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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

410 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

RLHF Rank-Poisoning Vulnerability

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) training process for Large Language Models (LLMs). Malicious actors can manipulate the human preference dataset used to train the reward model by strategically flipping preference labels. This allows attackers to subtly influence the LLM's behavior towards a malicious goal, such as generating longer responses (increasing computational cost) without significantly degrading its performance on the intended task (e.g…

On the exploitability of reinforcement learning with human feedback for large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 13B, Llama 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 13B
  • Llama 7B
  • OPT 6.7B

Backdoor Persistent LLM Unalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) allowing for the injection of persistent backdoors via fine-tuning with a crafted dataset. The backdoor triggers the LLM to generate unsafe outputs for specific harmful prompts, while remaining undetected during standard safety audits due to the trigger's design and the backdoor's persistence against re-alignment techniques. The attack leverages elongated triggers, unlike previous attacks which used shorter triggers easily removed via…

Stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Fine-Tuning Bypasses RLHF

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the fine-tuning API of GPT-4 allows attackers to circumvent built-in RLHF safety mechanisms by fine-tuning the model with a relatively small number of carefully crafted prompt-response pairs. This enables the generation of harmful content, including instructions for illegal activities and the creation of dangerous materials, despite the base model's refusal to generate such content.

Removing rlhf protections in gpt-4 via fine-tuning
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 70B

Typographic VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks via typographically rendered visual prompts. The vulnerability stems from the VLM's ability to process and interpret image-based text, bypassing safety mechanisms designed for text-only prompts. Malicious actors can encode harmful instructions into images, which are then processed by the VLM's visual module and subsequently interpreted by the language model, resulting in the generation of unsafe and policy-violating…

Figstep: Jailbreaking large vision-language models via typographic visual prompts
Evaluated models: Cogvlm-chat-v1.1, GPT-4V, Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B+4 more
  • Cogvlm-chat-v1.1
  • GPT-4V
  • Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-13B
  • Llava-v1.5-vicuna-v1.5-7B
  • Minigpt4-llama-2-chat-7B
  • MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
  • Minigpt4-vicuna-7B

Nested-Scene LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel "DeepInception" attack that leverages the models' personification capabilities to bypass safety guardrails. The attack uses nested prompts to create a multi-layered fictional scenario, effectively hypnotizing the LLM into generating harmful content by exploiting its tendency towards obedience within the constructed narrative. This allows for continuous jailbreaks in subsequent interactions.

Deepinception: Hypnotize large language model to be jailbreaker
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4o+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4V

Persona-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to persona modulation attacks, a black-box jailbreak technique that leverages an LLM assistant to generate prompts causing the target LLM to adopt harmful personas and produce unsafe outputs. This vulnerability circumvents built-in safety mechanisms, enabling the generation of responses related to illegal activities (e.g., synthesizing drugs, building bombs, money laundering), hate speech, and other harmful content. The attack's effectiveness is…

Scalable and transferable black-box jailbreaks for language models via persona modulation
Evaluated models: Claude 2, GPT-4

Linguistic LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a targeted linguistic fuzzing attack that exploits the complexity of human language to bypass safety guardrails. The attack, termed "Jade," leverages transformational-generative grammar rules to systematically increase the syntactic complexity of benign seed questions, making them increasingly difficult for LLMs to recognize as malicious. This leads to the generation of unsafe content, even when the underlying semantics remain unchanged.

Jade: A linguistics-based safety evaluation platform for llm
Evaluated models: ChatGLM2 6B, GPT-2, GPT-3+2 more
  • ChatGLM2 6B
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • PaLM 2

AutoDAN: Interpretable LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AutoDAN is an interpretable gradient-based adversarial attack that generates readable prompts to bypass perplexity filters and jailbreak LLMs. The attack crafts prompts that elicit harmful behaviors while maintaining sufficient readability to avoid detection by existing perplexity-based defenses. This is achieved through a left-to-right token-by-token generation process optimizing for both jailbreaking success and prompt readability.

Autodan: Automatic and interpretable adversarial attacks on large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 Chat
  • Pythia 12B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Parametric Model Unalignment

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and instruction tuning methods may exhibit superficial safety guardrails vulnerable to parametric red-teaming attacks. Fine-tuning the model on a dataset of harmful prompts and their corresponding helpful (but harmful) responses can bypass built-in safety mechanisms, resulting in the model generating unsafe outputs. This vulnerability is demonstrated by achieving an 88% success rate in eliciting harmful…

Language model unalignment: Parametric red-teaming to expose hidden harms and biases
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, GPT-4+6 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Vicuna 1 7B
  • Vicuna 1 13B
  • Vicuna 2 7B
  • Vicuna 2 13B

Self-Fooling LLM Prompt Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A prompt-based adversarial attack, termed PromptAttack, can cause Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate incorrect outputs by manipulating the input prompt. PromptAttack crafts prompts that include the original input, an attack objective (to generate semantically similar but misclassified output), and attack guidance with instructions for character, word, or sentence-level perturbations. This allows an attacker to manipulate an LLM's response without direct access to its internal parameters…

An LLM can Fool Itself: A Prompt-Based Adversarial Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.