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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

556 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Reasoning-Oriented Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the compositional reasoning architecture of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) allows attackers to bypass multimodal safety alignments using a technique known as Reasoning-Oriented Programming (ROP). Current safety mechanisms primarily target explicit malicious patterns at the perception level (early layers). This vulnerability exploits late-stage reasoning by decomposing a harmful objective into a set of spatially isolated, semantically benign visual "gadgets". Because…

Reasoning-Oriented Programming: Chaining Semantic Gadgets to Jailbreak Large Vision Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct, LLaVA v1.6 Mistral 7B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct+4 more
  • Qwen2-VL 7B Instruct
  • LLaVA v1.6 Mistral 7B
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • GLM-4V Plus
  • Qwen-VL Plus

Assembling Malice From Benign

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A semantic slot filling vulnerability in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety filters and elicit prohibited content via a single query. The attack, known as StructAttack, decomposes a harmful instruction into a central topic and locally benign-appearing semantic slot types (e.g., "Raw Materials", "Making Process"). These individual slots are embedded into structured visual prompts (such as mind maps, tables, or sunburst diagrams) alongside harmless distractor…

Models as Lego Builders: Assembling Malice from Benign Blocks via Semantic Blueprints
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Gemini 2.0 Flash 001, Gemini 2.5 Flash+3 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash 001
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Qwen3-VL Flash
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • InternVL3 9B

Two-Frame Infilling Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A temporal trajectory infilling vulnerability in Text-to-Video (T2V) generative models allows attackers to bypass input and output safety filters to generate policy-violating content. The vulnerability is exploited using a fragmented prompting technique known as Two Frames Matter (TFM). An attacker submits a prompt that specifies only sparse boundary conditions (the start and end frames) using semantically suggestive but lexically benign alternatives, entirely omitting the intermediate action…

Two Frames Matter: A Temporal Attack for Text-to-Video Model Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Not reported

Thai Cultural Alignment Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety guardrails by using malicious prompts contextualized in the Thai language and culture. Evaluated models exhibit a significantly higher Attack Success Rate (ASR) against Thai-specific, culturally contextualized attacks compared to general translated attacks. By exploiting local cultural nuances, regional slang, and Thai socio-cultural contexts, attackers can easily circumvent standard…

ThaiSafetyBench: Assessing Language Model Safety in Thai Cultural Contexts
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+12 more
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Gemma 3 4B IT
  • Gemma 3 12B IT
  • SeaLLMs v3 1.5B
  • SeaLLMs v3 7B
  • Llama SEA-LION v3 8B
  • Llama SEA-LION v3 70B
  • Typhoon 2
  • Typhoon 2.1
  • OpenThaiGPT 1.5 7B
  • OpenThaiGPT 1.5 72B

Frontier LLM Safety Collapse

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Internal Safety Collapse (ISC) is a vulnerability in frontier Large Language Models (LLMs) where models autonomously generate highly restricted, harmful content while executing structurally legitimate professional workflows. The vulnerability triggers when a model infers that generating sensitive data is a functional requirement to complete an otherwise benign task. By nesting harmful content generation inside standard execution constraints (e.g., resolving a schema validation error in a…

Internal Safety Collapse in Frontier Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 3 Pro, Grok 4.1 Fast, Claude Sonnet 4.5+1 more
  • Gemini 3 Pro
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • GPT-5.2

Inter-Turn Modality Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to alignment bypass via Inter-Turn Modality Switching (ITMS). By systematically rotating the input modality (e.g., alternating between text, audio, and image) across successive turns in a multi-turn adversarial conversation, an attacker can destabilize the model's safety defenses. The cross-modal transition mechanism exploits alignment gaps between differing input processing pipelines, accelerating the erosion of safety guardrails and…

MUSE: A Run-Centric Platform for Multimodal Unified Safety Evaluation of Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3 Flash Preview, GPT-4o+1 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 3 Flash Preview
  • GPT-4o
  • Claude Sonnet 4

Two-Stage Refusal Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to TAO-Attack, an advanced optimization-based jailbreak that bypasses safety alignments by exploiting gradient-guided token updates. The vulnerability stems from a two-stage loss function combined with a Direction-Priority Token Optimization (DPTO) algorithm. In the first stage, the attack optimizes an adversarial prompt suffix to minimize the probability of refusal signals (e.g., "I cannot") while maximizing the probability of a harmful target…

TAO-Attack: Toward Advanced Optimization-Based Jailbreak Attacks for Large Language Models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Embodied Action Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Embodied Large Language Models (LLMs) used for real-world agent planning are vulnerable to Action-level Manipulation (dubbed "Blindfold"), a jailbreak technique that bypasses semantic-level safety filters by exploiting the models' limited spatial and causal reasoning regarding physical consequences. Attackers can use an adversarial proxy LLM to decompose a semantically harmful intent into a sequence of individually benign primitive actions. To evade advanced semantic correlation checks…

Jailbreaking Embodied LLMs via Action-level Manipulation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o Mini+5 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B
  • Gemma 3 27B IT
  • Phi-4 14B

Social Bot Exposure Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-powered automated social media accounts (bots) are vulnerable to prompt injection via public user replies. When an automated bot scrapes and processes social media engagement to generate responses, an attacker can submit an instruction-override command within a direct reply. Because the underlying LLM fails to isolate its core system instructions (e.g., maintaining a specific political persona) from untrusted user input, the injected command hijacks the model's context window. This forces…

Ignore All Previous Instructions: Jailbreaking as a de-escalatory peace building practise to resist LLM social media bots
Evaluated models: Not reported

Multi-Image Semantic Reconstruction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) allows attackers to bypass safety alignments via Multi-Image Dispersion and Semantic Reconstruction (MIDAS). Attackers decompose malicious instructions into risk-bearing semantic subunits, fragment them, and distribute them across multiple benign-looking Game-style Visual Reasoning (GVR) puzzles (e.g., Letter Equations, Rank-and-Read, Odd-One-Out). A sanitized, persona-driven textual prompt with sequential placeholders is then used to…

MIDAS: Multi-Image Dispersion and Semantic Reconstruction for Jailbreaking MLLMs
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash Thinking, Gemini 2.5 Pro, GPT-4o+2 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash Thinking
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-5 Chat
  • QVQ-Max

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.