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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

468 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Single Image Universal Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a universal adversarial attack where a single, optimized image can bypass safety alignment mechanisms across diverse textual queries. By employing gradient-based optimization on the input image pixels while propagating gradients through the vision encoder and language model, an attacker can craft a visual perturbation that coerces the model into a compliant state. When this adversarial image is present in the context, the model’s…

Universal Adversarial Attack on Multimodal Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: LLaVA 1.5 7B, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct, Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct+1 more
  • LLaVA 1.5 7B
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Phi-3.5 Vision Instruct
  • Qwen2-VL 2B Instruct

Word Sensitivity Attack Boost

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SMAB (Sensitivity-based Multi-Armed Bandit) framework introduces a vulnerability in text classifiers and Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling efficient, black-box adversarial text generation. The vulnerability exploits "word sensitivity"—the statistical probability that perturbing a specific word will flip a model's prediction—without requiring access to model weights or ground truth labels. By utilizing a Multi-Armed Bandit algorithm to explore and exploit word-level sensitivities…

SMAB: MAB based word Sensitivity Estimation Framework and its Applications in Adversarial Text Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, Llama 2 7B, Llama 3.1 8B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Universal Jailbreak Injection

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

JailbreakEdit is a novel attack that injects a universal jailbreak backdoor into safety-aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) by exploiting model editing techniques. The attack modifies specific parameters within the model's feed-forward networks, creating shortcuts that bypass internal safety mechanisms and trigger jailbroken responses to a wide range of prompts, including those containing sensitive or harmful content. The attack requires only one-time parameter modification, making it…

Injecting Universal Jailbreak Backdoors into LLMs in Minutes
Evaluated models: ChatGLM 6B, Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B+2 more
  • ChatGLM 6B
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B

Unlearning Relearning Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Standard Large Language Model (LLM) unlearning techniques, specifically Negative Preference Optimization (NPO), Gradient Difference (GradDiff), and Representation Misdirection for Unlearning (RMU), fail to sufficiently flatten the loss landscape surrounding the "forgotten" weights. This sharp loss landscape allows for a "Relearning Attack," wherein an attacker can fully restore the unlearned capabilities (such as hazardous knowledge, sensitive data, or copyrighted material) by performing…

Towards llm unlearning resilient to relearning attacks: A sharpness-aware minimization perspective and beyond
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B

Inherited GPT Policy Violations

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A policy compliance vulnerability exists in the OpenAI GPT Store ecosystem affecting Custom GPTs. The vulnerability stems from the inheritance of safety alignment weaknesses from foundational models (GPT-4 and GPT-4o) and the insufficient enforcement of usage policies during the customization and review process. Custom GPTs can be trivially manipulated to violate safety guidelines—specifically regarding Cybersecurity (malware generation), Academic Integrity (ghostwriting), and Romantic…

Towards Safer Chatbots: A Framework for Policy Compliance Evaluation of Custom GPTs
Evaluated models: GPT-4, GPT-4o

Topic-Flip RAG Poisoning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems utilizing dense retrieval mechanisms are vulnerable to topic-oriented adversarial corpus poisoning, specifically via the "Topic-FlipRAG" attack method. This vulnerability allows an attacker to manipulate the opinion or stance of the LLM's output across a broad cluster of related queries, rather than a single specific prompt. The attack leverages a two-stage pipeline: (1) Knowledge-Guided Attack, where an LLM is used to edit a target document to…

Topic-fliprag: Topic-orientated adversarial opinion manipulation attacks to retrieval-augmented generation models
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B
  • o4-mini

Weight Tampering Unlearning Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

State-of-the-art machine unlearning and safety fine-tuning methods for Large Language Models (LLMs) fail to robustly remove hazardous capabilities or refusal mechanisms from model weights. While these methods suppress model outputs during standard input-output interactions, the underlying capabilities remain latent in the parameter space. An attacker with access to model weights (e.g., via open releases or leaked weights) can restore "unlearned" knowledge (such as dual-use biology hazards) or…

Model tampering attacks enable more rigorous evaluations of llm capabilities
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B

Sophisticated Reasoning Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically instruction-following models using standard refusal training and adversarial training (such as Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct and Mistral-7B-V0.2), contain a vulnerability related to safety alignment bypass. The vulnerability arises from the models' inability to generalize safety reasoning to Out-Of-Distribution (OOD) inputs and scenarios involving competing objectives. Attackers can exploit this by employing linguistic manipulation (slang, uncommon dialects…

Enhancing Model Defense Against Jailbreaks with Proactive Safety Reasoning
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2

Universal Magic Word Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in text embedding models used as safeguards for Large Language Models (LLMs). Due to a biased distribution of text embeddings, universal "magic words" (adversarial suffixes) can be appended to input or output text, manipulating the similarity scores calculated by the embedding model and thus bypassing the safeguard. This allows attackers to inject malicious prompts or responses undetected.

Jailbreaking LLMs' Safeguard with Universal Magic Words for Text Embedding Models
Evaluated models: E5 Base v2, Jina Embeddings v2, Nomic Embed+2 more
  • E5 Base v2
  • Jina Embeddings v2
  • Nomic Embed
  • Qwen 2.5 0.5B
  • Sentence-T5 Base

Guardrail Bypass Harmful Fine-tuning

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The Virus attack method enables attackers to bypass guardrail moderation on fine-tuning data, leading to a significant degradation of safety alignment in large language models (LLMs). This is achieved through a dual-objective data optimization strategy that crafts harmful data undetectable by the guardrail while maximizing their effectiveness in compromising the victim model's safety.

Virus: Harmful Fine-tuning Attack for Large Language Models Bypassing Guardrail Moderation
Evaluated models: Llama 3 8B, Llama Guard 2

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.