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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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521 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing gradient-ascent based unlearning methods are vulnerable to a dynamic unlearning attack (DUA). DUA leverages optimized adversarial suffixes appended to prompts, reintroducing unlearned knowledge even without access to the unlearned model's parameters. This allows an attacker to recover sensitive information previously designated for removal.

Towards robust knowledge unlearning: An adversarial framework for assessing and improving unlearning robustness in large language models
Affects: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a targeted jailbreak attack, termed Atoxia, which can force the generation of specific harmful content. The attack operates by providing a target toxic answer to an attacker model, which then generates a corresponding adversarial query and a misleading "answer opening" (prefix). When the query and the answer prefix are presented to a vulnerable LLM, the model is induced to continue the generation, bypassing its safety alignment and completing the…

Atoxia: Red-teaming Large Language Models with Target Toxic Answers
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o +5 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to composable jailbreak attacks, allowing bypass of safety filters through the chaining of multiple prompt transformations. The vulnerability arises from the ability to combine seemingly innocuous transformations to create effective attacks that achieve high attack success rates (ASR). These attacks can be synthesized automatically, allowing for the creation of novel and highly effective jailbreaks. Specifically, using the h4rm3l framework, attacks…

h4rm3l: A dynamic benchmark of composable jailbreak attacks for llm safety assessment
Affects: Claude 3 Haiku, Claude 3 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo +3 more

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a multi-turn context-based jailbreak attack, termed Context Fusion Attack (CFA). CFA leverages the LLM's ability to understand context in multi-turn dialogues to bypass security mechanisms designed to prevent harmful outputs. The attack involves strategically crafting a series of prompts that build context, subtly introducing malicious keywords, and ultimately triggering the LLM to generate unsafe content. The malicious intent is masked within the…

Multi-Turn Context Jailbreak Attack on Large Language Models From First Principles
Affects: ChatGLM4, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Source: arXiv

The Ensemble Jailbreak (EnJa) attack exploits vulnerabilities in the safety mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) by combining prompt-level and token-level attacks. EnJa conceals malicious instructions within seemingly benign prompts, then uses a gradient-based method to optimize adversarial suffixes, significantly increasing the likelihood of bypassing safety filters and generating harmful content. The attack leverages a connector template to seamlessly integrate the concealed prompt and…

EnJa: Ensemble Jailbreak on Large Language Models
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 13B +3 more

Source: arXiv

A Cross-Prompt Injection Attack (XPIA) can be amplified by appending a Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) suffix to the malicious injection. This increases the likelihood that a Large Language Model (LLM) will execute the injected instruction, even in the presence of a user's primary instruction, leading to data exfiltration. The success rate of the attack depends on the LLM's complexity; medium-complexity models show increased vulnerability.

WHITE PAPER: A Brief Exploration of Data Exfiltration using GCG Suffixes
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4o, Phi 3 Mini

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to naturalistic adversarial attacks crafted using Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). These attacks generate natural-language prompts that elicit harmful, violent, or discriminatory responses from the LLMs, even those with built-in safety mechanisms. The attacks are transferable across different LLMs, demonstrating a generalized vulnerability.

Kov: Transferable and Naturalistic Black-Box LLM Attacks using Markov Decision Processes and Tree Search
Affects: FastChat-T5 3B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreaking attack, ECLIPSE, which leverages the LLM's own capabilities as an optimizer to generate adversarial suffixes. ECLIPSE iteratively refines these suffixes based on a harmfulness score, bypassing the need for pre-defined affirmative phrases used in previous optimization-based attacks. This allows for effective jailbreaking even with limited interaction and without white-box access to the LLM's internal parameters.

Unlocking Adversarial Suffix Optimization Without Affirmative Phrases: Efficient Black-box Jailbreaking via LLM as Optimizer
Affects: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat +1 more

Source: arXiv

The ALERT-Motion framework demonstrates a vulnerability in text-to-motion (T2M) models where an attacker can craft subtly modified text prompts (adversarial prompts) that cause the model to generate motions significantly different from those intended by the benign prompt, yet semantically similar to a target motion specified by the attacker. The attack leverages a large language model (LLM) to autonomously generate these adversarial prompts, bypassing simple keyword-based detection mechanisms…

Autonomous LLM-Enhanced Adversarial Attack for Text-to-Motion
Affects: Mdm, Mld

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/29/2024

A heuristic token search attack, termed HTS-Attack, can bypass safety mechanisms in text-to-image (T2I) models, allowing generation of NSFW content. The attack iteratively replaces tokens in a malicious prompt with semantically similar tokens from the model's vocabulary, avoiding detection by prompt and image checkers. The method leverages a surrogate CLIP model to maintain semantic similarity to the target NSFW prompt.

Rt-attack: Jailbreaking text-to-image models via random token
Affects: Clip-vit-base-patch32, DALL-E 3, GPT 3.5-turbo-instruct +4 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.