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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

539 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 3/4/2025

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit increased responsiveness to prompts framed within positive narratives. The Happy Ending Attack (HEA) exploits this by embedding malicious requests within a positive-sentiment scenario culminating in a happy ending. This allows the LLM to generate responses that fulfill the malicious request while perceiving the overall prompt as benign.

Dagger Behind Smile: Fool LLMs with a Happy Ending Story
Evaluated models: Gemini Flash, Gemini Pro, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 2/2/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) used in hate speech detection systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and model stealing, resulting in evasion of hate speech detection. Adversarial attacks modify hate speech text to evade detection, while model stealing creates surrogate models that mimic the target system's behavior.

HateBench: Benchmarking Hate Speech Detectors on LLM-Generated Content and Hate Campaigns
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2, Dolly 2, GPT-3.5 Turbo +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Large Language Model (LLM) based search engines utilizing Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) are vulnerable to ranking manipulation attacks via indirect prompt injection. Adversaries can embed optimized adversarial triggers or crafted semantic patterns within external webpage content. When these manipulated documents are retrieved and integrated into the LLM's context window alongside a user query, the adversarial content disrupts the model's contextual understanding. This results in the LLM…

Dynamics of adversarial attacks on large language model-based search engines
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Voting-based Large Language Model (LLM) leaderboards, such as Chatbot Arena, are vulnerable to adversarial ranking manipulation due to insufficient response anonymity. While these systems obscure model identities during head-to-head comparisons to prevent bias, an attacker can de-anonymize the models with high accuracy (>95%) by analyzing response content. The attack functions in two stages: (1) Re-identification, where the attacker submits specific prompts (identity-probing or stylometric…

Exploring and mitigating adversarial manipulation of voting-based leaderboards
Evaluated models: Llama 3.1 70B

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 2/2/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that skillfully decompose malicious requests into seemingly benign interactions, progressively guiding the dialogue towards harmful outputs. This vulnerability allows attackers to bypass LLM safety mechanisms through a series of strategically crafted prompts, exploiting the model's iterative response generation. The attack's success hinges on dynamically adapting each prompt based on the LLM's previous responses…

Siren: A Learning-Based Multi-Turn Attack Framework for Simulating Real-World Human Jailbreak Behaviors
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 2/2/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to malicious prompts disguised as summaries of scientific papers, even when those papers are fabricated by the attacker. This allows attackers to manipulate LLMs into generating responses exhibiting significantly increased stereotypical bias and toxicity. The vulnerability is exacerbated by multi-turn interactions, where bias scores tend to increase with each subsequent response. The inclusion of author names and publication venues in the fabricated…

LLMs are Vulnerable to Malicious Prompts Disguised as Scientific Language
Evaluated models: Command R+, GPT-4, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 1/26/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a self-instruct few-shot jailbreaking attack that leverages pattern and behavior learning to bypass safety mechanisms. The attack efficiently induces harmful outputs by injecting a strategically chosen response prefix into the model's prompt and exploiting the model's tendency to mimic co-occurrence patterns of special tokens preceding the prefix. This allows the attacker to elicit unsafe responses with a small number of carefully crafted…

Self-Instruct Few-Shot Jailbreaking: Decompose the Attack into Pattern and Behavior Learning
Evaluated models: GPT-2, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 3/4/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing alignment techniques for safety embed a "safety classifier" within their architecture. This classifier, responsible for determining whether an input is safe or unsafe, can be approximated by extracting a surrogate classifier from a subset of the LLM's architecture. Attackers can leverage this surrogate classifier to more effectively craft adversarial inputs (jailbreaks) that bypass the LLM's intended safety mechanisms. The attack success rate against the…

Targeting Alignment: Extracting Safety Classifiers of Aligned LLMs
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 9B IT, Gemma 7B IT, Granite 3.1 8B Instruct +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 1/1/2025
Analyzed 3/19/2025

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial prompt engineering attacks that leverage proximity constraints to elicit harmful behaviors. By subtly modifying benign prompts within a semantically close embedding space, attackers can bypass existing safety mechanisms and induce undesired outputs, even when the original prompts would not trigger such a response. This vulnerability exploits the model's sensitivity to small perturbations in the input embedding, resulting in the…

Text-Diffusion Red-Teaming of Large Language Models: Unveiling Harmful Behaviors with Proximity Constraints
Evaluated models: GPT-2, Llama 2 7B Chat, Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

Published 12/1/2024
Analyzed 12/29/2024

Large Language Models (LLMs) employing prefix-forcing safety measures are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks if the set of "safe" prefixes is insufficiently diverse or does not account for model-specific response styles. Attackers can leverage this by crafting prompts that elicit alternative prefixes, effectively bypassing the intended safety mechanisms. The vulnerability stems from over-reliance on a limited set of prefixes (e.g., "Sure, here is...") and a failure to generalize safety mechanisms…

AdvPrefix: An Objective for Nuanced LLM Jailbreaks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.