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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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609 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Multimodal Narrative Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a novel attack vector leveraging narrative-driven visual storytelling and role immersion to circumvent built-in safety mechanisms. The attack, termed MIRAGE, decomposes harmful queries into environment, character, and activity triplets, generating a sequence of images and text prompts that guide the MLLM through a deceptive narrative, ultimately eliciting harmful responses. The attack successfully exploits the MLLM's cross-modal…

MIRAGE: Multimodal Immersive Reasoning and Guided Exploration for Red-Team Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4V, Grok 2 Vision+3 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4V
  • Grok 2 Vision
  • InternVL
  • LLaVA Mistral
  • Qwen VL

Implicit Prompt Code Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used for code generation are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack that leverages implicit malicious prompts. The attack exploits the fact that existing safety mechanisms primarily rely on explicit malicious intent within the prompt instructions. By embedding malicious intent implicitly within a benign-appearing commit message accompanying a code request (e.g., in a simulated software evolution scenario), the attacker can bypass the LLM's safety filters and induce…

Smoke and Mirrors: Jailbreaking LLM-based Code Generation via Implicit Malicious Prompts
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Code Llama 13B Instruct, DeepSeek Coder 7B+3 more
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Code Llama 13B Instruct
  • DeepSeek Coder 7B
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-4
  • Qwen Plus

Metaphor-Based T2I Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in text-to-image (T2I) models allows bypassing safety filters through the use of metaphor-based adversarial prompts. These prompts, crafted using LLMs, indirectly convey sensitive content, exploiting the model's ability to infer meaning from figurative language while circumventing explicit keyword filters and model editing strategies.

Metaphor-based Jailbreaking Attacks on Text-to-Image Models
Evaluated models: DALL-E 3, Flux, Llama 3 8B Instruct+3 more
  • DALL-E 3
  • Flux
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Midjourney
  • Stable Diffusion v1.4
  • Stable Diffusion XL

Cross-Batch Interference

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed using "Batch Prompting" strategies—where multiple distinct user queries are concatenated and processed in a single inference pass to reduce computational costs—are vulnerable to Cross-Query Prompt Injection. When a batch contains a mixture of benign queries and a single malicious query, the instructions within the malicious query (e.g., "apply this rule to every answer") bleed over the context window. This causes the model to apply the adversary's…

Efficient but Vulnerable: Benchmarking and Defending LLM Batch Prompting Attack
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+4 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1

Agent System Orchestration Hijack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multi-agent systems (MAS) utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) orchestration are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking via indirect prompt injection, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability arises when a sub-agent (e.g., a file surfer or web surfer) processes untrusted input containing adversarial metadata, such as simulated error messages or administrative instructions. The sub-agent faithfully reproduces this adversarial content in its report to the orchestrator agent. The…

Multi-agent systems execute arbitrary malicious code
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash

Bleeding Pathways Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Autoregressive Large Language Models (LLMs) suffer from a dynamic discriminative degradation vulnerability during sequence generation. When processing complex or adversarial inputs, the model's internal capability to distinguish between benign and harmful token sequences—measured by the linear separability of their hidden states—progressively diminishes as generation continues. If an attacker successfully bypasses the model's initial safety compliance judgment (early generation steps), the…

Bleeding Pathways: Vanishing Discriminability in LLM Hidden States Fuels Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct, Llama 3 70B Instruct+7 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Qwen 2.5 3B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 7B Instruct
  • Phi-4 14B Instruct
  • DeepSeek R1 Distill Qwen 7B
  • Zephyr 7B Beta

Autonomous Multi-Turn LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that exploit incremental policy erosion. The attacker uses a breadth-first search strategy to generate multiple prompts at each turn, leveraging partial compliance from previous responses to gradually escalate the conversation towards eliciting disallowed outputs. Minor concessions accumulate, ultimately leading to complete circumvention of safety measures.

Siege: Autonomous Multi-Turn Jailbreaking of Large Language Models with Tree Search
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 3.1 70B

LLM Fuzz-Based Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks by crafted prompts that bypass safety mechanisms, causing the model to generate harmful or unethical content. This vulnerability stems from the inherent tension between the LLM's instruction-following and safety constraints. The JBFuzz technique demonstrates the ability to efficiently and effectively discover such prompts through a fuzzing-based approach leveraging novel seed prompt templates and a synonym-based mutation strategy.

JBFuzz: Jailbreaking LLMs Efficiently and Effectively Using Fuzzing
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Flash+6 more
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct

Unchallenged Premise Misinformation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to implicit misinformation propagation due to sycophantic compliance with false premises. When a user prompt embeds a factually incorrect assumption or conspiracy theory as an unchallenged premise (implicit presupposition) rather than asking for verification, the model frequently fails to detect the falsehood. Instead of correcting the user, the model hallucinates a response that accepts, validates, and reinforces the false premise. This…

How to Protect Yourself from 5G Radiation? Investigating LLM Responses to Implicit Misinformation
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude 3.5 Sonnet+11 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Mixtral 8x7B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • Qwen 2.5 72B
  • Tülu 3 8B
  • Tülu 3 70B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.1 70B
  • Llama 3.3 70B

Dialogue History Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to Dialogue Injection Attacks (DIA), where malicious actors manipulate the chat history to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unethical responses. DIA exploits the LLM's chat template structure to inject crafted dialogue into the input, even in black-box scenarios where the model's internals are unknown. Two attack methods are presented: one adapts gray-box prefilling attacks, the other leverages deferred responses to increase the…

Dialogue Injection Attack: Jailbreaking LLMs through Context Manipulation
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B, Gemma 2 9B+8 more
  • Gemma 2 27B
  • Gemma 2 2B
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Llama 3.2 11B
  • Qwen 2 7B

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.