolic Mathematics
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet+10 more
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash (block None)
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro (block None)
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Adaptive Position Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AdaPPA is a jailbreak attack that exploits the varying levels of alignment protection in LLMs at different output positions. It leverages the model's instruction-following capabilities by pre-filling the output with carefully crafted "safe" content, creating a perceived completion and lowering the model's guard before generating malicious content. The attack's effectiveness relies on the adaptive generation of both safe and harmful pre-fill content, strategically placed to exploit weaknesses…

AdaPPA: Adaptive Position Pre-Fill Jailbreak Attack Approach Targeting LLMs
Evaluated models: ChatGLM3 6B, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+5 more
  • ChatGLM3 6B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Single-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A single-turn prompt injection attack that bypasses LLM content moderation filters by simulating a multi-turn conversation escalating towards harmful or inappropriate outputs within a single prompt. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to maintain context and continue established patterns, even when leading to undesirable content.

Well, that escalated quickly: The Single-Turn Crescendo Attack (STCA)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+4 more
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Attack LLMs with Toxic Answers

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a targeted jailbreak attack, termed Atoxia, which can force the generation of specific harmful content. The attack operates by providing a target toxic answer to an attacker model, which then generates a corresponding adversarial query and a misleading "answer opening" (prefix). When the query and the answer prefix are presented to a vulnerable LLM, the model is induced to continue the generation, bypassing its safety alignment and completing the…

Atoxia: Red-teaming Large Language Models with Target Toxic Answers
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+5 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Random Token T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A heuristic token search attack, termed HTS-Attack, can bypass safety mechanisms in text-to-image (T2I) models, allowing generation of NSFW content. The attack iteratively replaces tokens in a malicious prompt with semantically similar tokens from the model's vocabulary, avoiding detection by prompt and image checkers. The method leverages a surrogate CLIP model to maintain semantic similarity to the target NSFW prompt.

Rt-attack: Jailbreaking text-to-image models via random token
Evaluated models: Clip-vit-base-patch32, DALL-E 3, GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct+4 more
  • Clip-vit-base-patch32
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct
  • Safegen
  • Sld
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion v1.5

LLM Adversarial Suffix Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreaking attack, ECLIPSE, which leverages the LLM's own capabilities as an optimizer to generate adversarial suffixes. ECLIPSE iteratively refines these suffixes based on a harmfulness score, bypassing the need for pre-defined affirmative phrases used in previous optimization-based attacks. This allows for effective jailbreaking even with limited interaction and without white-box access to the LLM's internal parameters.

Unlocking Adversarial Suffix Optimization Without Affirmative Phrases: Efficient Black-box Jailbreaking via LLM as Optimizer
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B

Carrier Article Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack that leverages "neural carrier articles." This attack injects a prohibited query into a benign article generated by a secondary LLM, designed to be semantically similar to the prohibited query but not trigger the primary LLM's safety mechanisms. The secondary LLM generates articles based on hypernyms derived from the prohibited query, thus subtly shifting attention weights within the primary LLM, bypassing its safeguards.

Hide Your Malicious Goal Into Benign Narratives: Jailbreak Large Language Models through Neural Carrier Articles
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B

Perceptual Text-to-Image Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A perception-guided jailbreak (PGJ) attack allows bypassing safety filters in text-to-image models. The attack leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to identify safe phrases that are perceptually similar to unsafe words but semantically different. This allows the generation of NSFW images using prompts that evade the model's safety mechanisms.

Perception-guided jailbreak against text-to-image models
Evaluated models: Cogview3, Dall-e 2, DALL-E 3+5 more
  • Cogview3
  • Dall-e 2
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Hunyuan
  • Sdxl
  • Tongyiwanxiang

Synthetic LLM Jailbreak Dataset

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks leveraging synthetically generated prompts. A novel pipeline, SAGE-RT, generates a diverse dataset of 51,000 prompt-response pairs designed to exploit LLMs' vulnerabilities across various categories of harmfulness. These prompts successfully jailbreak state-of-the-art LLMs in a significant percentage of tested sub-categories, including 100% of macro-categories for certain models like GPT-4 and GPT-3.5-turbo. The vulnerability…

Sage-rt: Synthetic alignment data generation for safety evaluation and red teaming
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo+8 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.