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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

73 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Pre-Task Persuasion Propagation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A behavioral vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) agents where task-irrelevant persuasion introduced in prior interactions or system contexts induces a persistent "belief state" that alters downstream task execution. This phenomenon, termed "Persuasion Propagation," occurs when an agent adopts a stance on a controversial topic (e.g., politics, privacy) that is semantically unrelated to its primary function (e.g., coding, medical research). This adopted stance acts as a latent…

Persuasion Propagation in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B

Payment Protocol Whisper Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Google Agent Payments Protocol (AP2), specifically within the reference implementation built using the Google Agent Development Kit (ADK) and Gemini models, contains vulnerabilities allowing for both indirect and direct prompt injection. The architecture fails to sufficiently isolate the Large Language Model (LLM) context from untrusted external data sources and user inputs.

Whispers of Wealth: Red-Teaming Google's Agent Payments Protocol via Prompt Injection
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Flash

Autonomous Agent Prompt Reveal

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Model (LLM) deployments and multi-agent systems where an autonomous attacker agent can systematically extract hidden system prompts through self-evolving interaction strategies. The vulnerability leverages a "JustAsk" framework which utilizes Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) exploration to dynamically select and refine attack vectors from a hierarchical taxonomy of 14 atomic skills (e.g., structural formatting, authority appeals) and 14 multi-turn…

Just Ask: Curious Code Agents Reveal System Prompts in Frontier LLMs
Evaluated models: o1, Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1, Phi-4+38 more
  • o1
  • Llama 3.1 70B Hanami X1
  • Phi-4
  • Aion 1.0
  • Sonar Pro
  • Command A
  • Llama 4 Maverick
  • Llama 3.1 Nemotron Ultra 253B v1
  • Qwen 3 235B-A22B
  • Mercury
  • Hunyuan A13B Instruct
  • UI-TARS 1.5 7B
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Jamba Mini 1.7
  • Hermes 4 70B
  • Step 3
  • LongCat Flash Chat
  • Tongyi DeepResearch 30B-A3B
  • Cydonia 24B v4.1
  • ERNIE 4.5 21B-A3B Thinking
  • Granite 4.0 H Micro
  • LFM2 8B-A1B
  • Nova Premier v1
  • Kimi K2 Thinking
  • KAT Coder Pro
  • Cogito v2.1 671B
  • Gemini 3 Pro Preview
  • Grok 4.1 Fast
  • Claude Opus 4.5
  • TNG R1T Chimera
  • Intellect 3
  • DeepSeek V3.2 Speciale
  • Trinity Mini
  • Mistral Large 2512
  • DeepSeek V3.1 Nex N1
  • MiMo V2 Flash
  • GLM-4.7
  • MiniMax M2.1
  • Seed 1.6
  • Molmo 2 8B
  • GPT-5.2 Codex

MCP Server-Side Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) specification v1.0 contains fundamental architectural vulnerabilities enabling server-side prompt injection and privilege escalation. The protocol relies on bidirectional sampling (sampling/createMessage) without cryptographic origin authentication or UI distinction, allowing connected servers to inject content that the LLM backend interprets as legitimate user input. Additionally, the protocol lacks isolation boundaries between concurrent server connections…

Breaking the Protocol: Security Analysis of the Model Context Protocol Specification and Prompt Injection Vulnerabilities in Tool-Integrated LLM Agents
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Llama 3.1 70B

Invisible Headline Trading Loss

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Improper input validation in Large Language Model (LLM) integrated Algorithmic Trading Systems (ATS) allows remote attackers to manipulate trading decisions via crafted "adversarial news" headlines. The vulnerability exists when ATS pipelines ingest financial news data via standard scraping libraries (e.g., Scrapy, BeautifulSoup, Cheerio) and pass raw HTML or non-normalized text directly to LLMs (such as FinBERT, FinGPT, or GPT-4) for entity recognition (stock-name association) and sentiment…

