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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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736 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) safety judges exhibit vulnerability to adversarial attacks and stylistic prompt modifications, leading to increased false negative rates (FNR) and decreased accuracy in classifying harmful model outputs. Minor stylistic changes to model outputs, such as altering the formatting or tone, can significantly impact a judge's classification, while direct adversarial modifications to the generated text can fool judges into misclassifying even 100% of harmful generations as…

Know Thy Judge: On the Robustness Meta-Evaluation of LLM Safety Judges
Evaluated models: Atla Selene Mini 8B, Llama 2 13B, Llama 3.1 8B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 4/21/2025

A vulnerability in safeguarded text-to-image models allows bypassing of safety filters and alignment methods through the use of adversarial prompts generated by a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). The attack, termed PromptTune, effectively rewrites unsafe prompts into semantically similar adversarial prompts that evade safety mechanisms, resulting in the generation of harmful images. The attack does not require repeated queries to the target text-to-image model.

Jailbreaking Safeguarded Text-to-Image Models via Large Language Models
Evaluated models: BLIP-2, CLIP, DALL-E 3 +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Predictive Large Language Model (LLM) routers, specifically those utilizing Deep Neural Network (DNN) and Matrix Factorization (MF) architectures, are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation and backdoor poisoning. These routers are designed to optimize cost and latency by dynamically directing simple queries to "weak" (cheap) models and complex queries to "strong" (expensive) models. Attackers can exploit this mechanism in two ways: 1. Inference-time Attacks: By appending specific adversarial…

Life-Cycle Routing Vulnerabilities of LLM Router
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

A vulnerability exists in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems that allows for black-box adversarial attacks known as "CtrlRAG." This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) by injecting maliciously crafted inputs into the system's knowledge base. Unlike traditional injection attacks that rely on direct concatenation, CtrlRAG utilizes a Masked Language Model (MLM) to iteratively replace words in the malicious text. This optimization ensures…

CtrlRAG: Black-box Document Poisoning Attacks for Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreaking attack leveraging adversarial metaphors. The attack, termed AVATAR, induces the LLM to reason about benign metaphors related to harmful tasks, ultimately leading to the generation of harmful content either directly or through calibration of metaphorical and professional harmful content. The attack exploits the LLM's cognitive mapping process, bypassing standard safety mechanisms.

from Benign import Toxic: Jailbreaking the Language Model via Adversarial Metaphors
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GLM 3 6B, GPT-4o +8 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 4/12/2025

A vulnerability in text-to-image (T2I) models allows bypassing safety filters through the use of metaphor-based adversarial prompts. These prompts, crafted using LLMs, indirectly convey sensitive content, exploiting the model's ability to infer meaning from figurative language while circumventing explicit keyword filters and model editing strategies.

Metaphor-based Jailbreaking Attacks on Text-to-Image Models
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, Flux, Llama 3 8B Instruct +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 4/21/2025

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector leveraging narrative-driven visual storytelling and role immersion to circumvent built-in safety mechanisms. The attack, termed MIRAGE, decomposes harmful queries into environment, character, and activity triplets, generating a sequence of images and text prompts that guide the MLLM through a deceptive narrative, ultimately eliciting harmful responses. The attack successfully exploits the MLLM's cross-modal…

MIRAGE: Multimodal Immersive Reasoning and Guided Exploration for Red-Team Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4V, Grok 2 Vision +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Jailbreak-Probability-based Attacks (JPA). JPA leverages a Jailbreak Probability Prediction Network (JPPN) to identify and optimize adversarial perturbations in input images, maximizing the probability of eliciting harmful responses from the MLLM, even with small perturbation bounds and few iterations. The attack operates by modifying the input image's hidden states within the MLLM to increase the predicted jailbreak probability.

Utilizing Jailbreak Probability to Attack and Safeguard Multimodal LLMs
Evaluated models: DeepSeek VL 1.3B, InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B, InternLM XComposer +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Improper input validation in the memory module of Large Language Model (LLM)-powered agentic Recommender Systems (RS) allows remote attackers to perform indirect prompt injection via adversarial item descriptions. By utilizing the "DrunkAgent" framework, an attacker can embed semantic triggers and control characters (such as segmentation tokens and escape characters) into product descriptions. These injections manipulate the agent's memory update mechanism during agent-environment…

DrunkAgent: Stealthy Memory Corruption in LLM-Powered Recommender Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4, o1, Llama 3 8B

Source: arXiv

Published 3/1/2025
Analyzed 4/12/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) with structured output APIs (e.g., using JSON Schema) are vulnerable to Constrained Decoding Attacks (CDAs). CDAs exploit the control plane of the LLM's decoding process by embedding malicious intent within the schema-level grammar rules, bypassing safety mechanisms that primarily focus on input prompts. The attack manipulates the allowed output space, forcing the LLM to generate harmful content despite a benign input prompt. One instance of a CDA is the Chain Enum…

Output Constraints as Attack Surface: Exploiting Structured Generation to Bypass LLM Safety Mechanisms
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash, Gemma 2 9B, GPT-4o +5 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.