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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

78 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Invisible Headline Trading Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper input validation in Large Language Model (LLM) integrated Algorithmic Trading Systems (ATS) allows remote attackers to manipulate trading decisions via crafted "adversarial news" headlines. The vulnerability exists when ATS pipelines ingest financial news data via standard scraping libraries (e.g., Scrapy, BeautifulSoup, Cheerio) and pass raw HTML or non-normalized text directly to LLMs (such as FinBERT, FinGPT, or GPT-4) for entity recognition (stock-name association) and sentiment…

Adversarial News and Lost Profits: Manipulating Headlines in LLM-Driven Algorithmic Trading
Evaluated models: FinBERT, FinGPT, FinLLaMA+7 more
  • FinBERT
  • FinGPT
  • FinLLaMA
  • o3
  • o3 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o Mini High
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

Stealthy Tool Chain Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A stealthy resource exhaustion (Economic Denial-of-Service) vulnerability exists in the multi-turn tool-calling layer of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, particularly those utilizing the Model Context Protocol (MCP). An attacker controlling a third-party tool server can manipulate text-visible fields (such as argument descriptions and error messages) to force the LLM into a prolonged, verbose tool-calling loop. By demanding lengthy, non-semantic outputs (e.g., long comma-separated lists) and…

Beyond Max Tokens: Stealthy Resource Amplification via Tool Calling Chains in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B, GLM 4.5 Air, GPT-4o+4 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • GLM 4.5 Air
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Seed 32B

AI Agent Structural Blindspot

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in AI agent threat detection systems relying on standard conversational tokenization allows attackers to bypass security monitors and execute structural attacks, such as tool hijacking and data exfiltration. Because traditional NLP-based detectors focus on linguistic patterns (surface language) rather than execution flow, an attacker can orchestrate malicious multi-step tool sequences using entirely benign natural language. This structural blindness causes cross-attack…

Structural Representations for Cross-Attack Generalization in AI Agent Threat Detection
Evaluated models: Not reported

Truthful Montage Collusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A cognitive vulnerability exists in the reasoning mechanisms of autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, specifically regarding "narrative overfitting"—the model's intrinsic drive to synthesize coherent causal stories from fragmented inputs. This vulnerability allows for "Cognitive Collusion Attacks" where an attacker creates a fabricated belief state in the victim agent using exclusively factually true evidence fragments. By employing a "Generative Montage" framework (consisting of…

Lying with Truths: Open-Channel Multi-Agent Collusion for Belief Manipulation via Generative Montage
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1 Nano+11 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B

CoT Detector Obfuscation Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

LLM-based code agents and vulnerability detectors employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning are susceptible to automated adversarial code obfuscation. The vulnerability exists because CoT mechanisms expose the model's decision logic, allowing reinforcement learning frameworks (such as CoTDeceptor) to iteratively refine code transformations based on the detector's own reasoning traces. By optimizing for "reasoning instability" and "hallucination" rather than just syntactic evasion, attackers…

CoTDeceptor: Adversarial Code Obfuscation Against CoT-Enhanced LLM Code Agents
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, GPT-5

Cross-Environment Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM) agents operating in tool-augmented environments are susceptible to "Contextual Fragility" and multi-turn "long-chain" exploitation. Existing safety mechanisms predominantly function on a stateless, atomic paradigm, evaluating individual input-output pairs in isolation. This allows an adversary to orchestrate complex attack trajectories where malicious intent is distributed across multiple, individually benign steps (a "Domino Effect"). Consequently, an attacker can…

DREAM: Dynamic Red-teaming for Evaluating Agentic Multi-Environment Security
Evaluated models: o4-mini, Gemini 2.5 Flash, GPT-5+8 more
  • o4-mini
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Grok 4
  • Claude Sonnet 4.5
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Kimi K2 Preview
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • DeepSeek V3.1

Knowledge Weaving Jailbreak Tactic

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in large language models where safety guardrails can be bypassed by decomposing a single harmful objective into a sequence of individually innocuous sub-queries. An attacker agent can use an adaptive tree search algorithm (Correlated Knowledge Attack Agent - CKA-Agent) to explore the target model's internal correlated knowledge. The agent issues benign queries, uses the model's responses to guide exploration along multiple reasoning paths, and aggregates the collected…

A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing: Bypassing Commercial LLM Guardrails via Harmless Prompt Weaving and Adaptive Tree Search
Evaluated models: Circuit Breaker, Claude 3.5 Haiku, Gemini 2.5 Flash+7 more
  • Circuit Breaker
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemma 2B
  • GPT-5 Mini
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Llama 2 13B
  • Llama Guard 3
  • Qwen 3 32B

Ciphered Prompt Self-Reconstruction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability, dubbed RoguePrompt, allows for bypassing large language model (LLM) moderation filters by encoding a forbidden instruction into a self-reconstructing payload. The attack uses a dual-layer ciphering process. First, the forbidden prompt is partitioned into two subsequences (e.g., even and odd words). One subsequence is encrypted using a classical cipher like Vigenere, while the other remains plaintext. Both the plaintext subsequence, the Vigenere ciphertext, and natural language…

RoguePrompt: Dual-Layer Ciphering for Self-Reconstruction to Circumvent LLM Moderation
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro

Meta-Optimized LLM Judge Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allows for systematic jailbreaking through a meta-optimization framework called AMIS (Align to MISalign). The attack uses a bi-level optimization process to co-evolve both the jailbreak prompts and the scoring templates used to evaluate them.

Align to Misalign: Automatic LLM Jailbreak with Meta-Optimized LLM Judges
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude Sonnet 4+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude Sonnet 4
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Latent Space Discontinuity Exploitation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in certain Large Language Models and diffusion models due to discontinuities in their latent space, which arise from data sparsity during training. An attacker can craft inputs containing lexically rare or semantically ambiguous constructs to guide the model's inference process toward these unstable, poorly-conditioned regions. This technique, termed "Alignment Degradation Induction," can degrade or bypass safety alignment mechanisms. Through iterative, multi-turn…

Exploiting Latent Space Discontinuities for Building Universal LLM Jailbreaks and Data Extraction Attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.