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Updated 7/21/2026, database is current

Language Model Security Database

959 research findings · 1077 evaluated models

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608 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Many-Shot Jailbreaking (MSJ) is an adversarial technique that circumvents the safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) by exploiting their In-Context Learning (ICL) capabilities and extended context windows. By embedding a large number of "shots" (fake dialogue examples) within a single prompt—where a simulated assistant complies with harmful requests—the attacker conditions the model to ignore its safety training. As the number of malicious examples increases (following a power-law…

Mitigating Many-Shot Jailbreaking
Affects: Llama 3.1 8B

Source: arXiv

Updated 12/30/2025

A contextual integrity vulnerability exists in the memory mechanisms of multi-turn Text-to-Image (T2I) generation systems (e.g., those integrating Large Language Models with diffusion models). The vulnerability, dubbed "Inception," arises because safety filters typically operate on a per-turn basis, inspecting only the current input prompt, while the image generation model operates on an aggregated context (memory) of the conversation history. An attacker can exploit this discrepancy by…

Inception: Jailbreak the memory mechanism of text-to-image generation systems
Affects: GPT-3.5, GPT-4o, GPT-5 +3 more

Source: arXiv

Multilingual and multi-accent audio inputs, combined with acoustic adversarial perturbations (reverberation, echo, whisper effects), can bypass safety mechanisms in Large Audio Language Models (LALMs), causing them to generate unsafe or harmful outputs. The vulnerability is amplified by the interaction between acoustic and linguistic variations, particularly in languages with less training data.

Multilingual and Multi-Accent Jailbreaking of Audio LLMs
Affects: DIVA Llama 3 v0 8B, MERaLion AudioLLM, MiniCPM-o 2.6 +2 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability exists in multiple LLMs allowing attackers to elicit harmful responses by strategically distributing malicious intent across multiple turns in a conversation. The vulnerability is not detected by single-turn safety measures, as the harmful intent is only revealed through a sequence of seemingly benign prompts. The vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of techniques such as prompt optimization that dynamically adjust prompts based on model responses, maximizing the likelihood…

X-teaming: Multi-turn jailbreaks and defenses with adaptive multi-agents
Affects: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3 +7 more

Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems allows for a permutation-invariant adversarial prompt attack. By strategically partitioning adversarial prompts and routing them through a network topology, an attacker can bypass distributed safety mechanisms, even those with token bandwidth limitations and asynchronous message delivery. The attack optimizes prompt propagation as a maximum-flow minimum-cost problem, maximizing success while minimizing detection.

Agents Under Siege: Breaking Pragmatic Multi-Agent LLM Systems with Optimized Prompt Attacks
Affects: DeepSeek R1 Distill, Gemma 2 9B, Llama 2 7B +7 more

Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack, dubbed PiCo, that leverages token-level typographic attacks on images embedded within code-style instructions. The attack bypasses multi-tiered defense mechanisms, including input filtering and runtime monitoring, by exploiting weaknesses in the visual modality's integration with programming contexts. Harmful intent is concealed within visually benign image fragments and code instructions, circumventing safety…

PiCo: Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models via Pictorial Code Contextualization
Affects: Gemini 1.0 Pro Vision, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o +2 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) with user-controlled response prefilling features are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack. By manipulating the prefilled text, attackers can influence the model's subsequent token generation, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting harmful or unintended outputs. Two attack vectors are demonstrated: Static Prefilling (SP), using a fixed prefill string, and Optimized Prefilling (OP), iteratively optimizing the prefill string for maximum impact. The vulnerability…

Prefill-Based Jailbreak: A Novel Approach of Bypassing LLM Safety Boundary
Affects: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, DeepSeek V3 +3 more

Source: arXiv

LLM agents utilizing external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into the external data accessed by the agent, manipulating its behavior even when defenses against direct prompt injection are in place. Adaptive attacks, which modify the injected payload based on the specific defense mechanism, consistently bypass existing defenses with a success rate exceeding 50%.

Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents
Affects: Llama 3 8B, Vicuna 7B

Source: arXiv

Multi-agent systems (MAS) utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) orchestration are vulnerable to control-flow hijacking via indirect prompt injection, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability arises when a sub-agent (e.g., a file surfer or web surfer) processes untrusted input containing adversarial metadata, such as simulated error messages or administrative instructions. The sub-agent faithfully reproduces this adversarial content in its report to the orchestrator agent. The…

Multi-agent systems execute arbitrary malicious code
Affects: GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini, Gemini 1.5 Pro +1 more

Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn adversarial attacks that exploit incremental policy erosion. The attacker uses a breadth-first search strategy to generate multiple prompts at each turn, leveraging partial compliance from previous responses to gradually escalate the conversation towards eliciting disallowed outputs. Minor concessions accumulate, ultimately leading to complete circumvention of safety measures.

Siege: Autonomous Multi-Turn Jailbreaking of Large Language Models with Tree Search
Affects: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Llama 3.1 70B

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.