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Last analyzed 9/9/2026

Language Model Security Database

985 research findings · 1123 evaluated models

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704 entries

Matches every word across titles, descriptions, sources, affected systems, and models.

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

The MIST attack exploits a vulnerability in black-box large language models (LLMs) allowing iterative semantic tuning of prompts to elicit harmful responses. The attack leverages synonym substitution and optimization strategies to bypass safety mechanisms without requiring access to the model's internal parameters or weights. The vulnerability lies in the susceptibility of the LLM to semantically similar prompts that trigger unsafe outputs.

MIST: Jailbreaking Black-box Large Language Models via Iterative Semantic Tuning
Evaluated models: Claude 3.5 Sonnet, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/8/2025

A vulnerability exists in the safety alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) (including GPT-4, Claude 3, Gemini, and Qwen families) leading to "Implicit Harm." Unlike traditional jailbreaks that use overtly harmful queries, this vulnerability allows remote attackers to coerce the model into providing factually incorrect, plausible, and dangerous responses to benign-looking inputs. By employing "JailFlip" techniques—specifically constructed affirmative-type or denial-type queries…

Beyond Jailbreaks: Revealing Stealthier and Broader LLM Security Risks Stemming from Alignment Failures
Evaluated models: GPT-4.1, GPT-4.1 Mini, GPT-4o +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Alibaba Cloud PAI-Judge and PAI-Judge-Plus are vulnerable to a composite adversarial attack that exploits attention mechanism limitations in Large Language Models (LLMs). An authenticated attacker can manipulate automated evaluation outcomes by appending a long, irrelevant text suffix (approximately 1000 to 2000+ characters) to a response containing adversarial perturbations. This "long-suffix" strategy overwhelms the judge model's context window, causing the attention mechanism to degrade and…

LLMs Cannot Reliably Judge (Yet?): A Comprehensive Assessment on the Robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge
Evaluated models: GPT-4o, Llama 3.1 8B, Llama 3.3 70B +3 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs), including Llama-3, Gemma-2, and Qwen2.5, are vulnerable to automated adversarial attacks generated via a Quality-Diversity Red-Teaming (QDRT) framework. This vulnerability arises from the models' inability to robustly defend against attackers trained via behavior-conditioned reinforcement learning that optimize for specific "goal-driven" behaviors. Unlike standard attacks that optimize solely for toxicity, QDRT trains a population of specialized attacker models to…

Quality-Diversity Red-Teaming: Automated Generation of High-Quality and Diverse Attackers for Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Llama 3.2 3B Instruct, Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, Gemma 2 2B IT +5 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

The Adaptive Greedy Binary Search (AGBS) framework exposes a vulnerability in Large Language Models (LLMs) regarding their susceptibility to semantic-preserving adversarial attacks. The vulnerability is exploited through a hierarchical decomposition strategy that identifies key semantic units (clauses and keywords) within a prompt. AGBS utilizes a dynamic threshold mechanism to adjust semantic similarity bounds in real-time during a beam search process, replacing tokens with candidates that…

Semantic-Preserving Prompt Hijacking: A Black-Box Adversarial Attack on Auto-Prompt Optimization
Evaluated models: GPT-3.5 Turbo, GPT-4 Turbo, GPT-4o +7 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

Large language models (LLMs) protected by multi-stage safeguard pipelines (input and output classifiers) are vulnerable to staged adversarial attacks (STACK). STACK exploits weaknesses in individual components sequentially, combining jailbreaks for each classifier with a jailbreak for the underlying LLM to bypass the entire pipeline. Successful attacks achieve high attack success rates (ASR), even on datasets of particularly harmful queries.

STACK: Adversarial Attacks on LLM Safeguard Pipelines
Evaluated models: Claude Opus 4, Gemma 2 9B, GPT-4 Turbo +4 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/9/2025

Safety alignment degradation occurs in Large Language Models (LLMs) such as Llama-2, Llama-3, and Qwen-2 when subjected to Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or Continual Pre-Training (CPT) on telecommunications domain datasets (TeleQnA, TeleData, TSpecLLM). The vulnerability arises because benign telecom data—characterized by structured tabular entries, long standardization reports, and complex mathematical formulas—shares gradient update directions with harmful data types. This results in…

SafeCOMM: What about Safety Alignment in Fine-Tuned Telecom Large Language Models?
Evaluated models: Llama 2 7B, Llama 3 8B, Llama 3.1 8B +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

A white-box vulnerability allows attackers with full model access to bypass LLM safety alignments by identifying and pruning parameters responsible for rejecting harmful prompts. The attack leverages a novel "twin prompt" technique to differentiate safety-related parameters from those essential for model utility, performing fine-grained pruning with minimal impact on overall model functionality.

TwinBreak: Jailbreaking LLM Security Alignments based on Twin Prompts
Evaluated models: DeepSeek 7B, Gemma 2 27B, Gemma 2 2B +13 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 12/30/2025

Large Language Models (LLMs), specifically Transformer-based architectures, are vulnerable to an attention hijacking attack via optimized adversarial suffixes. The vulnerability resides in the shallow information flow mechanism of the attention layer, where specific token sequences (adversarial suffixes) can exert irregular and extreme dominance over the internal representation of the final chat template tokens immediately preceding generation. This "hijacking" suppresses the representation of…

Universal Jailbreak Suffixes Are Strong Attention Hijackers
Evaluated models: Gemma 2 2B IT, Qwen 2.5 0.5B Instruct, Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct +2 more

Source: arXiv

Published 6/1/2025
Analyzed 7/14/2025

VERA, a variational inference framework, enables the generation of diverse and fluent adversarial prompts that bypass safety mechanisms in large language models (LLMs). The attacker model, trained through a variational objective, learns a distribution of prompts likely to elicit harmful responses, effectively jailbreaking the target LLM. This allows for the generation of novel attacks that are not based on pre-existing, manually crafted prompts.

VERA: Variational Inference Framework for Jailbreaking Large Language Models
Evaluated models: Baichuan 2 7B, Gemini Pro, GPT-3.5 Turbo +8 more

Source: arXiv

Research methodology

Entries summarize publicly available primary-source security research. Model names reflect only systems explicitly evaluated by the cited paper, and measurements are research-reported unless independent verification is stated.