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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

670 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Logic-Based LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing safety mechanisms based on token-level distribution analysis are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack exploiting distributional discrepancies between alignment data and formally expressed logical statements. The vulnerability allows malicious actors to bypass safety restrictions by translating harmful natural language prompts into equivalent first-order logic expressions. The LLM, trained primarily on natural language, fails to recognize the harmful intent…

Logic Jailbreak: Efficiently Unlocking LLM Safety Restrictions Through Formal Logical Expression
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, DeepSeek V3, GPT-3.5 Turbo+4 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • DeepSeek V3
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Llama 3 70B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

Multilingual LLM Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multilingual prompt injection vulnerability in four closed-source Large Language Models (LLMs): GPT-4o, DeepSeek-R1, Gemini-1.5-Pro, and Qwen-Max. Attackers can bypass safety restrictions and elicit harmful or disallowed content by crafting prompts in English or Chinese, leveraging specific structural techniques (e.g., "Two Sides" prompting) that exploit inconsistencies in the models' safety alignment across languages and prompt formats.

The Tower of Babel Revisited: Multilingual Jailbreak Prompts on Closed-Source Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o+1 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Qwen Max

SLM Imperceptible Noise Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

An adversarial audio perturbation vulnerability exists in open-source Speech Language Models (SLMs), specifically Qwen2-Audio-7B-Instruct and LLaMa-Omni. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to bypass safety alignment mechanisms and jailbreak the model by injecting imperceptible adversarial noise into audio prompts. By utilizing white-box access and Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) optimization, an attacker can manipulate the continuous speech signal to trigger harmful responses (e.g…

SPIRIT: Patching Speech Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks
Evaluated models: Qwen 2 7B

LLM Self-Introspection Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) that allows attackers to manipulate the model's output by modifying token log probabilities. Attackers can use a lightweight plug-in model (BiasNet) to subtly alter the probabilities, steering the LLM toward generating harmful content even when safety mechanisms are in place. This attack requires only access to the top-k token log probabilities returned by the LLM's API, without needing model weights or internal access.

JULI: Jailbreak Large Language Models by Self-Introspection
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3 8B Instruct+3 more
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Qwen 2 1.5B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct

Latent-Space Jailbreak Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The LARGO attack exploits a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety mechanisms through the generation of "stealthy" adversarial prompts. The attack leverages gradient optimization in the LLM's continuous latent space to craft seemingly innocuous natural language suffixes which, when appended to harmful prompts, elicit unsafe responses. The vulnerability stems from the LLM's inability to reliably distinguish between benign and maliciously crafted latent…

LARGO: Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization for Jailbreaking LLMs
Evaluated models: Llama 2 13B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat, Phi 3 Mini+1 more
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Phi 3 Mini
  • Qwen 2.5 14B

Adversarial Suffix Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv
Research ID 84145909

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically instruction-tuned variants, are vulnerable to safety guardrail bypass via adversarial suffix injection. By appending a specific sequence of tokens—often semantically meaningless characters or carefully crafted distractors—to a malicious query, an attacker can manipulate the model's internal representation to override alignment training (RLHF). This coercion causes the model to affirmatively respond to otherwise refused requests, such as generating…

Adversarial Suffix Filtering: a Defense Pipeline for LLMs
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, Llama 2 7B+2 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Mistral 7B

Exponentiated Gradient Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in several open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) allows attackers using exponentiated gradient descent to craft adversarial prompts that cause the models to generate harmful or unintended outputs, effectively "jailbreaking" the safety alignment mechanisms. The attack optimizes a continuous relaxed one-hot encoding of the input tokens, intrinsically satisfying constraints, and avoiding the need for projection techniques used in previous methods.

Adversarial Attack on Large Language Models using Exponentiated Gradient Descent
Evaluated models: Beaver 7B v1.0 Cost, Falcon 7B Instruct, Llama 2 7B Chat+4 more
  • Beaver 7B v1.0 Cost
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B v0.3
  • MPT 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

SLM Quantization Direct Harms

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A security vulnerability exists in the quantization process of Small Language Models (SLMs) intended for on-device deployment. When full-precision models are compressed using quantization techniques (reducing weights and activations to 4-bit or 8-bit precision), the safety alignment and refusal mechanisms inherent in the original models are degraded or bypassed. This "Quantization-induced Risk" allows the quantized versions of models to respond to harmful, unethical, or illegal queries…

LiteLMGuard: Seamless and Lightweight On-Device Prompt Filtering for Safeguarding Small Language Models against Quantization-induced Risks and …
Evaluated models: Phi-3

Universal VLLM Visual Bypass

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in Vision-Language Models (VLLMs) that allows for transferable, targeted adversarial attacks. Attackers can generate adversarial image perturbations using an ensemble of open-source surrogate models (primarily CLIP-based visual encoders) which effectively transfer to proprietary, black-box VLLMs. The attack leverages a specific optimization framework that combines a Visual Contrastive Loss with multiple positive/negative visual examples, rather than relying solely on…

Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Black-Box Vision-Language Models
Evaluated models: Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct, Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct+6 more
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 7B Instruct
  • Qwen 2.5 VL 72B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 90B Vision Instruct
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Claude 3.7 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro

Targeted Noise Injection Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allows bypassing safety mechanisms through targeted noise injection. Explainable AI (XAI) techniques reveal specific layers within the LLM architecture most responsible for content filtering. Injecting noise into these layers or preceding layers circumvents safety restrictions, enabling the generation of harmful or previously prohibited outputs.

XBreaking: Understanding how LLMs security alignment can be broken
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 1B, Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 0.5B+4 more
  • Llama 3.2 1B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 0.5B
  • Qwen 2.5 3B
  • Gemma 2B
  • Gemma 7B
  • Mistral 7B v0.3

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.