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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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539 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

I-GCG: Accelerated LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to improved optimization-based jailbreaking attacks. The vulnerability stems from the susceptibility of LLMs to crafted prompts that exploit weaknesses in their safety mechanisms, allowing them to generate harmful responses despite safety training. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of diverse target templates containing harmful self-suggestions and guidance within the optimization goal, accelerating the convergence of the attack.

Improved techniques for optimization-based jailbreaking on large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral-7B-instruct-0.2
  • Starling-7B-alpha
  • Vicuna-7B-1.5

Silent Token Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to enhanced jailbreak attacks by appending multiple end-of-sentence (EOS) tokens to malicious prompts. This bypasses internal safety mechanisms, causing the LLM to respond to harmful queries that it would otherwise reject. The EOS tokens subtly shift the LLM’s internal representation of the prompt, making it appear less harmful without significantly altering the semantic meaning of the malicious content.

Enhancing jailbreak attack against large language models through silent tokens
Evaluated models: Gemma 2B, Gemma 7B IT, Llama 2 13B Chat+9 more
  • Gemma 2B
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • MPT 7B Chat
  • Qwen 1.5 7B Chat
  • Tulu-2-13B
  • Tulu-2-7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3
  • Vicuna-7B-1.5

Cipher-Character Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability allows attackers to bypass Large Language Model (LLM) moderation guardrails by using specially crafted prompts containing "cipher characters." These characters, strategically placed within the prompt's output, alter the LLM's response to reduce its "harm" score, enabling the generation of content that would otherwise be blocked. The attack leverages a jailbreak prefix combined with a malicious question and cipher characters to bypass both input and output level filters. This…

Jailbreaking Large Language Models Against Moderation Guardrails via Cipher Characters
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Quantization-Based LLM Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the quantization process of Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows an attacker to inject malicious behavior into a quantized model, even if the full-precision model appears benign. The attack leverages the discrepancy between full-precision and quantized model behavior introduced by quantization methods such as LLM.int8(), NF4, and FP4. An attacker can fine-tune a model to exhibit malicious behavior when quantized, then use projected gradient descent to remove the…

Exploiting LLM Quantization
Evaluated models: Gemma 2B, Phi 3 Mini, Phi-2+3 more
  • Gemma 2B
  • Phi 3 Mini
  • Phi-2
  • Starcoder-1B
  • Starcoder-3B
  • Starcoder-7B

Automated T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial text-to-image (T2I) generative AI systems are vulnerable to automated prompt injection attacks that bypass their safety mechanisms and induce the generation of copyrighted material. An attacker can use an automated pipeline to generate prompts that precisely describe copyrighted images, effectively circumventing word-based detection filters.

Automatic Jailbreaking of the Text-to-Image Generative AI Systems
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3

MedMMLM Cross-Modality Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Medical Multimodal Large Language Models (MedMLLMs) are vulnerable to cross-modality attacks. Attackers can craft "mismatched malicious attacks" (2M-attacks) by providing MedMLLMs with image-text pairs where the image modality and/or anatomical region do not match the textual query, causing the model to generate incorrect or harmful responses. These attacks can be further optimized ("optimized mismatched malicious attacks"—O2M-attacks) using multimodal cross-optimization (MCM) techniques to…

Cross-Modality Jailbreak and Mismatched Attacks on Medical Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: CheXagent, LLaVA Med, Med-Flamingo+2 more
  • CheXagent
  • LLaVA Med
  • Med-Flamingo
  • RadFM
  • XrayGLM

Visual Role-Play Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal jailbreak attack, termed Visual Role-Play (VRP), which leverages role-playing image characters to elicit harmful responses. VRP generates images depicting high-risk characters (e.g., cybercriminals) described by an LLM, paired with a benign role-play instruction and a malicious query. This combined input tricks the MLLM into generating malicious content by enacting the character's persona.

Visual-RolePlay: Universal Jailbreak Attack on MultiModal Large Language Models via Role-playing Image Characte
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision, Internvlchat-v1.5, LLaVA 1.6 Mistral 7B+4 more
  • Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision
  • Internvlchat-v1.5
  • LLaVA 1.6 Mistral 7B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Omnilmm (12B)
  • Qwen-vl-chat (7B)
  • Stable Diffusion

WordGame LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreaking attack, "WordGame," which leverages simultaneous query and response obfuscation to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack replaces malicious words with word games in the query, forcing the LLM to reason through the game before addressing the original malicious intent. This, coupled with auxiliary tasks or questions (WordGame+), creates a context absent in the LLM's safety training data, enabling the generation of harmful content.

WordGame: Efficient & Effective LLM Jailbreak via Simultaneous Obfuscation in Query and Response
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Self-Explanatory LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in large language models (LLMs) allows for near-perfect jailbreaking via iterative prompt refinement and self-explanation. The attacker uses the LLM itself to iteratively refine adversarial prompts by requesting self-explanations of failed attempts, ultimately generating prompts that bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful content. A subsequent "Rate+Enhance" step further maximizes the harmfulness of the generated output.

GPT-4 Jailbreaks Itself with Near-Perfect Success Using Self-Explanation
Evaluated models: Claude 3 Opus, Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-4+5 more
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • Claude 3 Sonnet
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B

Logit-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several large language models (LLMs) allowing attackers to manipulate the models' output logits, biasing the probability distribution toward the generation of harmful content. The attack does not involve modifying the input prompt, but rather directly manipulates the internal probability scores assigned to output tokens during the generation process. By strategically increasing the logits of tokens forming a harmful response while decreasing those belonging to safety…

Lockpicking LLMs: A Logit-Based Jailbreak Using Token-level Manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemma 7B IT, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+2 more
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.