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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

52 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Agent Policy Hacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-powered agentic systems that use external tools are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that cause them to bypass their explicit policy instructions. The vulnerability can be exploited through both direct user interaction and indirect injection, where malicious instructions are embedded in external data sources processed by the agent (e.g., documents, API responses, webpages). These attacks cause agents to perform prohibited actions, leak confidential data, and adopt unauthorized…

Security challenges in ai agent deployment: Insights from a large scale public competition
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Command R+11 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Command R
  • Command R+
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • o3
  • o3-mini
  • o4-mini

Agent Intent Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM agents integrating with external environments (e.g., via tool use, web retrieval, or RAG) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks. Malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data sources—such as emails, webpages, or tool outputs—are ingested by the agent and treated as valid context. Because the backend Large Language Model (LLM) struggles to distinguish between system instructions, user instructions, and third-party data, these embedded prompts can hijack the execution flow…

PromptArmor: Simple yet Effective Prompt Injection Defenses
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • o4-mini

Enterprise Multi-Turn Data Exfiltration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) systems integrated with private enterprise data, such as those using Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), are vulnerable to multi-stage prompt inference attacks. An attacker can use a sequence of individually benign-looking queries to incrementally extract confidential information from the LLM's context. Each query appears innocuous in isolation, bypassing safety filters designed to block single malicious prompts. By chaining these queries, the attacker can…

Multi-Stage Prompt Inference Attacks on Enterprise LLM Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3, GPT-4+1 more
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3
  • GPT-4
  • RoBERTa

Inter-Agent Computer Takeover

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A remote code execution (RCE) and privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems and agentic RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) architectures. The vulnerability arises from "Inter-Agent Trust Exploitation," where LLM agents implicitly trust instructions received from peer agents, bypassing safety guardrails and jailbreak defenses that are active during direct human-to-LLM interaction. An attacker can inject a malicious command payload (e.g., a…

The Dark Side of LLMs: Agent-based Attack Vectors for System-level Compromise
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1 Mini+15 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Magistral Medium
  • Mistral Large
  • Mistral Small
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Llama 4 16x17B
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Devstral 24B
  • DeepSeek R1 Tool Calling 70B

Agent Tool Selection Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanism of Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize a retrieval-then-selection pipeline (RAG) for identifying executable tools. The vulnerability, known as "ToolHijacker," allows a remote attacker to manipulate the agent's decision-making process by injecting a malicious tool document into the accessible tool library (e.g., via third-party tool hubs or plugins). The attack employs a two-phase optimization strategy to craft a malicious tool…

Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct+5 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o

Chained Guardrail Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating in stateful environments (web browsers, operating systems, and tool-use contexts) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and multi-modal adversarial attacks. These vulnerabilities arise when agents process untrusted environmental observations—such as web accessibility trees, screen screenshots, or database query results—that contain concealed malicious instructions. Specifically, attackers can embed prompt injections into HTML accessibility…

DoomArena: A Framework for Testing AI Agents Against Evolving Security Threats
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Llama Guard

Recommender Memory Update Corruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper input validation in the memory module of Large Language Model (LLM)-powered agentic Recommender Systems (RS) allows remote attackers to perform indirect prompt injection via adversarial item descriptions. By utilizing the "DrunkAgent" framework, an attacker can embed semantic triggers and control characters (such as segmentation tokens and escape characters) into product descriptions. These injections manipulate the agent's memory update mechanism during agent-environment…

DrunkAgent: Stealthy Memory Corruption in LLM-Powered Recommender Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4, o1, Llama 3 8B

Agent Pipeline Simple Hacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial LLM-powered agents utilizing autonomous web access, memory modules, and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and environmental manipulation. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into external data sources trusted by the agent (such as Reddit posts, public databases, or ArXiv papers). When the agent autonomously retrieves and processes this content during task execution, it executes the embedded malicious commands. This vulnerability…

Commercial llm agents are already vulnerable to simple yet dangerous attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Risk Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to visual prompt injection attacks via text-to-image obfuscation. While these models often possess safety guardrails for standard text-based inputs, they fail to apply equivalent safety alignment to textual instructions embedded visually within an image. An attacker can overlay malicious instructions (e.g., requests for illegal acts, hate speech) onto an image file and submit it to the model. The model’s Optical Character Recognition (OCR) or visual…

Lessons from red teaming 100 generative ai products
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Phi-3

Adversarial Tool Injection Attacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) tool-calling systems are vulnerable to adversarial tool injection attacks. Attackers can inject malicious tools ("Manipulator Tools") into the tool platform, manipulating the LLM's tool selection and execution process. This allows for privacy theft (extracting user queries), denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against legitimate tools, and unscheduled tool-calling (forcing the use of attacker-specified tools regardless of relevance). The attack exploits vulnerabilities…

From Allies to Adversaries: Manipulating LLM Tool-Calling through Adversarial Injection
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Qwen 2 7B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.