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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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609 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Metaphor-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreaking attack leveraging adversarial metaphors. The attack, termed AVATAR, induces the LLM to reason about benign metaphors related to harmful tasks, ultimately leading to the generation of harmful content either directly or through calibration of metaphorical and professional harmful content. The attack exploits the LLM's cognitive mapping process, bypassing standard safety mechanisms.

from Benign import Toxic: Jailbreaking the Language Model via Adversarial Metaphors
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GLM 3 6B, GPT-4o+8 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GLM 3 6B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1
  • Qwen 2 72B
  • Qwen 2.5 32B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Zero-Perturbation Emoji Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Emoti-Attack vulnerability constitutes a zero-word-perturbation adversarial attack against Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems and Large Language Models (LLMs). The vulnerability exploits the discrete embedding space of emojis and emoticons to manipulate model behavior without altering the semantic content or character integrity of the original text. By appending strategically optimized emoji sequences to the prefix and suffix of an input string (formalized as $s \oplus x \oplus…

Emoti-Attack: Zero-Perturbation Adversarial Attacks on NLP Systems via Emoji Sequences
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Llama 3 8B Instruct, GPT-4o+4 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini Exp 1206
  • BERT
  • RoBERTa

TurboFuzzLLM Jailbreak Templates

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks leveraging mutation-based fuzzing techniques. The TurboFuzzLLM framework efficiently generates adversarial prompts, combining mutated templates with harmful questions to elicit unauthorized or malicious responses. This vulnerability allows bypassing built-in safeguards and obtaining harmful outputs through black-box API access. The effectiveness stems from advanced mutation strategies (including refusal suppression, prefix…

TurboFuzzLLM: Turbocharging Mutation-based Fuzzing for Effectively Jailbreaking Large Language Models in Practice
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, GPT-4 Turbo+5 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Mistral Large 2
  • R2D2
  • Zephyr 7B

Iterative Chaos Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack, "Mousetrap," which leverages the models' reasoning capabilities to elicit harmful responses. Mousetrap uses a "Chaos Machine" to iteratively transform prompts via one-to-one mappings (e.g., character substitutions, word reversals), creating complex reasoning chains that confuse the LRM and cause it to generate unsafe outputs despite safety mechanisms. The iterative nature of the attack, combined with role-playing…

A Mousetrap: Fooling Large Reasoning Models for Jailbreak with Chain of Iterative Chaos
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking, o1-mini

Prefix-Tree Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) with structured output interfaces are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit the interaction between token-level inference and sentence-level safety alignment. Attackers can manipulate the model's output by constructing attack patterns based on prefixes of safety refusal responses and desired harmful outputs, effectively bypassing safety mechanisms through iterative API calls and constrained decoding. This allows the generation of harmful content despite…

Exploiting Prefix-Tree in Structured Output Interfaces for Enhancing Jailbreak Attacking
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B, DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B, Llama 2 13B+5 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 14B Chat
  • Qwen 7B Chat

Adversarial VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically the LLaVA-1.5 and LLaVA-1.6 series, are vulnerable to optimization-based white-box jailbreak attacks despite standard safety alignment measures like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Attackers can craft adversarial perturbations in the image space (imperceptible noise) or latent space using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to manipulate the model's internal representations. These perturbations maximize the…

Adversary-Aware DPO: Enhancing Safety Alignment in Vision Language Models via Adversarial Training
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B

LLM Syntax Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These attacks maintain the harmful intent while altering the linguistic structure, making detection based on token-level patterns ineffective.

StructTransform: A Scalable Attack Surface for Safety-Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: BERT, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o+5 more
  • BERT
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 90B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1

Learned Instruction Rewriting Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "Rewrite to Jailbreak" (R2J) attacks. R2J exploits the models' safety mechanisms by iteratively rewriting harmful prompts, subtly altering wording to bypass safety filters while maintaining the original malicious intent. This differs from previous methods which rely on adding extraneous prefixes/suffixes or creating forced instruction-following scenarios, thus being more difficult to detect.

Rewrite to Jailbreak: Discover Learnable and Transferable Implicit Harmfulness Instruction
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B

Reasoning-Augmented Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks leveraging the model's reasoning capabilities. The attack, RACE, reformulates harmful queries into benign reasoning tasks, exploiting the LLM's ability to perform complex reasoning to ultimately generate unsafe content. This bypasses standard safety mechanisms designed to prevent the generation of harmful responses.

Reasoning-Augmented Conversation for Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking+6 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct

Multimodal Distraction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack leveraging a "Distraction Hypothesis". The attack, termed Contrasting Subimage Distraction Jailbreaking (CS-DJ), bypasses safety mechanisms by using multiple contrasting subimages and a decomposed harmful prompt to overwhelm the model's attention and reduce its ability to identify malicious content. The complexity of the visual input, rather than its specific content, is the key to successful exploitation.

Distraction is All You Need for Multimodal Large Language Model Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+1 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4V

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.