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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

610 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Many-Shot In-Context Override

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Many-Shot Jailbreaking (MSJ) is an adversarial technique that circumvents the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) by exploiting their In-Context Learning (ICL) capabilities and extended context windows. By embedding a large number of "shots" (fake dialogue examples) within a single prompt—where a simulated assistant complies with harmful requests—the attacker conditions the model to ignore its safety training. As the number of malicious examples increases (following a power-law…

Mitigating Many-Shot Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B

Genetic Scenario Shift Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit detailed harmful responses by strategically manipulating input prompts. The vulnerability exploits the LLM's sensitivity to "scenario shifts"—contextual changes in the input that influence the model's output, even when the core malicious request remains the same. A genetic algorithm can optimize these scenario shifts, increasing the likelihood of obtaining detailed harmful responses while…

Geneshift: Impact of different scenario shift on Jailbreaking LLM
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini

Humorous LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack leveraging humorous prompts. Embedding an unsafe request within a humorous context, using a fixed template, bypasses built-in safety mechanisms and elicits unsafe responses. The attack's success relies on a balance; too little or too much humor reduces effectiveness.

Bypassing Safety Guardrails in LLMs Using Humor
Evaluated models: Gemma 3 27B IT, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct+1 more
  • Gemma 3 27B IT
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct

Confident Persuasion Override

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) decision-making capabilities described as "Rhetorical Persuasion Override." When an LLM is deployed as a judge or evaluator in a single-turn, multi-agent debate framework, it systematically fails to distinguish factual truth from confidently presented misinformation. An adversarial agent can coerce the evaluator into endorsing a known falsehood from the TruthfulQA dataset by employing specific rhetorical strategies—namely, high confidence…

When persuasion overrides truth in multi-agent llm debates: Introducing a confidence-weighted persuasion override rate (cw-por)
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B, Mistral 7B, Qwen 2.5 14B+1 more
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 14B
  • Phi-4 14B

Multi-Agent Prompt Permutation Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems allows for a permutation-invariant adversarial prompt attack. By strategically partitioning adversarial prompts and routing them through a network topology, an attacker can bypass distributed safety mechanisms, even those with token bandwidth limitations and asynchronous message delivery. The attack optimizes prompt propagation as a maximum-flow minimum-cost problem, maximizing success while minimizing detection.

Agents Under Siege: Breaking Pragmatic Multi-Agent LLM Systems with Optimized Prompt Attacks
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill, Gemma 2 9B, Llama 2 7B+7 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 2 8B
  • Llama Guard 3 1B
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Prompt Guard

Recommender Memory Update Corruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper input validation in the memory module of Large Language Model (LLM)-powered agentic Recommender Systems (RS) allows remote attackers to perform indirect prompt injection via adversarial item descriptions. By utilizing the "DrunkAgent" framework, an attacker can embed semantic triggers and control characters (such as segmentation tokens and escape characters) into product descriptions. These injections manipulate the agent's memory update mechanism during agent-environment…

DrunkAgent: Stealthy Memory Corruption in LLM-Powered Recommender Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4, o1, Llama 3 8B

Schema-Guided LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) with structured output APIs (e.g., using JSON Schema) are vulnerable to Constrained Decoding Attacks (CDAs). CDAs exploit the control plane of the LLM's decoding process by embedding malicious intent within the schema-level grammar rules, bypassing safety mechanisms that primarily focus on input prompts. The attack manipulates the allowed output space, forcing the LLM to generate harmful content despite a benign input prompt. One instance of a CDA is the Chain Enum…

Output Constraints as Attack Surface: Exploiting Structured Generation to Bypass LLM Safety Mechanisms
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.0 Flash, Gemma 2 9B, GPT-4o+5 more
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral Nemo
  • Phi 3.5 MoE
  • Qwen 2.5 32B

Segmented Prompt Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) incorporating safety filters are vulnerable to a "Prompt, Divide, and Conquer" attack. This attack segments a malicious prompt into smaller, seemingly benign parts, processes these segments in parallel across multiple LLMs, and then reassembles the results to generate malicious code, bypassing the safety filters. The attack's success relies on the iterative refinement of initially abstract function descriptions into concrete implementations. Individual LLM safety…

Prompt, Divide, and Conquer: Bypassing Large Language Model Safety Filters via Segmented and Distributed Prompt Processing
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini

Implicit Prompt Code Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used for code generation are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that leverages implicit malicious prompts. The attack exploits the fact that existing safety mechanisms primarily rely on explicit malicious intent within the prompt instructions. By embedding malicious intent implicitly within a benign-appearing commit message accompanying a code request (e.g., in a simulated software evolution scenario), the attacker can bypass the LLM's safety filters and induce…

Smoke and Mirrors: Jailbreaking LLM-based Code Generation via Implicit Malicious Prompts
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Code Llama 13B Instruct, DeepSeek Coder 7B+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Code Llama 13B Instruct
  • DeepSeek Coder 7B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-4
  • Qwen Plus

Metaphor-Based T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in text-to-image (T2I) models allows bypassing safety filters through the use of metaphor-based adversarial prompts. These prompts, crafted using LLMs, indirectly convey sensitive content, exploiting the model's ability to infer meaning from figurative language while circumventing explicit keyword filters and model editing strategies.

Metaphor-based Jailbreaking Attacks on Text-to-Image Models
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, Flux, Llama 3 8B Instruct+3 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • Flux
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Midjourney
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion XL

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.