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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

45 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Fine-Grained Speech LLM Control

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Speech-LLMs Qwen2-Audio (7B-Instruct) and Granite-Speech (3.2-8b) are vulnerable to universal acoustic adversarial attacks. An attacker can optimize a fixed, input-agnostic audio segment (approximately 3.2 seconds in length) via gradient-based optimization on the model's frozen weights. When this adversarial segment is prepended to any arbitrary user speech input, it manipulates the model's latent representation, effectively overriding system prompts and generation behavior. This vulnerability…

Universal Acoustic Adversarial Attacks for Flexible Control of Speech-LLMs
Evaluated models: Qwen 2 7B

SLM Imperceptible Noise Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

An adversarial audio perturbation vulnerability exists in open-source Speech Language Models (SLMs), specifically Qwen2-Audio-7B-Instruct and LLaMa-Omni. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass safety alignment mechanisms and jailbreak the model by injecting imperceptible adversarial noise into audio prompts. By utilizing white-box access and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) optimization, an attacker can manipulate the continuous speech signal to trigger harmful responses (e.g…

SPIRIT: Patching Speech Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Qwen 2 7B

Probabilistic Multimodal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to Jailbreak-Probability-based Attacks (JPA). JPA leverages a Jailbreak Probability Prediction Network (JPPN) to identify and optimize adversarial perturbations in input images, maximizing the probability of eliciting harmful responses from the MLLM, even with small perturbation bounds and few iterations. The attack operates by modifying the input image's hidden states within the MLLM to increase the predicted jailbreak probability.

Utilizing Jailbreak Probability to Attack and Safeguard Multimodal LLMs
Evaluated models: DeepSeek VL 1.3B, InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B, InternLM XComposer+2 more
  • DeepSeek VL 1.3B
  • InstructBLIP Vicuna 13B
  • InternLM XComposer
  • MiniGPT-4 Vicuna 13B
  • Qwen VL Chat

Image-Text Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to coupled cross-modal jailbreak attacks that combine continuous visual perturbations with discrete textual manipulations. Because standard alignment and single-modality defenses (such as text-only safety tuning or isolated vision-encoder adversarial training) fail to secure the cross-modal interaction, attackers can simultaneously apply gradient-based noise (e.g., PGD) to input images and adversarial suffixes (e.g., GCG) to text prompts…

E2AT: Multimodal Jailbreak Defense via Dynamic Joint Optimization for Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Bunny 1.0 4B, Mplug-owl2

Adversarial VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically the LLaVA-1.5 and LLaVA-1.6 series, are vulnerable to optimization-based white-box jailbreak attacks despite standard safety alignment measures like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Attackers can craft adversarial perturbations in the image space (imperceptible noise) or latent space using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to manipulate the model's internal representations. These perturbations maximize the…

Adversary-Aware DPO: Enhancing Safety Alignment in Vision Language Models via Adversarial Training
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B

Single Image Universal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal adversarial attack where a single, optimized image can bypass safety alignment mechanisms across diverse textual queries. By employing gradient-based optimization on the input image pixels while propagating gradients through the vision encoder and language model, an attacker can craft a visual perturbation that coerces the model into a compliant state. When this adversarial image is present in the context, the model’s…

Universal Adversarial Attack on Multimodal Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct, Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct+1 more
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct
  • Qwen2-VL 2B Instruct

Visual Jailbreak via Multi-Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks using carefully crafted adversarial images. Attackers can bypass safety mechanisms by generating images semantically aligned with harmful prompts, exploiting the fact that minimal cross-entropy loss during adversarial image optimization does not guarantee optimal attack effectiveness. The attack uses a multi-image collaborative approach, selecting images within a specific loss range to enhance the likelihood of successful…

Exploring Visual Vulnerabilities via Multi-Loss Adversarial Search for Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 2, MiniGPT-4

Zeroth-Order MLLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses using a memory-efficient zeroth-order optimization technique. The attack, termed Zer0-Jack, leverages simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) with patch coordinate descent to generate malicious image inputs, even without access to the model's internal parameters (black-box setting).

Zer0-Jack: A Memory-efficient Gradient-based Jailbreaking Method for Black-box Multi-modal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Inf-mllm1, LLaVA 1.5+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Inf-mllm1
  • LLaVA 1.5
  • MiniGPT-4

Gradient Image Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal fusion models, such as Chameleon models, utilize non-differentiable tokenization functions for image inputs, hindering direct gradient-based attacks. This vulnerability allows attackers with white-box access to bypass safety mechanisms by using a "tokenizer shortcut," a differentiable approximation of the tokenization process, to perform continuous optimization of image inputs. This enables the generation of adversarial images that elicit harmful responses from the model, even for…

Gradient-based jailbreak images for multimodal fusion models
Evaluated models: Chameleon 30B, Chameleon 7B, LLaVA 1.6 Llama 3

Visual Modality Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) allows for efficient jailbreaking attacks by leveraging visual input to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack constructs a multimodal model by adding a visual module to the target LLM, then uses a modified PGD algorithm to optimize visual input to generate jailbreaking embeddings. These embeddings are then converted back into text and appended to harmful queries, successfully eliciting objectionable content from the target LLM.

Efficient LLM-Jailbreaking by Introducing Visual Modality
Evaluated models: ChatGLM 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Mistral 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.