Language Model Security Database

IntentionReasoner, specifically the 1.5B and 3B parameter versions optimized via Reinforcement Learning (RL), contains a safety regression vulnerability where the RL alignment process degrades the model's resistance to jailbreak attacks compared to the Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) baseline. While RL improves general utility and rewriting quality, it inadvertently increases the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for adversarial inputs in smaller architectures. This allows sophisticated jailbreak prompts…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to an adaptive black-box jailbreaking framework named MAJIC (Markovian Adaptive Jailbreaking via Iterative Composition). This vulnerability allows an attacker to bypass safety alignment mechanisms by modeling the selection and composition of prompt disguise strategies as a Markov chain. Unlike static attacks, MAJIC initializes a transition matrix using a proxy model to determine the probability of a specific strategy succeeding after a prior strategy…

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) employed in autonomous driving (AD) systems are vulnerable to a physically realizable adversarial patch attack dubbed "PhysPatch." This vulnerability exists because MLLMs inherit susceptibility to visual adversarial perturbations from their vision backbones. The attack utilizes a semantic-aware mask initialization strategy combined with a potential field algorithm to identify physically plausible regions for patch placement within a driving scene (e.g…

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to knowledge poisoning attacks (specifically the "PoisonedRAG" method) where an attacker injects adversarial texts into the retrieval knowledge database. These adversarial texts are optimized to achieve two simultaneous goals: 1) rank highly (top-k) during the retrieval phase for specific target queries, and 2) semantically steer the Large Language Model (LLM) to generate a pre-defined, attacker-chosen response instead of the ground…

A vulnerability exists in LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) where an attacker with control over the communication network can perform a multi-round, adaptive, and stealthy message tampering attack. By intercepting and subtly modifying inter-agent messages over multiple conversational turns, an attacker can manipulate the system's collective reasoning process. The attack (named MAST in the reference paper) uses a fine-tuned policy model to generate a sequence of small, context-aware…

Large Language Models (LLMs) implementing "Thinking Mode" (also known as Reasoning Mode or Chain-of-Thought) exhibit a heightened susceptibility to jailbreak attacks compared to their non-reasoning counterparts. When a model is prompted to reason step-by-step (often delimited by specific tokens like <think> and </think>), the internal reasoning process frequently overrides safety alignment training. Research indicates that during the generation of the thinking chain, the model often…

A universal prompt injection vulnerability, termed "Involuntary Jailbreak," affects multiple large language models. The attack uses a single prompt that instructs the model to learn a pattern from abstract string operators (X and Y). The model is then asked to generate its own examples of questions that should be refused (harmful questions) and provide detailed, non-refusal answers to them, in order to satisfy the learned operator logic. This reframes the generation of harmful content as a…

A logic-based jailbreak vulnerability exists in Large Language Models (LLMs) known as "PUZZLED," where safety alignment mechanisms are bypassed by embedding harmful instructions within word-based puzzles. The attacker identifies sensitive keywords in a malicious prompt, masks them (e.g., replacing "bomb" with "[WORD1]"), and presents the masked terms as a cognitive task—specifically Word Searches, Anagrams, or Crosswords—accompanied by linguistic clues (word length, part-of-speech, and…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreak attack termed Paper Summary Attack (PSA). An attacker can bypass safety alignment mechanisms by framing a harmful query within the context of a summarized academic paper. The model's propensity to trust the authoritative structure and tone of a research paper summary overrides its safety filters, leading it to process and respond to the embedded malicious instruction. The vulnerability is particularly potent when using summaries of…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to activation steering attacks that bypass safety and privacy mechanisms. By manipulating internal attention head activations using lightweight linear probes trained on refusal/disclosure behavior, an attacker can induce the model to reveal Personally Identifiable Information (PII) memorized during training, including sensitive attributes like sexual orientation, relationships, and life events. The attack does not require adversarial prompts or…