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Last analyzed Sep 9, 2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1119 evaluated models

Filtered research findings

556 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

LLM Syntax Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to structure transformation attacks, where malicious prompts are encoded in diverse syntax spaces (e.g., SQL, JSON, LLM-generated syntaxes) to bypass safety mechanisms. These attacks maintain the harmful intent while altering the linguistic structure, making detection based on token-level patterns ineffective.

StructTransform: A Scalable Attack Surface for Safety-Aligned Large Language Models
Evaluated models: BERT, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4o+5 more
  • BERT
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3 8B
  • Llama 3.2 3B
  • Llama 3.2 90B
  • Mistral 7B
  • o1

Learned Instruction Rewriting Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to "Rewrite to Jailbreak" (R2J) attacks. R2J exploits the models' safety mechanisms by iteratively rewriting harmful prompts, subtly altering wording to bypass safety filters while maintaining the original malicious intent. This differs from previous methods which rely on adding extraneous prefixes/suffixes or creating forced instruction-following scenarios, thus being more difficult to detect.

Rewrite to Jailbreak: Discover Learnable and Transferable Implicit Harmfulness Instruction
Evaluated models: Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Llama 2 7B Chat+1 more
  • Gemini Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B

Reasoning-Augmented Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks leveraging the model's reasoning capabilities. The attack, RACE, reformulates harmful queries into benign reasoning tasks, exploiting the LLM's ability to perform complex reasoning to ultimately generate unsafe content. This bypasses standard safety mechanisms designed to prevent the generation of harmful responses.

Reasoning-Augmented Conversation for Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models
Evaluated models: DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking+6 more
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking
  • Gemma 2 9B
  • GLM 4 9B Chat
  • GPT-4
  • GPT-4o
  • o1
  • Qwen 2 7B Instruct

Multimodal Distraction Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to a jailbreaking attack leveraging a "Distraction Hypothesis". The attack, termed Contrasting Subimage Distraction Jailbreaking (CS-DJ), bypasses safety mechanisms by using multiple contrasting subimages and a decomposed harmful prompt to overwhelm the model's attention and reduce its ability to identify malicious content. The complexity of the visual input, rather than its specific content, is the key to successful exploitation.

Distraction is All You Need for Multimodal Large Language Model Jailbreaking
Evaluated models: Gemini 1.5 Flash, GPT-4o, GPT-4o Mini+1 more
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • GPT-4o
  • GPT-4o Mini
  • GPT-4V

CRI Jailbreak Initialization

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

CRI (Compliance Refusal Initialization) initializes jailbreak attacks by leveraging pre-trained jailbreak prompts, effectively guiding the optimization process towards the compliance subspace of harmful prompts. This significantly enhances the success rate and reduces the computational overhead of attacks, often requiring only a single optimization step to bypass safety mechanisms. Attacks utilizing CRI demonstrate significantly improved ASR (Adversarial Success Rate) and reduced median steps…

Jailbreak Attack Initializations as Extractors of Compliance Directions
Evaluated models: Falcon 7B Instruct, Llama 2 7B Chat, Llama 3 8B Instruct+5 more
  • Falcon 7B Instruct
  • Llama 2 7B Chat
  • Llama 3 8B Instruct
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.2
  • Mistral 7B Instruct v0.3
  • Phi-4
  • Qwen 2.5 Coder 7B Instruct
  • Vicuna 7B v1.3

Query Code Jailbreak

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to QueryAttack, a novel jailbreak technique that leverages structured, non-natural query languages (e.g., SQL, URL formats, or other programming language constructs) to bypass safety alignment mechanisms. The attack translates malicious natural language queries into these structured formats, exploiting the LLM's ability to understand and process such languages without triggering safety filters designed for natural language prompts. The LLM then…

QueryAttack: Jailbreaking Aligned Large Language Models Using Structured Non-natural Query Language
Evaluated models: DeepSeek Chat, DeepSeek R1, Gemini 1.5 Flash+11 more
  • DeepSeek Chat
  • DeepSeek R1
  • Gemini 1.5 Flash
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-3.5 Turbo
  • GPT-4 Turbo
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 70B Instruct
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 11B Vision Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 1B Instruct
  • Llama 3.2 3B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • o1

Agent Pipeline Simple Hacks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Commercial LLM-powered agents utilizing autonomous web access, memory modules, and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and environmental manipulation. Attackers can embed malicious instructions into external data sources trusted by the agent (such as Reddit posts, public databases, or ArXiv papers). When the agent autonomously retrieves and processes this content during task execution, it executes the embedded malicious commands. This vulnerability…

Commercial llm agents are already vulnerable to simple yet dangerous attacks
Evaluated models: Not reported

Word Sensitivity Attack Boost

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

The SMAB (Sensitivity-based Multi-Armed Bandit) framework introduces a vulnerability in text classifiers and Large Language Models (LLMs) by enabling efficient, black-box adversarial text generation. The vulnerability exploits "word sensitivity"—the statistical probability that perturbing a specific word will flip a model's prediction—without requiring access to model weights or ground truth labels. By utilizing a Multi-Armed Bandit algorithm to explore and exploit word-level sensitivities…

SMAB: MAB based word Sensitivity Estimation Framework and its Applications in Adversarial Text Generation
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5, Llama 2 7B, Llama 3.1 8B+1 more
  • GPT-3.5
  • Llama 2 7B
  • Llama 3.1 8B
  • Qwen 2.5 7B

LLM Self-Jailbreaking Attack

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) with refusal training are vulnerable to a "jailbreaking-to-jailbreak" (J2) attack. A J2 attack involves initially jailbreaking a powerful LLM to create a "J2 attacker." This attacker, instructed with general jailbreaking strategies, then autonomously attempts to jailbreak other LLMs, including potentially the same model it was derived from, by iteratively refining its attack based on previous attempts and in-context learning.

Jailbreaking to Jailbreak
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Haiku, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro+2 more
  • Claude 3.5 Haiku
  • Claude 3.5 Sonnet
  • Gemini 1.5 Pro
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 405B

Simple Interaction Jailbreaks

Published Analyzed Source: arXiv

Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to a novel jailbreak attack, "Speak Easy," which leverages common multi-step and multilingual interaction patterns to elicit harmful and actionable responses. The attack decomposes a malicious query into multiple seemingly innocuous sub-queries, translates them into various languages, and then selects the most actionable and informative responses from the LLM's output across languages. This bypasses existing safety mechanisms more effectively than…

Speak Easy: Eliciting Harmful Jailbreaks from LLMs with Simple Interactions
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Llama 3.3 70B Instruct+1 more
  • GPT-4o
  • Llama 3.1 8B Instruct
  • Llama 3.3 70B Instruct
  • Qwen 2 72B Instruct

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.

Discovery and publication are separate: new papers enter a candidate queue, then require human review and explicit approval before publication. Updates follow that review process, not a guaranteed daily publishing schedule. “Last analyzed” is the newest analysis date among published entries; it does not mean that all recent research has been covered.