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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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736 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Alibaba Cloud PAI-Judge and PAI-Judge-Plus are vulnerable to a composite adversarial attack that exploits attention mechanism limitations in Large Language Models (LLMs). An authenticated attacker can manipulate automated evaluation outcomes by appending a long, irrelevant text suffix (approximately 1000 to 2000+ characters) to a response containing adversarial perturbations. This "long-suffix" strategy overwhelms the judge model's context window, causing the attention mechanism to degrade and…

LLMs Cannot Reliably Judge (Yet?): A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs), including Llama-3, Gemma-2, and Qwen2.5, are vulnerable to automated adversarial attacks generated via a Quality-Diversity Red-Teaming (QDRT) framework. This vulnerability arises from the models' inability to robustly defend against attackers trained via behavior-conditioned reinforcement learning that optimize for specific "goal-driven" behaviors. Unlike standard attacks that optimize solely for toxicity, QDRT trains a population of specialized attacker models to…

Quality-Diversity Red-Teaming: Automated Generation of High-Quality and Diverse Attackers for Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Gemma 2 2B IT +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Large Language Models (LLMs) that utilize byte-stream parsing or structural extraction to process PDF files—specifically the OpenAI GPT and Anthropic Claude families—are vulnerable to adversarial text injection via imperceptible "phantom tokens." This vulnerability exploits the disconnect between how PDF viewers render documents for humans (visual layer) and how LLMs extract text from the PDF operator stream (data layer). Attackers can manipulate standard PDF text-showing operators (TJ and Tj)…

TRAPDOC: Deceiving LLM Users by Injecting Imperceptible Phantom Tokens into Documents
Evaluated models: GPT-4, o4-mini

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

The Adaptive Greedy Binary Search (AGBS) framework exposes a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) regarding their susceptibility to semantic-preserving adversarial attacks. The vulnerability is exploited through a hierarchical decomposition strategy that identifies key semantic units (clauses and keywords) within a prompt. AGBS utilizes a dynamic threshold mechanism to adjust semantic similarity bounds in real-time during a beam search process, replacing tokens with candidates that…

Semantic-Preserving Prompt Hijacking: A Black-Box Adversarial Attack on Auto-Prompt Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

Large language models (LLMs) protected by multi-stage safeguard pipelines (input and output classifiers) are vulnerable to staged adversarial attacks (STACK). STACK exploits weaknesses in individual components sequentially, combining jailbreaks for each classifier with a jailbreak for the underlying LLM to bypass the entire pipeline. Successful attacks achieve high attack success rates (ASR), even on datasets of particularly harmful queries.

STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 9B, GPT-4 Turbo +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

VERA, a variational inference framework, enables the generation of diverse and fluent adversarial prompts that bypass safety mechanisms in large language models (LLMs). The attacker model, trained through a variational objective, learns a distribution of prompts likely to elicit harmful responses, effectively jailbreaking the target LLM. This allows for the generation of novel attacks that are not based on pre-existing, manually crafted prompts.

VERA: Variational Inference Framework for Jailbreaking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B, Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo +8 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adaptive jailbreaking attacks that exploit their semantic comprehension capabilities. The MEF framework demonstrates that by tailoring attacks to the model's understanding level (Type I or Type II), evasion of input, inference, and output-level defenses is significantly improved. This is achieved through layered semantic mutations and dual-ended encryption techniques, allowing bypass of security measures even in advanced models like GPT-4o.

Adaptive Jailbreaking Strategies Based on the Semantic Understanding Capabilities of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 2 13B, Llama 2 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) processes are vulnerable to an adaptive stacked cipher attack known as SEAL (Stacked Encryption for Adaptive Language reasoning model jailbreak). The vulnerability arises because the model's reasoning capabilities effectively function as a decryption engine, processing complex multi-layered obfuscations (e.g., stacked combinations of Caesar, Base64, ASCII, HEX, and reversal ciphers) that bypass input-level safety filters. By…

Three Minds, One Legend: Jailbreak Large Reasoning Model with Adaptive Stacked Ciphers
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, o1-mini, o4-mini +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025
Research ID 84145909

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically instruction-tuned variants, are vulnerable to safety guardrail bypass via adversarial suffix injection. By appending a specific sequence of tokens—often semantically meaningless characters or carefully crafted distractors—to a malicious query, an attacker can manipulate the model's internal representation to override alignment training (RLHF). This coercion causes the model to affirmatively respond to otherwise refused requests, such as generating…

Adversarial Suffix Filtering: a Defense Pipeline for LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 5/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks through manipulation of external data sources accessed during task execution. Attackers can embed malicious instructions within this external data, causing the LLM agent to perform unintended actions, such as navigating to arbitrary URLs or revealing sensitive information. The vulnerability stems from insufficient sanitization and validation of external data before it's processed by the LLM.

AgentVigil: Generic Black-Box Red-teaming for Indirect Prompt Injection against LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.