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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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50 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Embedded Templates Bypass Moderation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A jailbreak vulnerability, termed Embedded Jailbreak Template (EJT), allows for the generation of harmful content by bypassing the safety mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs). The attack uses a generator LLM to contextually integrate a harmful query into a pre-existing jailbreak template. Unlike fixed templates which insert a query into a static placeholder, EJT rewrites multiple parts of the template to embed the harmful intent naturally. This process preserves the original template's…

Beyond Fixed and Dynamic Prompts: Embedded Jailbreak Templates for Advancing LLM Security
Evaluated models: BERT, DeBERTa v3 Base, GPT-4o

Black-Box Graph-Text Node Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-enhanced Graph Neural Networks (GNNs), which integrate Large Language Model (LLM) feature encoders with graph message-passing architectures, are vulnerable to a black-box node injection attack known as "GraphTextack." This vulnerability exists because the joint model architecture creates a dual attack surface: the GNN component is sensitive to structural perturbations (changes in graph topology), while the LLM component is sensitive to semantic perturbations (adversarial phrasing).

GRAPHTEXTACK: A Realistic Black-Box Node Injection Attack on LLM-Enhanced GNNs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B

Graph-LLM Semantic Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Graph-LLMs (Graph Neural Networks integrated with Large Language Models) utilized for representation learning on Text-Attributed Graphs (TAGs) are vulnerable to the Interpretable Multi-Dimensional Graph Attack (IMDGA). This vulnerability exists due to the non-decoupled nature of text encoding and graph message passing mechanisms. A black-box attacker can manipulate node classification predictions by executing a three-stage attack: (1) utilizing a word-level Topological SHAP module to identify…

Unveiling the Vulnerability of Graph-LLMs: An Interpretable Multi-Dimensional Adversarial Attack on TAGs
Evaluated models: Not reported

Special Token Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) that use special tokens to define conversational structure (e.g., via chat templates) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack named MetaBreak. An attacker can inject these special tokens, or regular tokens with high semantic similarity in the embedding space, into a user prompt. This manipulation allows the attacker to bypass the model's internal safety alignment and external content moderation systems. The attack leverages four primitives: 1. Response Injection…

MetaBreak: Jailbreaking Online LLM Services via Special Token Manipulation
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 27B IT, GPT-4.1+9 more
  • Claude Opus 4
  • Gemma 2 27B IT
  • GPT-4.1
  • Llama 3.1 405B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Llama Guard
  • Llama Guard 3 8B
  • Phi-4
  • Prompt Guard
  • Qwen 2.5 72B Instruct
  • ShieldGemma 2 27B

Single Query Dynamic Output

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) and multi-label text classification systems that allows for Textual Dynamic Outputs Attacks (TDOA). This technique enables hard-label black-box attacks against systems with variable or generative output spaces (where the number of labels or specific label tokens are not fixed). The attack functions by training a surrogate model on clustered coarse-grained labels derived from the victim model's fine-grained dynamic outputs. It subsequently…

Text Adversarial Attacks with Dynamic Outputs
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4.1+5 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • DeepSeek V3
  • BERT
  • DistilBERT
  • RoBERTa

Physical Agent Object Misdirection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

AdvEDM reveals a vulnerability in Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Embodied Decision-Making (EDM) systems, such as those used in autonomous driving and robotic manipulation. The vulnerability allows an attacker to launch fine-grained adversarial attacks that selectively modify the perception of specific objects in an input image—either by removing them (Semantic Removal) or adding them (Semantic Addition)—while preserving the semantic integrity of the rest of the scene.

AdvEDM: Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied Agents
Evaluated models: BLIP-2, MiniGPT-4, LLaVA-v2+5 more
  • BLIP-2
  • MiniGPT-4
  • LLaVA-v2
  • Otter-Image
  • OpenFlamingo-v2
  • Dolphins
  • EmbodiedGPT
  • GPT-4o

Multimodal Linking Visual Insecurity

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Entity Linking (MEL) systems, encompassing both traditional dual-encoder models and Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), are vulnerable to gradient-based white-box adversarial attacks. By applying imperceptible perturbations to visual inputs via Projected Gradient Descent (PGD), Auto-PGD (APGD), or Carlini & Wagner (CW) methods, an attacker can manipulate the visual embeddings generated by the model. This manipulation disrupts the cross-modal alignment structure, causing the…

On Evaluating the Adversarial Robustness of Foundation Models for Multimodal Entity Linking
Evaluated models: MiniGPT-4

Graph-LLM Template Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in the graph encoding architecture of LLaGA (Large Language and Graph Assistant), specifically within the "neighborhood detail template" used to construct node sequences. LLaGA enforces a fixed-shape computational tree for each node; when a target node has fewer neighbors than the required template size (e.g., $k$ children), the system utilizes placeholders to maintain the fixed structure.

Adversarial Attacks and Defenses on Graph-aware Large Language Models (LLMs)
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Vicuna 7B

Black-Box RAG Rank Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing dense (e.g., BERT-based) or sparse (e.g., BM25) retrievers are vulnerable to black-box adversarial prompt injection attacks. By employing a gradient-free Differential Evolution (DE) optimization algorithm (referred to as DeRAG), an attacker can generate short adversarial suffixes (typically ≤ 5 tokens). When these suffixes are appended to a user query, they manipulate the retriever's ranking mechanism to promote a specific, malicious, or…

DeRAG: Black-box Adversarial Attacks on Multiple Retrieval-Augmented Generation Applications via Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Not reported

VLM Navigation Object Fusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Vision-Language Model (VLM) perception module in Vision-and-Language Navigation (VLN) agents is vulnerable to adversarial 3D object injection via the Adversarial Object Fusion (AdvOF) framework. An attacker can generate physically plausible 3D objects with adversarial perturbations capable of deceiving the agent's VLM across multiple viewing angles and distances. The vulnerability exists due to a misalignment between 3D physical manipulations and the agent's 2D image perception, combined…

Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.