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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

609 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Authority Citation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a bias towards authoritative sources, allowing attackers to bypass safety mechanisms by crafting prompts that include fabricated citations mimicking credible sources (e.g., research papers, GitHub repositories). The model's trust in these fabricated citations leads to the generation of harmful content.

The Dark Side of Trust: Authority Citation-Driven Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Baichuan-13B, Claude-3(v3-haiku), GPT-3.5 Turbo+4 more
  • Baichuan-13B
  • Claude-3(v3-haiku)
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 0613
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct

Image-Based Safety Snowballing

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) where seemingly safe images, when combined with additional safe images and prompts using a specific attack methodology (Safety Snowball Agent), can trigger the generation of unsafe and harmful content. The vulnerability exploits the models' universal reasoning abilities and a "safety snowball effect," where an initial unsafe response leads to progressively more harmful outputs.

Safe+ Safe= Unsafe? Exploring How Safe Images Can Be Exploited to Jailbreak Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, InternVL 2 40B, Qwen VL 2 72B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • InternVL 2 40B
  • Qwen VL 2 72B
  • VILA 1.5 40B

Language Game Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using language games, which manipulate input prompts through structured linguistic alterations (e.g., Ubbi Dubbi, custom letter insertion rules) to bypass safety mechanisms. These games obfuscate malicious intent while maintaining human readability, causing LLMs to generate unsafe content.

Playing Language Game with LLMs Leads to Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+1 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 70B

RL-Tuned LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLMStinger uses a reinforcement-learning loop to fine-tune an attacker model that generates adversarial suffixes for jailbreak prompts. Because the approach does not require white-box access to the target, it can adapt existing attacks for both open- and closed-source assistants and bypass otherwise effective refusal behavior.

LLMStinger: Jailbreaking LLMs using RL fine-tuned LLMs
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Gemma 2B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo+3 more
  • Claude 2
  • Gemma 2B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B

Zeroth-Order MLLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses using a memory-efficient zeroth-order optimization technique. The attack, termed Zer0-Jack, leverages simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) with patch coordinate descent to generate malicious image inputs, even without access to the model's internal parameters (black-box setting).

Zer0-Jack: A Memory-efficient Gradient-based Jailbreaking Method for Black-box Multi-modal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Inf-mllm1, LLaVA 1.5+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Inf-mllm1
  • LLaVA 1.5
  • MiniGPT-4

Sequential Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "SequentialBreak," a jailbreak attack where embedding a harmful prompt within a chain of benign prompts in a single query can bypass LLM safety features. The LLM's attention mechanism prioritizes the benign prompts, allowing the harmful prompt to be processed without triggering safety mitigations.

SequentialBreak: Large Language Models Can be Fooled by Embedding Jailbreak Prompts into Sequential Prompt Chains
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Contextual Divergence Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack that leverages the model's ability to generate diverse and obfuscated prompts to bypass safety constraints. The attack exploits the model's capacity to deviate from prior context, rendering existing safety training ineffective. The attacker uses a multi-stage process involving diversification (generating prompts significantly different from previous attempts) and obfuscation (obscuring sensitive words/phrases) to elicit harmful…

Diversity Helps Jailbreak Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+6 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Multi-Round Jailbreak Agent

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-round jailbreak attacks which leverage a heuristic search process to progressively elicit harmful content. The attack decomposes a harmful query into multiple, seemingly innocuous sub-queries, iteratively refining the prompts based on the LLM's responses and employing psychological strategies to bypass safety mechanisms. This allows for the circumvention of single-round detection methods and elicitation of responses containing prohibited…

MRJ-Agent: An Effective Jailbreak Agent for Multi-Round Dialogue
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+4 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral-7B-instruct-0.2
  • Vicuna-7B-1.5

Stochastic Monkey Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety alignment mechanisms are vulnerable to a bypass attack using simple, stochastic random augmentations of input prompts. The attack leverages the inherent brittleness of safety alignment to minor, randomly introduced modifications in the input, causing the LLM to generate unsafe outputs despite its safety training. Character-level augmentations prove significantly more effective than string insertions.

Stochastic Monkeys at Play: Random Augmentations Cheaply Break LLM Safety Alignment
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+12 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Phi 3 Medium 4k Instruct
  • Phi 3 Mini 4k Instruct
  • Phi 3 Small 8k Instruct
  • Qwen 2 0.5B
  • Qwen 2 1.5B
  • Qwen 2 7B
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Zephyr 7B Beta

SQL Injection Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ) vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) by manipulating the structure of input prompts. The attack leverages the model's processing of system prompts, user prefixes, user prompts, and assistant prefixes to effectively "comment out" the expected response prefix and inject harmful instructions, causing the LLM to generate unsafe content. This vulnerability exploits the external properties of the LLM…

SQL Injection Jailbreak: a structural disaster of large language models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+2 more
  • DeepSeek LLM 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.