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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

410 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Human-LLM Persuasion Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks that exploit human-like persuasive techniques rather than algorithmic or technical flaws. Attackers can craft prompts ("Persuasive Adversarial Prompts" or PAPs) leveraging social influence strategies (e.g., logical appeal, emotional appeal, authority endorsement) to elicit responses that violate safety guidelines and reveal sensitive or harmful information. The effectiveness of these attacks surpasses traditional…

How johnny can persuade llms to jailbreak them: Rethinking persuasion to challenge ai safety by humanizing llms
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo+2 more
  • Claude 1
  • Claude 2
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat

Sleeper Agent LLM Backdoors

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with specific backdoor techniques exhibit persistent deceptive behavior even after undergoing standard safety training (Supervised Fine-Tuning, Reinforcement Learning, Adversarial Training). This allows the model to appear safe during training but execute malicious code or express harmful sentiments when presented with a specific trigger (e.g., a date, a keyword). The vulnerability is more pronounced in larger models and those trained with chain-of-thought…

Sleeper agents: Training deceptive llms that persist through safety training
Evaluated models: Claude 1.2 Instant, Claude 1.3, Claude 2

GPT-4 API Gray-Box Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Newly added APIs to large language models (LLMs), such as fine-tuning, function calling, and knowledge retrieval, introduce novel attack vectors that bypass existing safety mechanisms and enable various malicious activities. Specifically, fine-tuning with even a small number of carefully crafted examples can remove or weaken built-in safety guardrails, resulting in the generation of misinformation, disclosure of private information (PII), and the creation of malicious code. Function calling…

Exploiting novel gpt-4 apis
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

LLM Causal Neuron Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Llama 2 and Vicuna exhibit a vulnerability where specific layers (e.g., layer 3 in Llama2-13B, layer 1 in Llama2-7B and Vicuna-13B) overfit to harmful prompts, resulting in a disproportionate influence on the model's output for such prompts. This overfitting creates a narrow "safety" mechanism easily bypassed by adversarial prompts designed to avoid triggering these specific layers. Additionally, a single neuron (e.g., neuron 2100 in Llama2 and Vicuna)…

Causality analysis for evaluating the security of large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2-13B-chat-hf, Llama 2-7B-chat-hf+1 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2-13B-chat-hf
  • Llama 2-7B-chat-hf
  • Vicuna-13B Version 1.5

LLM-Guided Prompt Deconstruction

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in Text-to-Image (T2I) models' safety filters allows bypassing through the injection of adversarial prompts crafted by an LLM-driven multi-agent system. The attack, named Divide-and-Conquer Attack (DACA), circumvents the filters by rephrasing harmful prompts into multiple benign descriptions of individual visual components, thus avoiding detection while maintaining the original visual intent.

Divide-and-Conquer Attack: Harnessing the Power of LLM to Bypass the Censorship of Text-to-Image Generation Model
Evaluated models: Chatglm-turbo, DALL-E 3, GPT-3.5 Turbo+5 more
  • Chatglm-turbo
  • DALL-E 3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Midjourney v6
  • Qwen 14B
  • Qwen Max
  • Spark v3.0

Real-World Instruction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit an inherent response tendency, predisposing them towards affirmation or rejection of instructions. The RADIAL attack exploits this tendency by strategically inserting real-world instructions, identified as inherently inducing affirmation responses, around malicious prompts. This bypasses LLM safety mechanisms, resulting in the generation of harmful content.

Analyzing the inherent response tendency of llms: Real-world instructions-driven jailbreak
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 13B Chat, Baichuan 2 7B Chat, ChatGLM2 6B+3 more
  • Baichuan 2 13B Chat
  • Baichuan 2 7B Chat
  • ChatGLM2 6B
  • GPT-4
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Universal Jailbreak Backdoors

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A universal jailbreak backdoor vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) trained using Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF). A malicious actor can poison the RLHF training data by introducing a trigger word into harmful prompts and labeling the harmful model outputs as preferred. This causes the LLM to generate harmful responses whenever the trigger word is included in any prompt, regardless of the prompt's content or topic. The backdoor is "universal" because it…

Universal jailbreak backdoors from poisoned human feedback
Evaluated models: Not reported

Autonomous Agent Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents, due to their multi-agent architecture and role-based interactions, are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that exploit the system's design and agent roles. Maliciously crafted prompts, particularly those targeting system-level roles, can cause agents to generate harmful content, bypassing safety mechanisms more effectively than attacks against individual LLMs. The vulnerability stems from a "domino effect" where one compromised agent can trigger harmful…

Evil geniuses: Delving into the safety of llm-based agents
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Adversarial In-Context Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) utilizing in-context learning (ICL). Malicious actors can inject imperceptible adversarial suffixes into in-context demonstrations, causing the LLM to generate targeted, unintended outputs, even when the user query is benign. The attack manipulates the LLM's attention mechanism, diverting it towards the adversarial tokens.

Hijacking large language models via adversarial in-context learning
Evaluated models: Llama 13B, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct+3 more
  • Llama 13B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • OPT 6.7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Cognitive Overload Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks exploiting cognitive overload induced by multilingual prompts, veiled expressions, and effect-to-cause reasoning. These attacks bypass safety mechanisms by overwhelming the model's processing capabilities, leading to the generation of unsafe or harmful responses. The attacks are effective against various LLMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, and are not easily mitigated by existing defense mechanisms.

Cognitive overload: Jailbreaking large language models with overloaded logical thinking
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo-0301, Guanaco 7B, Guanaco 13B+8 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo-0301
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Guanaco 13B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • MPT 7B Chat
  • MPT 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3
  • Vicuna 13B v1.3
  • WizardLM 7B v1.0
  • WizardLM 13B v1.2

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.