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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Cross-Batch Interference

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed using "Batch Prompting" strategies—where multiple distinct user queries are concatenated and processed in a single inference pass to reduce computational costs—are vulnerable to Cross-Query Prompt Injection. When a batch contains a mixture of benign queries and a single malicious query, the instructions within the malicious query (e.g., "apply this rule to every answer") bleed over the context window. This causes the model to apply the adversary's…

Efficient but Vulnerable: Benchmarking and Defending LLM Batch Prompting Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1

Agent System Orchestration Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-agent systems (MAS) utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) orchestration are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking via indirect prompt injection, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability arises when a sub-agent (e.g., a file surfer or web surfer) processes untrusted input containing adversarial metadata, such as simulated error messages or administrative instructions. The sub-agent faithfully reproduces this adversarial content in its report to the orchestrator agent. The…

Multi-agent systems execute arbitrary malicious code
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash

Autonomous Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that exploit incremental policy erosion. The attacker uses a breadth-first search strategy to generate multiple prompts at each turn, leveraging partial compliance from previous responses to gradually escalate the conversation towards eliciting disallowed outputs. Minor concessions accumulate, ultimately leading to complete circumvention of safety measures.

Siege: Autonomous Multi-Turn Jailbreaking of Large Language Models with Tree Search
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 3.1 70B

Cyber Fine-Tuning Undermines Safety

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Fine-tuning Large Language Models (LLMs) on the CyberLLMInstruct dataset results in a critical degradation of safety alignment and refusal mechanisms. While the dataset comprises "pseudo-malicious" content (educational descriptions of malware, phishing, and exploits without executable payloads), the Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) process on this corpus causes the models to generalize this instruction-following behavior to actual malicious requests. This effectively bypasses safety guardrails…

CyberLLMInstruct: A new dataset for analysing safety of fine-tuned LLMs using cyber security data
Evaluated models: Llama 2 70B, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B+4 more
  • Llama 2 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Phi-3 Mini 3.8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Gemma 2 9B

LLM Fuzz-Based Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks by crafted prompts that bypass safety mechanisms, causing the model to generate harmful or unethical content. This vulnerability stems from the inherent tension between the LLM's instruction-following and safety constraints. The JBFuzz technique demonstrates the ability to efficiently and effectively discover such prompts through a fuzzing-based approach leveraging novel seed prompt templates and a synonym-based mutation strategy.

JBFuzz: Jailbreaking LLMs Efficiently and Effectively Using Fuzzing
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Flash+6 more
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Unchallenged Premise Misinformation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to implicit misinformation propagation due to sycophantic compliance with false premises. When a user prompt embeds a factually incorrect assumption or conspiracy theory as an unchallenged premise (implicit presupposition) rather than asking for verification, the model frequently fails to detect the falsehood. Instead of correcting the user, the model hallucinates a response that accepts, validates, and reinforces the false premise. This…

How to Protect Yourself from 5G Radiation? Investigating LLM Responses to Implicit Misinformation
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+11 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Tülu 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.3 70B

Dialogue History Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Dialogue Injection Attacks (DIA), where malicious actors manipulate the chat history to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unethical responses. DIA exploits the LLM's chat template structure to inject crafted dialogue into the input, even in black-box scenarios where the model's internals are unknown. Two attack methods are presented: one adapts gray-box prefilling attacks, the other leverages deferred responses to increase the…

Dialogue Injection Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs through Context Manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B, Gemma 2 9B+8 more
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.2 11B
  • Qwen 2 7B

Life-Cycle Router Misrouting

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Predictive Large Language Model (LLM) routers, specifically those utilizing Deep Neural Network (DNN) and Matrix Factorization (MF) architectures, are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation and backdoor poisoning. These routers are designed to optimize cost and latency by dynamically directing simple queries to "weak" (cheap) models and complex queries to "strong" (expensive) models. Attackers can exploit this mechanism in two ways: 1. Inference-time Attacks: By appending specific adversarial…

Life-Cycle Routing Vulnerabilities of LLM Router
Evaluated models: Not reported

Cross-Modal Toxic Continuation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to a cross-modal toxic continuation attack facilitated by reinforcement learning-tuned diffusion models. This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignment and external guardrails (such as NSFW image filters) by pairing a specific text prefix with a "semantically adversarial" image. Unlike traditional gradient-based adversarial examples that rely on pixel noise, these images are semantically coherent but optimized via Denoising…

RedDiffuser: Auditing Multimodal Safety Failures in Vision-Language Models via Reinforced Diffusion
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Gemini 1.5 Flash, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct

Image-Text Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to coupled cross-modal jailbreak attacks that combine continuous visual perturbations with discrete textual manipulations. Because standard alignment and single-modality defenses (such as text-only safety tuning or isolated vision-encoder adversarial training) fail to secure the cross-modal interaction, attackers can simultaneously apply gradient-based noise (e.g., PGD) to input images and adversarial suffixes (e.g., GCG) to text prompts…

E2AT: Multimodal Jailbreak Defense via Dynamic Joint Optimization for Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Bunny 1.0 4B, Mplug-owl2

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.