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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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69 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

KV-Cache Sharing Timing Side-channel

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-tenant Large Language Model (LLM) inference systems utilizing global Key-Value (KV) cache sharing are vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack. By measuring the Time-To-First-Token (TTFT) latency of crafted API requests, an unprivileged remote attacker can determine if specific token sequences have been previously processed and cached by the system for other users. This observable timing difference between cache hits (low TTFT) and cache misses (high TTFT) allows for the token-by-token…

Selective KV-Cache Sharing to Mitigate Timing Side-Channels in LLM Inference
Evaluated models: Phi-4 14B, Qwen 3 30B-A3B, Qwen 3 32B+3 more
  • Phi-4 14B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • DeepSeek R1

Agent Tool Metadata Lure

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanisms of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, identified as the "Attractive Metadata Attack" (AMA). This flaw allows an adversary to manipulate the metadata (names, descriptions, and parameter schemas) of malicious external tools to statistically maximize the likelihood of their selection by the agent, without requiring prompt injection or access to model internals. The vulnerability exploits the agent’s semantic scoring function used to map user…

Attractive Metadata Attack: Inducing LLM Agents to Invoke Malicious Tools
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct+2 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 32B Instruct
  • Gemma 3 27B IT
  • Qwen 3 32B

LLM Interpreter Resource Exhaustion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) equipped with native code interpreters are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) via resource exhaustion. An attacker can craft a single prompt that causes the interpreter to execute code that depletes CPU, memory, or disk resources. The vulnerability is particularly pronounced when a resource-intensive task is framed within a plausibly benign or socially-engineered context ("indirect prompts"), which significantly lowers the model's likelihood of refusal compared…

Running in CIRCLE? A Simple Benchmark for LLM Code Interpreter Security
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 2.5 Pro+5 more
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4.1
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • o3 Pro
  • o4-mini

Forged Assistant Message Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability termed "Trojan Horse Prompting" exists in conversational multimodal models, specifically demonstrated on Google’s Gemini-2.0-flash-preview-image-generation. The vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignment mechanisms (RLHF and SFT) by manipulating the structural protocol of the conversational API. Unlike standard jailbreaks that manipulate the user prompt, this attack exploits "Asymmetric Safety Alignment" by forging a conversational history where the role is…

Trojan Horse Prompting: Jailbreaking Conversational Multimodal Models by Forging Assistant Message
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash Preview Image Generation

Variational Jailbreak Inference

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

VERA, a variational inference framework, enables the generation of diverse and fluent adversarial prompts that bypass safety mechanisms in large language models (LLMs). The attacker model, trained through a variational objective, learns a distribution of prompts likely to elicit harmful responses, effectively jailbreaking the target LLM. This allows for the generation of novel attacks that are not based on pre-existing, manually crafted prompts.

VERA: Variational Inference Framework for Jailbreaking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B, Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo+8 more
  • Baichuan 2 7B
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Orca 2 7B
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Zephyr 7B

LLM Judge Subversion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Alibaba Cloud PAI-Judge and PAI-Judge-Plus are vulnerable to a composite adversarial attack that exploits attention mechanism limitations in Large Language Models (LLMs). An authenticated attacker can manipulate automated evaluation outcomes by appending a long, irrelevant text suffix (approximately 1000 to 2000+ characters) to a response containing adversarial perturbations. This "long-suffix" strategy overwhelms the judge model's context window, causing the attention mechanism to degrade and…

LLMs Cannot Reliably Judge (Yet?): A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Mistral 7B
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Agent API Goal Divergence

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents capable of invoking external APIs are vulnerable to intent integrity violations. When an agent receives natural language instructions that are ambiguous, underspecified, or contain values not supported by the underlying API schema, the agent frequently fails to preserve user intent. Instead of rejecting the request or asking for clarification, the model may hallucinate parameter values, map unsupported requests to unsafe defaults, or execute actions on…

TAI3: Testing Agent Integrity in Interpreting User Intent
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 3 30B-A3B+5 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • o3-mini

Adaptive Stacked Cipher Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) processes are vulnerable to an adaptive stacked cipher attack known as SEAL (Stacked Encryption for Adaptive Language reasoning model jailbreak). The vulnerability arises because the model's reasoning capabilities effectively function as a decryption engine, processing complex multi-layered obfuscations (e.g., stacked combinations of Caesar, Base64, ASCII, HEX, and reversal ciphers) that bypass input-level safety filters. By…

Three Minds, One Legend: Jailbreak Large Reasoning Model with Adaptive Stacked Ciphers
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, o1-mini, o4-mini+3 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • o1-mini
  • o4-mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking

Conditional Prompt Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SPECTRE framework introduces a black-box adversarial attack vector against Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilizes malicious system prompts to hijack conversations. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim to bypass safeguards for all inputs, SPECTRE optimizes system prompts to induce incorrect or harmful responses only for specific targeted questions (e.g., "Are COVID vaccines safe?", "Who should I vote for?"), while maintaining high accuracy and benign behavior on all other non-targeted…

SPECTRE: Conditional System Prompt Poisoning to Hijack LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini, Llama 2 7B+8 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Pythia 12B

LLM Self-Introspection Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows attackers to manipulate the model's output by modifying token log probabilities. Attackers can use a lightweight plug-in model (BiasNet) to subtly alter the probabilities, steering the LLM toward generating harmful content even when safety mechanisms are in place. This attack requires only access to the top-k token log probabilities returned by the LLM's API, without needing model weights or internal access.

JULI: Jailbreak Large Language Models by Self-Introspection
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3 8B Instruct+3 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.