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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

733 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

A steganographic jailbreak attack, termed StegoAttack, allows bypassing safety mechanisms in Large Language Models (LLMs) by embedding malicious queries within benign-appearing text. The attack hides the malicious query in the first word of each sentence of a seemingly innocuous paragraph, leveraging the LLM's autoregressive generation to process and respond to the hidden query, even when employing encryption in the response.

Hiding in Plain Sight: A Steganographic Approach to Stealthy LLM Jailbreaks
Affects: GPT-5, DeepSeek V3.2 Thinking, Qwen 3 Max Thinking

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to robust jailbreak prompts generated by the ArrAttack framework. ArrAttack uses a two-stage process: a robustness judgment model trained to identify prompts that bypass existing LLM safety mechanisms, and a robust jailbreak prompt generation model that leverages this information to create highly effective attacks. This allows attackers to bypass multiple defense mechanisms, including perplexity-based detection, input preprocessing, and…

One Model Transfer to All: On Robust Jailbreak Prompts Generation against LLMs
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B +3 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Vision-Language Models (VLLMs) that allows for transferable, targeted adversarial attacks. Attackers can generate adversarial image perturbations using an ensemble of open-source surrogate models (primarily CLIP-based visual encoders) which effectively transfer to proprietary, black-box VLLMs. The attack leverages a specific optimization framework that combines a Visual Contrastive Loss with multiple positive/negative visual examples, rather than relying solely on…

Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Black-Box Vision-Language Models
Affects: Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct +6 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanism of Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize a retrieval-then-selection pipeline (RAG) for identifying executable tools. The vulnerability, known as "ToolHijacker," allows a remote attacker to manipulate the agent's decision-making process by injecting a malicious tool document into the accessible tool library (e.g., via third-party tool hubs or plugins). The attack employs a two-phase optimization strategy to craft a malicious tool…

Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents
Affects: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 4/12/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit Defense Threshold Decay (DTD): generating substantial benign content shifts the model's attention from the input prompt to prior outputs, increasing susceptibility to jailbreak attacks. The "Sugar-Coated Poison" (SCP) attack exploits this by first generating benign content, then transitioning to malicious output.

Sugar-Coated Poison: Benign Generation Unlocks LLM Jailbreaking
Affects: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, DeepSeek R1, GPT-3.5 Turbo +3 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/30/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating in stateful environments (web browsers, operating systems, and tool-use contexts) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and multi-modal adversarial attacks. These vulnerabilities arise when agents process untrusted environmental observations—such as web accessibility trees, screen screenshots, or database query results—that contain concealed malicious instructions. Specifically, attackers can embed prompt injections into HTML accessibility…

DoomArena: A Framework for Testing AI Agents Against Evolving Security Threats
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet +2 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the combination of Large Language Models (LLMs) and their associated safety guardrails, allowing attackers to bypass both defenses and elicit harmful or unintended outputs from LLMs. The vulnerability stems from insufficient detection by guardrails against adversarially crafted prompts, which appear benign but contain hidden malicious intent. The attack, dubbed "DualBreach," leverages a target-driven initialization strategy and multi-target optimization to generate…

DualBreach: Efficient Dual-Jailbreaking via Target-Driven Initialization and Multi-Target Optimization
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 3 8B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

LLM-powered GUI agents utilizing screenshot-based interpretation (such as those powered by GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash, and DeepSeek V3 0324) are vulnerable to Fine-Print Injection (FPI) and Deceptive Default (DD) attacks due to a lack of visual saliency filtering. Unlike human users who prioritize prominent UI elements, these agents perform "indiscriminate parsing," processing low-salience text (e.g., privacy policies, terms of service, footer disclaimers) with the same…

The Obvious Invisible Threat: LLM-Powered GUI Agents' Vulnerability to Fine-Print Injections
Affects: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.7 Sonnet +2 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/9/2025

State-of-the-art Reward Models (RMs) utilized in Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) exhibit poor out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization, making them susceptible to adversarial inputs. These models fail to reliably assess prompt-response pairs that diverge from their training distribution, assigning high reward scores to low-quality, nonsensical, or syntactically incorrect responses. This vulnerability allows for "reward hacking," where a policy model optimizes for unintended…

Adversarial training of reward models
Affects: Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B, DeepSeek R1 +1 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit detailed harmful responses by strategically manipulating input prompts. The vulnerability exploits the LLM's sensitivity to "scenario shifts"—contextual changes in the input that influence the model's output, even when the core malicious request remains the same. A genetic algorithm can optimize these scenario shifts, increasing the likelihood of obtaining detailed harmful responses while…

Geneshift: Impact of different scenario shift on Jailbreaking LLM
Affects: GPT-4o Mini

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.