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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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609 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

PC-Bias Jailbreak Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with safety mechanisms exhibit biases which disproportionately allow successful "jailbreak" attacks (circumvention of safety protocols to generate harmful content) when targeting prompts related to marginalized groups compared to privileged groups. This vulnerability stems from the unintended correlation between safety alignment techniques and demographic keywords, creating a higher success rate for malicious prompts incorporating keywords associated with…

Biasjailbreak: analyzing ethical biases and jailbreak vulnerabilities in large language models
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+5 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2 7B

Robotic LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) controlling robots are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks. The ROBOPAIR algorithm demonstrates that malicious prompts can bypass safety mechanisms, causing robots to perform harmful physical actions. This vulnerability exploits the LLM's reliance on textual prompts and its potential lack of sufficient contextual understanding to prevent unsafe commands. The attack is effective across different access levels.

Jailbreaking LLM-controlled robots
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Nvidia Dolphins Self-driving Llm

Multi-Round LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A multi-round attack against Large Language Models (LLMs) allows bypassing safety mechanisms by iteratively refining prompts to elicit undesired behavior. The attack leverages the LLM's tendency to adjust its response based on preceding interactions, circumventing single-round prompt filtering defenses.

Multi-round jailbreak attack on large language models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Multi-Turn Question Fragmentation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn jailbreak attack, termed "Jigsaw Puzzles" (JSP), which circumvents existing safeguards by splitting harmful questions into harmless fragments. The LLM is prompted to reconstruct and answer the complete question from these fragments, resulting in the generation of harmful responses. The attack relies on the LLM's ability to piece together seemingly benign input to form a malicious query, exploiting the model's contextual understanding…

Jigsaw Puzzles: Splitting Harmful Questions to Jailbreak Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B

Prompt Translation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms using adversarial prompt translation. The vulnerability stems from the ability to translate garbled adversarial prompts generated by gradient-based attacks into coherent, human-readable prompts that retain their adversarial capability. This allows for the successful transfer of attacks across different LLMs.

Deciphering the Chaos: Enhancing Jailbreak Attacks via Adversarial Prompt Translation
Evaluated models: Not reported

Multi-turn Actor Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks where malicious users obscure harmful intents across multiple queries. The ActorAttack method leverages the LLM's own knowledge base to discover semantically linked "actors" related to a harmful target. By posing seemingly innocuous questions about these actors, the attacker guides the LLM towards revealing harmful information step-by-step, accumulating knowledge until the desired malicious output is obtained, even…

Derail Yourself: Multi-turn LLM Jailbreak Attack through Self-discovered Clues
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • o1

Multi-Objective LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-objective black-box jailbreaking attack (BlackDAN) that optimizes prompts to maximize the likelihood of generating unsafe responses while maintaining contextual relevance and minimizing detectability. The attack leverages a multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (NSGA-II) to balance attack success rate, semantic consistency, and stealthiness, resulting in more effective and less easily detectable jailbreaks than single-objective approaches.

BlackDAN: A Black-Box Multi-Objective Approach for Effective and Contextual Jailbreaking of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Aquilachat-7B, Baichuan 2 13B Chat, Baichuan-7B+12 more
  • Aquilachat-7B
  • Baichuan 2 13B Chat
  • Baichuan-7B
  • GPT-2 XL
  • Internlm2-chat-7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama-2-13B-hf
  • Llama-2-7B-hf
  • Llava v1.6-mistral-7B-hf
  • Llava-v1.6-vicuna-7B-hf
  • Minitron-8B-base
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Yi 1.5 9B Chat

Attention-Guided Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that manipulate attention scores to redirect the model's focus away from safety protocols. The AttnGCG attack method increases the attention score on adversarial suffixes within the input prompt, causing the model to prioritize the malicious content over safety guidelines, leading to the generation of harmful outputs.

AttnGCG: Enhancing jailbreaking attacks on LLMs with attention manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash, Gemini Pro, Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest+6 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro Latest
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Browser Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Refusal-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) show decreased safety when deployed as browser agents compared to their performance in chatbot settings. Attack methods effective at jailbreaking LLMs in chat contexts also successfully bypass safety mechanisms in browser agents, leading to the execution of harmful behaviors. This vulnerability stems from a lack of generalization of safety training to agentic, real-world interaction scenarios and the increased context available to the agent (browser…

Refusal-Trained LLMs Are Easily Jailbroken As Browser Agents
Evaluated models: o1-preview, o1-mini, GPT-4 Turbo+5 more
  • o1-preview
  • o1-mini
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

Homotopy-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks utilizing a novel Functional Homotopy (FH) optimization method. FH exploits the functional duality between model training and input generation, iteratively solving a series of "easy-to-hard" optimization problems to generate adversarial prompts that circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit undesirable model responses. This is achieved by first misaligning the model via gradient descent on continuous parameters, then leveraging…

Functional Homotopy: Smoothing Discrete Optimization via Continuous Parameters for LLM Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Mistral 7B v0.3

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.