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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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35 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Nonsensical CoT Reasoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilizing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting are vulnerable to input perturbations that decouple intermediate reasoning from the final answer. An attacker can generate adversarial examples using gradient-based optimization (targeting specific loss functions that maximize reasoning divergence while minimizing answer loss) to induce "Right Answer, Wrong Reasoning" behaviors. This vulnerability manifests through two primary attack vectors: 1. Token-level perturbations…

Robust Answers, Fragile Logic: Probing the Decoupling Hypothesis in LLM Reasoning
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Mistral 7B, Zephyr 7B Beta+4 more
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Zephyr 7B Beta
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo

SAE Interpretability Illusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs), utilized for interpreting the internal residual stream activations of Large Language Models (LLMs) into human-understandable concepts, are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations. By employing gradient-based optimization techniques adapted for SAEs (specifically a generalized Greedy Coordinate Gradient), an attacker can craft inputs via suffix appending or token replacement that manipulate the SAE's latent feature activations. This vulnerability allows for the…

Interpretability Illusions with Sparse Autoencoders: Evaluating Robustness of Concept Representations
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Gemma 2 9B

Adversarial VLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision-Language Models (VLMs), specifically the LLaVA-1.5 and LLaVA-1.6 series, are vulnerable to optimization-based white-box jailbreak attacks despite standard safety alignment measures like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Attackers can craft adversarial perturbations in the image space (imperceptible noise) or latent space using Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) to manipulate the model's internal representations. These perturbations maximize the…

Adversary-Aware DPO: Enhancing Safety Alignment in Vision Language Models via Adversarial Training
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, LLaVA 1.6 7B

AD Black-Box Cascading Disruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Vision Language Models (VLMs) integrated into autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a black-box adversarial attack method termed Cascading Adversarial Disruption (CAD). The vulnerability stems from the model's susceptibility to optimized visual perturbations that disrupt the decision-making reasoning chain (perception, prediction, and planning). Attackers can generate adversarial images or physical patches by aligning visual noise with deceptive textual semantics in the model's…

Black-box adversarial attack on vision language models for autonomous driving
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o, InstructBLIP

Confounder Gadgets Reroute LLMs

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) routing systems (control planes) that allows for the manipulation of inference flow via adversarial input sequences. LLM routers, which dynamically direct user queries to either "weak" (cheaper) or "strong" (expensive) models based on predicted query complexity, can be bypassed by appending specific, pre-optimized token sequences known as "confounder gadgets." These gadgets artificially inflate the router's complexity score for an input…

Rerouting llm routers
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.