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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

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410 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Fast Adaptive LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial prompting attacks, where a crafted suffix appended to an instruction causes the LLM to generate unsafe or harmful content. The AdvPrompter technique trains a separate LLM to generate these adversarial suffixes, rapidly bypassing LLM safety mechanisms. The generated suffixes are human-readable and contextually relevant, making them harder to detect than previous methods. The attack is effective against both open-source and closed-source…

Advprompter: Fast adaptive adversarial prompting for llms
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+6 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Pythia-12B-chat
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Amplified Adversarial Suffix Generation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks using adversarially generated suffixes. The AmpleGCG attack generates a large number of diverse, effective suffixes which bypass safety mechanisms in both open and closed-source LLMs. The attack leverages the observation that low loss during suffix generation is not a reliable indicator of jailbreaking success, and generates diverse suffixes from intermediate steps of the optimization process.

Amplegcg: Learning a universal and transferable generative model of adversarial suffixes for jailbreaking both open and closed llms
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 2 7B Chat+2 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B

Logic-Chain Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass LLM safety mechanisms and elicit malicious content by injecting a chain of benign, semantically equivalent narrations into a seemingly innocuous article. The LLM connects these scattered narrations, effectively executing the malicious intent hidden within the seemingly benign context. This differs from previous attacks which directly embed malicious prompts, making detection by both LLMs and human reviewers more difficult.

Hidden You Malicious Goal Into Benigh Narratives: Jailbreak Large Language Models through Logic Chain Injection
Evaluated models: BERT, GPT-4, PaLM 2

Vocabulary-Guided LLM Hijacking

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a vocabulary attack where carefully selected words from the model's vocabulary, identified using an optimization procedure and embeddings from another LLM, are inserted into user prompts. This manipulation can cause the target LLM to generate specific undesired outputs (goal hijacking), such as offensive language or false information, even with minimal word insertions. The attack is difficult to detect because the inserted words may appear…

Vocabulary Attack to Hijack Large Language Model Applications
Evaluated models: Flan-T5 XXL, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 2 Chat+1 more
  • Flan-T5 XXL
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 Chat
  • T5 Base

LLM Fake News Generation

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel prompting technique, "conditional Variational-autoencoder-Like Prompt" (VLPrompt), which enables the generation of highly convincing fake news articles. VLPrompt overcomes limitations of previous methods by eliminating the need for additional human-collected data while maintaining contextual coherence and detail. This allows for the automated mass-production of realistic-sounding fake news.

Exploring the deceptive power of llm-generated fake news: A study of real-world detection challenges
Evaluated models: Not reported

LLM Distraction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel black-box jailbreak attack, termed "Distraction-based Adversarial Prompts" (DAP). DAP leverages the distractibility and over-confidence of LLMs by concealing malicious queries within complex, unrelated prompts. A memory-reframing mechanism further redirects the LLM's attention away from the distracting context and toward the malicious query, causing the model to bypass safety mechanisms and generate harmful or unintended outputs.

Tastle: Distract large language models for automatic jailbreak attack
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-3.5-1106), GPT-4+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-3.5-1106)
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama-2-sys
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Diverse Jailbreak Optimization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that utilize an optimized algorithm to bypass safety mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from the redundancy in existing trigger-searching algorithms, resulting in inefficient exploration of the prompt space and allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses. The proposed DPP-based Stochastic Trigger Searching (DSTS) algorithm demonstrates a statistically significant improvement over existing optimization-based attacks.

Enhancing Jailbreak Attacks with Diversity Guidance
Evaluated models: Alpaca 7B, Gemma 7B IT, GPT-3.5 Turbo+10 more
  • Alpaca 7B
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 33B
  • Vicuna 7B
  • Wizard Vicuna 13B

Personalized Encryption Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in several Large Language Models (LLMs) allowing attackers to bypass safety and ethical protocols through a novel code injection technique using personalized encryption and decryption functions. The attack leverages the LLMs' code execution capabilities to process encrypted malicious instructions, circumventing the intent security recognition mechanism.

Codechameleon: Personalized encryption framework for jailbreaking large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4-1106, Llama 2 13B Chat+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4-1106
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Rainbow Teaming LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial prompts generated by the Rainbow Teaming technique. Rainbow Teaming uses a quality-diversity search algorithm to create a diverse set of prompts that elicit unsafe, biased, or incorrect outputs from the target LLM, exceeding a 90% success rate across various models. The vulnerability stems from the LLMs' susceptibility to these carefully crafted prompts, bypassing existing safety mechanisms. These prompts are highly transferable across…

Rainbow teaming: Open-ended generation of diverse adversarial prompts
Evaluated models: Codellama 34B Instruct, CodeLlama 7B Instruct, GPT-4+6 more
  • Codellama 34B Instruct
  • CodeLlama 7B Instruct
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3-instruct 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5

Embedding-Translated Adversarial Suffixes

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A novel adversarial suffix embedding translation framework (ASETF) enables efficient and highly successful attacks against large language models (LLMs). ASETF optimizes continuous adversarial suffix embeddings, then translates these embeddings into coherent, human-readable text. This bypasses existing defenses which rely on detecting unusual or nonsensical suffixes. The attack achieves a high success rate across multiple LLMs, including both open-source and black-box models.

ASETF: A Novel Method for Jailbreak Attack on LLMs through Translate Suffix Embeddings
Evaluated models: Alpaca 7B (Safe-RLHF), ChatGLM3 6B, GPT-3.5 Turbo+6 more
  • Alpaca 7B (Safe-RLHF)
  • ChatGLM3 6B
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-J 6B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Mistral 7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.5
  • Vicuna 13B v1.5

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.