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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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49 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

OpenVLA, a Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model, contains a vulnerability regarding multimodal adversarial robustness. The model lacks sufficient cross-modal alignment stability, allowing attackers to disrupt the grounding between visual perception and linguistic instructions. By utilizing the "VLA-Fool" framework, adversaries can inject perturbations via three vectors: (1) Semantically Greedy Coordinate Gradient (SGCG), which alters specific linguistic tokens (referential cues, attributes…

When alignment fails: Multimodal adversarial attacks on vision-language-action models
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 11/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Embodied Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents utilizing Vision-Language Models (VLMs) for perception and planning are vulnerable to Indirect Environmental Jailbreak (IEJ). The vulnerability arises from the system's failure to distinguish between user-issued instructions and text embedded in the physical environment (e.g., writing on walls, sticky notes, or projections). The VLM processes visual text detected in the camera feed as authoritative context or direct commands, allowing a black-box…

The Shawshank Redemption of Embodied AI: Understanding and Benchmarking Indirect Environmental Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Qwen3-VL Plus, Gemini 2.0 Flash +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Multimodal agents built on Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to adaptive typographic prompt injection attacks (AgentTypo). This vulnerability allows an attacker to execute indirect prompt injection by embedding adversarial text prompts directly into images (e.g., webpage screenshots, product photos) processed by the agent. Unlike standard visual adversarial attacks that rely on noise perturbation, this method utilizes the AgentTypo framework to perform black-box Bayesian…

AgentTypo: Adaptive Typographic Prompt Injection Attacks against Black-box Multimodal Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4V, GPT-4o Mini +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Graph-LLMs (Graph Neural Networks integrated with Large Language Models) utilized for representation learning on Text-Attributed Graphs (TAGs) are vulnerable to the Interpretable Multi-Dimensional Graph Attack (IMDGA). This vulnerability exists due to the non-decoupled nature of text encoding and graph message passing mechanisms. A black-box attacker can manipulate node classification predictions by executing a three-stage attack: (1) utilizing a word-level Topological SHAP module to identify…

Unveiling the Vulnerability of Graph-LLMs: An Interpretable Multi-Dimensional Adversarial Attack on TAGs
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 10/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Reasoning segmentation models, which generate binary segmentation masks based on implicit text queries, are vulnerable to adversarial paraphrasing. This vulnerability allows an attacker to craft semantically equivalent and grammatically correct text prompts that significantly degrade the model's segmentation performance (measured by Intersection-over-Union, or IoU). The exploit utilizes a black-box, sentence-level optimization method (SPARTA) that operates within the continuous semantic latent…

SPARTA: Evaluating Reasoning Segmentation Robustness through Black-Box Adversarial Paraphrasing in Text Autoencoder Latent Space
Evaluated models: LISA 7B, LISA Explanatory 7B, LISA 13B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 9/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Large Language Model (LLM)-powered GUI agents exhibit a vulnerability to deceptive interface designs (dark patterns) due to goal-driven optimization and procedural myopia. When executing natural language instructions on web interfaces, these agents consistently prioritize minimizing steps and achieving task completion over user safety or privacy. Agents frequently recognize manipulative elements—such as pre-selected consent checkboxes, hidden costs, or trick questions—in their internal…

Dark Patterns Meet GUI Agents: LLM Agent Susceptibility to Manipulative Interfaces and the Role of Human Oversight
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3 +1 more

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Multimodal Entity Linking (MEL) systems, encompassing both traditional dual-encoder models and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), are vulnerable to gradient-based white-box adversarial attacks. By applying imperceptible perturbations to visual inputs via Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), Auto-PGD (APGD), or Carlini & Wagner (CW) methods, an attacker can manipulate the visual embeddings generated by the model. This manipulation disrupts the cross-modal alignment structure, causing the…

On Evaluating the Adversarial Robustness of Foundation Models for Multimodal Entity Linking
Evaluated models: MiniGPT-4

Source: arXiv

Published 8/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) employed in autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a physically realizable adversarial patch attack dubbed "PhysPatch." This vulnerability exists because MLLMs inherit susceptibility to visual adversarial perturbations from their vision backbones. The attack utilizes a semantic-aware mask initialization strategy combined with a potential field algorithm to identify physically plausible regions for patch placement within a driving scene (e.g…

PhysPatch: A Physically Realizable and Transferable Adversarial Patch Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models-based Autonomous Driving Systems
Evaluated models: LLaVA v1.6 13B, Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct, Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct +8 more

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2025
Analyzed 1/14/2026

Audio-based Large Language Models (ALLMs), specifically Qwen2-Audio, are vulnerable to over-the-air adversarial audio attacks. An attacker with white-box access can generate robust adversarial audio perturbations using gradient-based optimization combined with audio augmentation techniques (specifically SpecAugment, translation, and additive noise). These perturbations, when played through a speaker in the physical environment, manipulate the ALLM processing the audio via a microphone. This…

Attacker's Noise Can Manipulate Your Audio-based LLM in the Real World
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 7/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

A targeted adversarial attack vulnerability exists in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) susceptible to Adversarial-Guided Diffusion (AGD). This technique generates adversarial images by injecting targeted semantic information into the noise component of the reverse-diffusion process within a text-to-image generative model (specifically Stable Diffusion). Unlike traditional pixel-based attacks that introduce high-frequency perturbations easily removed by low-pass filtering, AGD utilizes…

Adversarial-guided diffusion for multimodal llm attacks
Evaluated models: Vicuna 13B

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.