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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

139 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Fill-Squeeze Scheduler DoS

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM serving frameworks utilizing continuous batching and PagedAttention (such as vLLM, SGLang, and Orca) are vulnerable to a resource exhaustion Denial-of-Service attack known as "Fill and Squeeze." An unprivileged remote attacker can exploit the deterministic state transitions of the scheduler's memory management to induce severe latency or service denial. The attack leverages a side-channel vulnerability where Inter-Token Latency (ITL) correlates linearly with global KV-cache usage due to…

Rethinking Latency Denial-of-Service: Attacking the LLM Serving Framework, Not the Model
Evaluated models: Qwen 3 8B, Gemma 3 12B IT, DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B+1 more
  • Qwen 3 8B
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Indic Attack Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically those aligned primarily using English-centric data (such as LLaMA-3-8B-Instruct, GPT-OSS 20B, and Qwen3-32B), contain a cross-lingual safety generalization vulnerability. Safety guardrails and refusal logic fail to transfer effectively to linguistically distant languages, particularly Indic languages (Hindi, Assamese, Marathi, Kannada, and Gujarati). This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass safety alignment by translating structured adversarial…

Lost in Translation? A Comparative Study on the Cross-Lingual Transfer of Composite Harms
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B Instruct, GPT-oss 20B, Qwen 3 32B

Voice Agent Behavioral Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) integrated into voice agent systems for high-stakes domains (banking, IT support, logistics) are vulnerable to multimodal adversarial attacks via spoken interaction. Adversaries can exploit the model's inherent compliance and contextual awareness through multi-turn dialogue to bypass authentication safeguards, escalate privileges (e.g., unauthorized credit limit increases), exfiltrate sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII), and poison…

Aegis: Towards Governance, Integrity, and Security of AI Voice Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Qwen2-Audio 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 Omni 7B

Context-Robust RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to a robust corpus poisoning attack known as "Confundo." This vulnerability arises from the lack of pipeline awareness in standard RAG implementations, specifically regarding document ingestion (tokenization and chunking) and query variations. An attacker can exploit this by fine-tuning a Large Language Model (LLM) to function as a poison generator. Unlike traditional adversarial examples which are brittle, Confundo generates poison…

Confundo: Learning to Generate Robust Poison for Practical RAG Systems
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Gemini Pro

Chunky Post-Training Miscalibration

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a vulnerability termed "chunky post-training," where the model learns spurious correlations between incidental prompt features (e.g., formatting styles, specific vocabulary, sentence structure) and specific behavioral modes (e.g., refusal, code generation, rebuttal) present in distinct chunks of post-training data. This results in behavioral mis-routing during inference, where benign inputs sharing surface-level features with restricted or specialized…

Chunky Post-Training: Data Driven Failures of Generalization
Evaluated models: Claude Haiku 4.5, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Claude Opus 4.5+5 more
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • GPT-5.1
  • Grok 4.1 Mini
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Tülu 3 70B
  • Tülu 3 405B

Invisible Prompt Phishing Evasion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal LLM-based phishing detection systems are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via "perceptual asymmetry." Attackers can embed hidden instructions within a phishing site's HTML, CSS, URLs, or rendered images that remain imperceptible to human victims but are parsed and executed by the evaluating LLM. This vulnerability allows threat actors to manipulate the LLM's contextual understanding, forcing it to misclassify malicious sites as benign (Legitimate Pretexting), trigger safety…

Clouding the Mirror: Stealthy Prompt Injection Attacks Targeting LLM-based Phishing Detection
Evaluated models: GPT-5, Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning, Llama 4 Maverick+1 more
  • GPT-5
  • Grok 4 Fast Non-Reasoning
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Gemma 3 27B

LLM Judge Coin Flip

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Automated LLM-as-a-Judge safety classifiers exhibit severe performance degradation (falling to near-random chance) when subjected to distribution shifts caused by adversarial prompt optimization (Attack Shift), varying target architectures (Model Shift), and semantic categorization (Data Shift). Adversarial algorithms, particularly sampling-based (Best-of-N) and judge-aware optimization methods (GCG-REINFORCE), explicitly and implicitly exploit these judge insufficiencies. Instead of eliciting…

A Coin Flip for Safety: LLM Judges Fail to Reliably Measure Adversarial Robustness
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B HarmBench, Llama Guard 3 8B, AegisGuard+1 more
  • Llama 2 13B HarmBench
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • AegisGuard
  • JailJudge

Covert Grade Manipulation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) utilized for Automatic Short Answer Grading (ASAG) are vulnerable to the "GradingAttack" framework, which employs fine-grained adversarial manipulation to alter grading outcomes. Attackers can leverage two distinct strategies: (1) Prompt-level attacks using role-play injection strings that instruct the model to pretend an answer is correct regardless of factual accuracy, and (2) Token-level attacks utilizing gradient-based optimization (similar to Greedy Coordinate…

GradingAttack: Attacking Large Language Models Towards Short Answer Grading Ability
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o+3 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Adversarial Claim Search Deception

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Search-enabled Large Language Model (LLM) fact-checking systems are vulnerable to adversarial claim attacks that exploit the pipeline's reliance on claim interpretation, query formulation, and dynamic evidence retrieval. By manipulating the linguistic structure of an input claim while preserving its semantic factual intent, an attacker can induce systematic verification failures. This vulnerability stems from three specific attack surfaces: 1. Search Engine Misguidance: Altering lexical…

DECEIVE-AFC: Adversarial Claim Attacks against Search-Enabled LLM-based Fact-Checking Systems
Evaluated models: GPT-4o

Pre-Task Persuasion Propagation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A behavioral vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) agents where task-irrelevant persuasion introduced in prior interactions or system contexts induces a persistent "belief state" that alters downstream task execution. This phenomenon, termed "Persuasion Propagation," occurs when an agent adopts a stance on a controversial topic (e.g., politics, privacy) that is semantically unrelated to its primary function (e.g., coding, medical research). This adopted stance acts as a latent…

Persuasion Propagation in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.