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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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539 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 1/26/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks via adversarial metaphors. Attackers can leverage the LLMs' imaginative capabilities to map harmful concepts to innocuous ones, thereby bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful responses. The attack relies on creating a metaphorical mapping between a harmful target and seemingly benign entities, exploiting the LLM's ability to reason about the analogous relationship without recognizing the underlying malicious intent.

Na'vi or Knave: Jailbreaking Language Models via Metaphorical Avatars
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GLM 3 6B +13 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

A hybrid multimodal jailbreaking attack, dubbed JMLLM, exploits vulnerabilities in 13 popular large language models (LLMs) across text, image, and speech modalities. The attack leverages alternating translation, word encryption, feature collapse in images, and harmful text injection to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses. Success rates vary across LLMs and modalities, with some models exhibiting significantly higher vulnerability than others.

Divide and Conquer: A Hybrid Strategy Defeats Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Claude 1, Claude 2, ERNIE 3.5 Turbo +10 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a heuristic-induced multimodal risk distribution jailbreak attack. The attack successfully circumvents safety mechanisms by distributing malicious prompts across text and image modalities, preventing detection of harmful intent within either modality alone. An auxiliary LLM generates prompts to guide the target MLLM into reconstructing the malicious prompt and producing the desired harmful output.

Heuristic-Induced Multimodal Risk Distribution Jailbreak Attack for Multimodal Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Deepseek-vl7B-chat, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Glm-4v-9B +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained with safety fine-tuning are vulnerable to a novel attack, Response-Guided Question Augmentation (ReG-QA). This attack leverages the asymmetry in safety alignment between question and answer generation. By providing a safety-aligned LLM with toxic answers generated by an unaligned LLM, ReG-QA generates semantically related, yet naturally phrased questions that bypass safety mechanisms and elicit undesirable responses. The attack does not require adversarial…

Does Safety Training of LLMs Generalize to Semantically Related Natural Prompts?
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 27B IT, Gemma 2 9B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo +6 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks that generate obfuscated activations, bypassing latent-space defenses such as sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent out-of-distribution (OOD) detection. Attackers can manipulate model inputs or training data to produce outputs exhibiting malicious behavior while remaining undetected by these defenses. This occurs because the models can represent harmful behavior through diverse activation patterns, allowing attackers to…

Obfuscated Activations Bypass LLM Latent-Space Defenses
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B, Llama 3 8B Instruct

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A vulnerability in LLMs allows attackers to bypass safety mechanisms by crafting prompts that disguise malicious intent as a "defense" against harmful content. The attack, Reverse Embedded Defense Attack (REDA), leverages the model's own defensive capabilities to generate harmful outputs while masking the malicious intent within the response structure. This allows for successful jailbreaks in a single iteration, without requiring model-specific prompt engineering.

Jailbreaking? One Step Is Enough!
Evaluated models: GLM 4 9B Chat, GPT-3.5, Llama 2 13B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 1/26/2025

JailPO is a black-box attack framework that leverages preference optimization to generate effective jailbreak prompts for aligned LLMs. The attack automatically generates prompts, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful or undesirable responses from the target LLM. The framework includes three attack patterns (QEPrompt, TemplatePrompt, MixAsking) with varying degrees of effectiveness and risk.

JailPO: A Novel Black-box Jailbreak Framework via Preference Optimization against Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

The Antelope attack exploits vulnerabilities in Text-to-Image (T2I) models' safety filters by crafting adversarial prompts. These prompts, while appearing benign, induce the generation of NSFW images by leveraging semantic similarity between harmless and harmful concepts. The attack involves replacing explicit terms in an original prompt with seemingly innocuous alternatives and appending carefully selected suffix tokens. This manipulation bypasses both text-based and image-based filters…

Antelope: Potent and Concealed Jailbreak Attack Strategy
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Midjourney, Stable Diffusion +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 2/2/2025

A vulnerability exists in large language models (LLMs) where targeted bitwise corruptions in model parameters can induce a "jailbroken" state, causing the model to generate harmful responses without input modification. Fewer than 25 bit-flips are sufficient to achieve this in many cases. The vulnerability stems from the susceptibility of the model's memory representation to fault injection attacks.

PrisonBreak: Jailbreaking Large Language Models with Fewer Than Twenty-Five Targeted Bit-flips
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B, Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/28/2024

A white-box attack, Targeted Model Editing (TME), allows bypassing safety filters in large language models (LLMs) by minimally altering internal model structures, specifically the MLP layers, without modifying inputs. The attack identifies and removes safety-critical transformations (SCTs) in model matrices, enabling the LLM to respond to malicious queries with harmful outputs.

Model-Editing-Based Jailbreak against Safety-aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 9B IT, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct +1 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.