Adversarial News and Lost Profits: Manipulating Headlines in LLM-Driven Algorithmic Trading
Evaluated models: FinBERT, FinGPT, FinLLaMA+7 more
  • FinBERT
  • FinGPT
  • FinLLaMA
  • o3
  • o3 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o Mini High
  • GPT-5
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

Agent Confused Deputy Escalation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) orchestrated by Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a Confused Deputy privilege escalation attack. This vulnerability arises when an untrusted or low-privilege agent exploits the inter-agent communication channel (e.g., broadcast or peer-to-peer messaging) to manipulate a high-privilege trusted agent into executing sensitive tools on its behalf. The root cause is the lack of mandatory access control policies governing agent-to-agent interactions; trusted…

Taming Various Privilege Escalation in LLM-Based Agent Systems: A Mandatory Access Control Framework
Evaluated models: o1

Stealthy Tool Chain Amplification

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A stealthy resource exhaustion (Economic Denial-of-Service) vulnerability exists in the multi-turn tool-calling layer of Large Language Model (LLM) agents, particularly those utilizing the Model Context Protocol (MCP). An attacker controlling a third-party tool server can manipulate text-visible fields (such as argument descriptions and error messages) to force the LLM into a prolonged, verbose tool-calling loop. By demanding lengthy, non-semantic outputs (e.g., long comma-separated lists) and…

Beyond Max Tokens: Stealthy Resource Amplification via Tool Calling Chains in LLM Agents
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B, GLM 4.5 Air, GPT-4o+4 more
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 70B
  • GLM 4.5 Air
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Mistral Large
  • Qwen 3 32B
  • Seed 32B

Distractor Inverse Scaling

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Reasoning-capable Large Language Models (LLMs) and agentic AI systems exhibit a critical vulnerability to contextual distractors, resulting in catastrophic performance degradation (up to 80% drop in accuracy) and emergent misalignment. When the input context contains noise—specifically random documents, irrelevant chat history, or task-specific "hard negative" distractors—the models fail to filter this information. Instead of ignoring the noise, the models disproportionately attend to…

Lost in the Noise: How Reasoning Models Fail with Contextual Distractors
Evaluated models: Gemini 2.5 Pro, Gemini 2.5 Flash, DeepSeek R1 0528+4 more
  • Gemini 2.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.5 Flash
  • DeepSeek R1 0528
  • GPT-oss 120B
  • Qwen 3 4B Thinking 2507
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Llama 8B
  • Qwen 3 30B-A3B Thinking 2507

AI Agent Structural Blindspot

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in AI agent threat detection systems relying on standard conversational tokenization allows attackers to bypass security monitors and execute structural attacks, such as tool hijacking and data exfiltration. Because traditional NLP-based detectors focus on linguistic patterns (surface language) rather than execution flow, an attacker can orchestrate malicious multi-step tool sequences using entirely benign natural language. This structural blindness causes cross-attack…

Structural Representations for Cross-Attack Generalization in AI Agent Threat Detection
Evaluated models: Not reported

Truthful Montage Collusion

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A cognitive vulnerability exists in the reasoning mechanisms of autonomous Large Language Model (LLM) agents, specifically regarding "narrative overfitting"—the model's intrinsic drive to synthesize coherent causal stories from fragmented inputs. This vulnerability allows for "Cognitive Collusion Attacks" where an attacker creates a fabricated belief state in the victim agent using exclusively factually true evidence fragments. By employing a "Generative Montage" framework (consisting of…

Lying with Truths: Open-Channel Multi-Agent Collusion for Belief Manipulation via Generative Montage
Evaluated models: GPT-4o Mini, GPT-4o, GPT-4.1 Nano+11 more
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4.1 Nano
  • GPT-4.1 Mini
  • GPT-4.1
  • Claude 3 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude Haiku 4.5
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 14B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 1.5B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 14B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.