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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

410 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

DRL-Guided LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based attack, termed RLbreaker, demonstrates the ability to more efficiently generate jailbreaking prompts for large language models (LLMs) than existing methods. The attack leverages a DRL agent to guide the search for effective prompt structures, bypassing safety mechanisms and eliciting undesirable responses to harmful questions. The effectiveness stems from the DRL agent's ability to strategically select prompt mutators, rather than relying on random…

When LLM Meets DRL: Advancing Jailbreaking Efficiency via DRL-guided Search
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 70B Chat, Llama 2 7B Chat+3 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mixtral 8x7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Hidden Structure Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks exploiting uncommon text-encoded structures (UTES) rarely encountered during training. These UTES, such as JSON, tree representations, or LaTeX code, embedded within prompts, cause LLMs to bypass safety mechanisms and generate harmful content. The attack's success stems from the LLM's difficulty in processing and interpreting these unusual structures, coupled with the obfuscation of malicious instructions within the structured…

StructuralSleight: Automated Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models Utilizing Uncommon Text-Encoded Structure
Evaluated models: Claude 2, Claude 3 Opus, GPT-3.5 Turbo+3 more
  • Claude 2
  • Claude 3 Opus
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 70B

LLM Robot Bias & Violence

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) used to control robots exhibit biases leading to discriminatory and unsafe behaviors. When provided with personal characteristics (e.g., race, gender, disability), LLMs generate biased outputs resulting in discriminatory actions (e.g., assigning lower rescue priority to certain groups) and accept or deem feasible dangerous or unlawful instructions (e.g., removing a person's mobility aid).

Llm-driven robots risk enacting discrimination, violence, and unlawful actions
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Mistral 7B

RL-Powered LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

RL-JACK is a reinforcement learning-based black-box attack that generates jailbreaking prompts to bypass safety mechanisms in LLMs. The attack leverages a deep reinforcement learning agent to iteratively refine prompts, maximizing the likelihood of eliciting harmful responses to unethical questions. The effectiveness stems from a novel reward function that provides continuous feedback based on cosine similarity to a reference answer from an unaligned LLM, and an action space that strategically…

RL-JACK: Reinforcement Learning-powered Black-box Jailbreaking Attack against LLMs
Evaluated models: Falcon-40B-instruct, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 70B Chat+3 more
  • Falcon-40B-instruct
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 70B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Vicuna 13B
  • Vicuna 7B

Bi-Modal Adversarial Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to a bi-modal adversarial prompt attack (BAP). BAP leverages a combined textual and visual prompt to bypass safety mechanisms and elicit harmful responses, even in models designed to resist single-modality attacks. The attack first introduces a query-agnostic adversarial perturbation to the visual prompt, making the model more likely to respond positively regardless of the text. Then, an LLM refines the textual prompt iteratively to achieve…

Jailbreak Vision Language Models via Bi-Modal Adversarial Prompt
Evaluated models: Not reported

Black-Box Query Optimization Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a black-box query-response optimization attack (QROA). QROA iteratively refines a malicious prompt suffix using a surrogate model to maximize a reward function that measures the likelihood of eliciting harmful content from the LLM. This attack does not require access to the model's internal parameters or logits; it operates solely via standard query-response interactions.

QROA: A Black-Box Query-Response Optimization Attack on LLMs
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, Llama 2 7B Chat, Mistral 7B Instruct+1 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna-1.3 (7B)

Few-Shot LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability in aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) allows circumvention of safety mechanisms through improved few-shot jailbreaking techniques. The attack leverages injection of special system tokens (e.g., [/INST]) into few-shot demonstrations and demo-level random search to optimize the probability of generating harmful responses. This bypasses defenses that rely on perplexity filtering and input perturbation.

Improved few-shot jailbreaking can circumvent aligned language models and their defenses
Evaluated models: GPT-4, Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B+4 more
  • GPT-4
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Mistral 7B
  • OpenChat 3.5
  • Qwen 1.5 7B Chat
  • Starling LM 7B

I-GCG: Accelerated LLM Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to improved optimization-based jailbreaking attacks. The vulnerability stems from the susceptibility of LLMs to crafted prompts that exploit weaknesses in their safety mechanisms, allowing them to generate harmful responses despite safety training. This vulnerability is exacerbated by the use of diverse target templates containing harmful self-suggestions and guidance within the optimization goal, accelerating the convergence of the attack.

Improved techniques for optimization-based jailbreaking on large language models
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4, Guanaco 7B+4 more
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4
  • Guanaco 7B
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Mistral-7B-instruct-0.2
  • Starling-7B-alpha
  • Vicuna-7B-1.5

Silent Token Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to enhanced jailbreak attacks by appending multiple end-of-sentence (EOS) tokens to malicious prompts. This bypasses internal safety mechanisms, causing the LLM to respond to harmful queries that it would otherwise reject. The EOS tokens subtly shift the LLM’s internal representation of the prompt, making it appear less harmful without significantly altering the semantic meaning of the malicious content.

Enhancing jailbreak attack against large language models through silent tokens
Evaluated models: Gemma 2B, Gemma 7B IT, Llama 2 13B Chat+9 more
  • Gemma 2B
  • Gemma 7B IT
  • Llama 2 13B Chat
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • MPT 7B Chat
  • Qwen 1.5 7B Chat
  • Tulu-2-13B
  • Tulu-2-7B
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3
  • Vicuna-7B-1.5

Cipher-Character Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

A vulnerability allows attackers to bypass Large Language Model (LLM) moderation guardrails by using specially crafted prompts containing "cipher characters." These characters, strategically placed within the prompt's output, alter the LLM's response to reduce its "harm" score, enabling the generation of content that would otherwise be blocked. The attack leverages a jailbreak prefix combined with a malicious question and cipher characters to bypass both input and output level filters. This…

Jailbreaking Large Language Models Against Moderation Guardrails via Cipher Characters
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.