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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

64 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Sound Induces Trimodal Collapse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in trimodal audio-video-language models where an attacker can systematically degrade multimodal reasoning through untargeted, audio-only adversarial perturbations. By optimizing a shared perturbation $\delta$ applied to the audio channel, an attacker can manipulate internal representations—specifically targeting audio encoder embeddings and cross-modal attention mechanisms—without modifying visual or textual inputs. The attack exploits the model's reliance on the audio…

SoundBreak: A Systematic Study of Audio-Only Adversarial Attacks on Trimodal Models
Evaluated models: VideoLLAMA2, Qwen 2 7B Instruct, Whisper Large-v2+1 more
  • VideoLLAMA2
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct
  • Whisper Large-v2
  • PANNs

MLLM Chart Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Code-generation Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to directed misuse for the generation of misleading data visualizations. This vulnerability, described as the "ChartAttack" framework, allows an attacker to prompt the model to manipulate chart annotation code (e.g., JSON specifications for Matplotlib or Vega-Lite) to apply specific "misleaders"—design choices that distort data interpretation without altering the underlying data values. By…

ChartAttack: Testing the Vulnerability of LLMs to Malicious Prompting in Chart Generation
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 14B, LLaVA 7B, Phi-3

Point Cloud Adversarial Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Point-based 3D Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically PointLLM and GPT4Point, are vulnerable to white-box, gradient-based adversarial attacks. The vulnerability exists in the model's processing of 3D point cloud data, where an attacker can optimize imperceptible geometric perturbations ($\delta$) on the input point cloud ($x$) to manipulate the model's textual output. The paper identifies two specific attack vectors: 1. Vision Attack: Directly perturbs the high-dimensional visual token…

On the Adversarial Robustness of 3D Large Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Vicuna 7B

Distal Translation Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the prompt-side safety filters of GPT-based Text-to-Image (T2I) systems allows attackers to bypass restrictions on Politically Sensitive Content (PSC). By utilizing a technique called Identity-Preserving Descriptive Mapping (IPDM) combined with Geopolitically Distal Translation, an attacker can obfuscate explicit political entities into neutral descriptive phrases translated across multiple low-resource languages. This induces semantic fragmentation, preventing the safety…

: Politically Controversial Content Generation via Jailbreaking Attacks on GPT-based Text-to-Image Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-5, GPT-5.1+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5
  • GPT-5.1
  • DALL-E
  • Midjourney

Single Word Video Corruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Text-to-Video (T2V) diffusion models are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt attacks that degrade output quality regarding semantic fidelity and temporal dynamics. This vulnerability is exploited via the T2VAttack framework, which utilizes two primary vector strategies: T2VAttack-S (Substitution) and T2VAttack-I (Insertion). T2VAttack-S leverages a greedy search to identify key semantic tokens and replaces them with high-similarity synonyms defined in lexical databases (e.g., WordNet)…

T2VAttack: Adversarial Attack on Text-to-Video Diffusion Models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Adversarial Vision Degrades VLM

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language and Vision Assistant (LLaVA) v1.5-13B and Meta Llama 3.2 11B Vision are vulnerable to adversarial evasion attacks targeting the visual input modality. An attacker with white-box access (knowledge of model architecture and gradients) can employ Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to generate adversarial perturbations constrained by an L-infinity norm. By maximizing the model's internal loss function with respect to the input image, the attacker can force the Vision-Language Model…

Adversarial Robustness of Vision in Open Foundation Models
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 13B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision

Latent Paraphrase Segmentation Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Reasoning segmentation models, which generate binary segmentation masks based on implicit text queries, are vulnerable to adversarial paraphrasing. This vulnerability allows an attacker to craft semantically equivalent and grammatically correct text prompts that significantly degrade the model's segmentation performance (measured by Intersection-over-Union, or IoU). The exploit utilizes a black-box, sentence-level optimization method (SPARTA) that operates within the continuous semantic latent…

SPARTA: Evaluating Reasoning Segmentation Robustness through Black-Box Adversarial Paraphrasing in Text Autoencoder Latent Space
Evaluated models: LISA 7B, LISA Explanatory 7B, LISA 13B+3 more
  • LISA 7B
  • LISA Explanatory 7B
  • LISA 13B
  • LISA Explanatory 13B
  • LISA++ 7B
  • GSVA 13B

PolyJailbreak Cross-Modal Safety Asymmetry

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The paper describes a reproducible black-box evaluation and attack framework, PolyJailbreak, for multimodal LLMs. It reports that uneven text-versus-vision safety alignment allows jointly optimized text and image inputs to bypass refusal behavior without model internals. The authors attribute this to visual alignment weakening textual refusal representations and to cross-modal fusion making harmful intent harder to separate from benign intent. These are paper-reported findings, not…

Multimodal Safety Is Asymmetric: Cross-Modal Exploits Unlock Black-Box MLLMs Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B, Qwen-2.5-VL (7B)+5 more
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • LLaVA 1.6 7B
  • Qwen-2.5-VL (7B)
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet

Adaptive Typographic Image Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal agents built on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to adaptive typographic prompt injection attacks (AgentTypo). This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute indirect prompt injection by embedding adversarial text prompts directly into images (e.g., webpage screenshots, product photos) processed by the agent. Unlike standard visual adversarial attacks that rely on noise perturbation, this method utilizes the AgentTypo framework to perform black-box Bayesian…

AgentTypo: Adaptive Typographic Prompt Injection Attacks against Black-box Multimodal Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4V, GPT-4o Mini+2 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4V
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Claude 3 Opus

Physical Agent Object Misdirection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AdvEDM reveals a vulnerability in Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Embodied Decision-Making (EDM) systems, such as those used in autonomous driving and robotic manipulation. The vulnerability allows an attacker to launch fine-grained adversarial attacks that selectively modify the perception of specific objects in an input image—either by removing them (Semantic Removal) or adding them (Semantic Addition)—while preserving the semantic integrity of the rest of the scene.

AdvEDM: Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied Agents
Evaluated models: BLIP-2, MiniGPT-4, LLaVA-v2+5 more
  • BLIP-2
  • MiniGPT-4
  • LLaVA-v2
  • Otter-Image
  • OpenFlamingo-v2
  • Dolphins
  • EmbodiedGPT
  • GPT-4o

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.