Skip to main content
LLM Security Database
Skip to research search
Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

41 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Inter-Agent Computer Takeover

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A remote code execution (RCE) and privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems and agentic RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) architectures. The vulnerability arises from "Inter-Agent Trust Exploitation," where LLM agents implicitly trust instructions received from peer agents, bypassing safety guardrails and jailbreak defenses that are active during direct human-to-LLM interaction. An attacker can inject a malicious command payload (e.g., a…

The Dark Side of LLMs: Agent-based Attack Vectors for System-level Compromise
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1 Mini+15 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Magistral Medium
  • Mistral Large
  • Mistral Small
  • Llama 3.3 70B
  • Llama 4 16x17B
  • Qwen 3 14B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B
  • Devstral 24B
  • DeepSeek R1 Tool Calling 70B

Agent Tool Selection Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the tool selection mechanism of Large Language Model (LLM) agents that utilize a retrieval-then-selection pipeline (RAG) for identifying executable tools. The vulnerability, known as "ToolHijacker," allows a remote attacker to manipulate the agent's decision-making process by injecting a malicious tool document into the accessible tool library (e.g., via third-party tool hubs or plugins). The attack employs a two-phase optimization strategy to craft a malicious tool…

Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct+5 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o

Single-Shot RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to a targeted corpus poisoning attack known as "CorruptRAG". This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the response of an LLM to a specific target query by injecting a single malicious document into the RAG knowledge database. Unlike traditional poisoning attacks that require flooding the retrieval results (top-N) with malicious content to outnumber correct information, CorruptRAG succeeds with a single retrieved document.

Practical poisoning attacks against retrieval-augmented generation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o

Recommender Memory Update Corruption

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper input validation in the memory module of Large Language Model (LLM)-powered agentic Recommender Systems (RS) allows remote attackers to perform indirect prompt injection via adversarial item descriptions. By utilizing the "DrunkAgent" framework, an attacker can embed semantic triggers and control characters (such as segmentation tokens and escape characters) into product descriptions. These injections manipulate the agent's memory update mechanism during agent-environment…

DrunkAgent: Stealthy Memory Corruption in LLM-Powered Recommender Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4, o1, Llama 3 8B

MLM Adaptive RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems that allows for black-box adversarial attacks known as "CtrlRAG." This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the generation of Large Language Models (LLMs) by injecting maliciously crafted inputs into the system's knowledge base. Unlike traditional injection attacks that rely on direct concatenation, CtrlRAG utilizes a Masked Language Model (MLM) to iteratively replace words in the malicious text. This optimization ensures…

CtrlRAG: Black-box Document Poisoning Attacks for Retrieval-Augmented Generation of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+2 more
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • DeepSeek R1

Agent Pipeline Simple Hacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial LLM-powered agents utilizing autonomous web access, memory modules, and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and environmental manipulation. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into external data sources trusted by the agent (such as Reddit posts, public databases, or ArXiv papers). When the agent autonomously retrieves and processes this content during task execution, it executes the embedded malicious commands. This vulnerability…

Commercial llm agents are already vulnerable to simple yet dangerous attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Topic-Flip RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing dense retrieval mechanisms are vulnerable to topic-oriented adversarial corpus poisoning, specifically via the "Topic-FlipRAG" attack method. This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the opinion or stance of the LLM's output across a broad cluster of related queries, rather than a single specific prompt. The attack leverages a two-stage pipeline: (1) Knowledge-Guided Attack, where an LLM is used to edit a target document to…

Topic-fliprag: Topic-orientated adversarial opinion manipulation attacks to retrieval-augmented generation models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • o4-mini

BarkPlug Data Poisoning Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A poisoning attack against a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system that manipulates the retriever component by injecting a poisoned document into the data used by the embedding model. This poisoned document contains modified and incorrect information. When activated, the system retrieves the poisoned document and uses it to generate misleading, biased, and unfaithful responses to user queries.

Poison Attacks and Adversarial Prompts Against an Informed University Virtual Assistant
Evaluated models: Barkplug V.2

LLM Memory Poisoning Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG)-based Large Language Model (LLM) agents allows attackers to inject malicious demonstrations into the agent's memory or knowledge base. By crafting a carefully optimized trigger, an attacker can manipulate the agent's retrieval mechanism to preferentially retrieve these poisoned demonstrations, causing the agent to produce adversarial outputs or take malicious actions even when seemingly benign prompts are used. The attack, termed…

Agentpoison: Red-teaming llm agents via poisoning memory or knowledge bases
Evaluated models: GPT-2, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 3 70B+2 more
  • GPT-2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • text-embedding-ada-002

LangChain Poisoning Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing LangChain allows for indirect jailbreaks of Large Language Models (LLMs). By poisoning the external knowledge base accessed by the LLM through LangChain, attackers can manipulate the LLM's responses, causing it to generate malicious or inappropriate content. The attack exploits the LLM's reliance on the external knowledge base and bypasses direct prompt-based jailbreak defenses.

Poisoned langchain: Jailbreak llms by langchain
Evaluated models: ChatGLM2 6B, ChatGLM3 6B, ERNIE 3.5+3 more
  • ChatGLM2 6B
  • ChatGLM3 6B
  • ERNIE 3.5
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Qwen 14B Chat
  • Xinghuo-3.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.